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
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**Publications of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Division of International Law
Washington**

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

The European Background of the
Monroe Doctrine

BY

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FOREWORD

The Monroe Doctrine, which in a few months will celebrate its hundredth anniversary, is one of the few foreign policies advanced by any one of the nations taking part in the World War which bids fair to survive that great catastrophe. While the American and British phases of the Monroe Doctrine are familiar to students of diplomatic history, the materials have hitherto been lacking for an adequate appreciation of the relations between President Monroe and John Quincy Adams, on the one hand, and the Tsar, Alexander, on the other, against whose Holy Alliance President Monroe's message of 1823 was chiefly directed.

Mr. Cresson has laid students of history, and more especially of international organization, under a deep and abiding obligation by his researches in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office immediately following the Revolution of March, 1917. He was Secretary of the American Embassy at Petrograd at the time when Professor F. A. Golder was preparing his invaluable list of documents in the Imperial archives relating to America, and, knowing Mr. Cresson's interest in the history of Russian-American relations, the authorities of the Provisional Government invited him also to examine the Imperial archives. Mr. Cresson's work more especially related to the personal dispatches of the Tsar, Alexander, and the memoranda in his private diplomatic papers, which had never before been open to students.

In the midst of these labors, Mr. Cresson put aside the more leisurely task of writing history for the more arduous task of observing history in the making. He resigned from the diplomatic service, entered the army, served with the American Expeditionary Forces, and ended the war as Chief of the American Military Mission at Belgian Headquarters in Flanders. Upon his demobilization he resumed his interrupted task, and he has recently been able to bring his work to a conclusion by researches in the archives of the Department of State. While Mr. Cresson's work is complementary to the labors of others in the same field, it covers—as its title implies—negotiations carried on in St.

Petersburg and Washington, which form the European background of this American doctrine.

The value of the little work is out of all proportion to its size. It makes clear the aim and purpose of the Tsar, Alexander, in forcing the Holy Alliance upon his unwilling confederates, it shows the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Holy Alliance, and it enables the unprejudiced reader of the Old as well as the New World the better to understand both.

It is to the credit of our common humanity that at the end of the greatest of wars attempts have been made to devise some scheme whereby a recourse to arms might be less likely to occur, if it could not be wholly avoided. The Thirty Years' War is responsible for the *Nouveau Cynée* of Emeric Crucé, the *Law of War and Peace* of Hugo Grotius, not to speak of the *Great Design* which Sully foisted upon his master, the good King Henry IV. The wars of Europe culminating in the wars of the Spanish Succession and ended by the Treaties of Utrecht (1713-14) and of Rastadt (1714) produced the *Project of Perpetual Peace* of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. The wars of the French Revolution following these at the space of a century gave birth to the Holy Alliance. The World War, a hundred years later, has brought forth a League of Nations, conceived in the same generous spirit.

Will history repeat itself? History alone can tell.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,
Director.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
July 14, 1922.

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INTRODUCTION

Within a few months will occur the one hundredth anniversary of the reading of President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message to Congress. The three great Continental Powers to which its warnings were chiefly directed are today prostrate as the result of the World War. Yet the principles it defined have continued to furnish the basis of the foreign policy of the United States. Moreover, the eclipse of Russia, Prussia and Austria has but resulted in a renewal of the fundamental problem which confronted the diplomatists and statesmen of the Republic in 1823—a problem which in the words of Monroe regards essentially "the condition of the civilized world and its bearing on us."

The international questions which the trained diplomacy of Monroe and Adams was called upon to meet and decide a century ago were similar in a remarkable degree to those of the present day. Again the measure to be arrived at is: How far the conditions of the international situation justify the United States in departing from a system of isolation imposed by geographical conditions and a generally accepted, time-honored policy? How far may we abandon the restraints of this safeguarding principle, and at the earnest solicitation of friendly nations bear a part in agreements intended to maintain the general peace? At such a moment as the present one, to use once more the language of Monroe, "a precise knowledge of our relations with foreign powers as respects our negotiations and transactions with each" is indeed "particularly necessary."

The trend of American diplomacy towards a return to the "traditional prejudice" in favor of an American system apart from the affairs of Europe, has offered one of the chief problems confronting the statesmen of the Allied Powers since the close of the War. It is the author's belief that in the light of a renewed study of the events which led to the declarations of the Monroe manifesto, the motives underlying recent policy tend to justify themselves as the continuing result of historical experience. Examination of the archives of the Department of State and documents which have but recently become available in the Imperial Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prove the

similarity of earlier negotiations to those of the present day. Yet the story of the attempts made by the statesmen of Europe to detach the United States from their traditional policy (notably the efforts of the Tsar Idealist, Alexander I, to induce the government in Washington to accede to the pact of the Holy Alliance) forms an almost forgotten chapter of American diplomatic history.

A misunderstanding of the policies in opposition to which the Monroe Doctrine was formulated has frequently arisen from a failure to apprehend the nature of the strange pact known as the "Holy Alliance" or to establish its true relation to the series of treaties known as the "System of 1815." The latter formed the basis of the diplomatic reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic wars. The "Holy Alliance," or "Holy League," was, in its inception, an expression of the highly idealistic personal policy of a single powerful sovereign, the Tsar Alexander I of Russia. Of its three signers the Tsar, and the Tsar alone, affixed his seal without mental reservations concerning the principles it invoked. The System of 1815 resulted from a long series of debated agreements, beginning with the politico-military pacts of Toeplitz, Reichenbach and Chaumont, continued by the two Treaties of Paris and the Acts of the Congress of Vienna. The Tsar's "League of Peace" was suddenly imposed upon his allies at a time when the prestige of his military power was essential to their cause; when to do otherwise than humor his doctrinaire theories of international solidarity might have resulted in a serious breach in the ranks of the Grand Alliance.

In the perspective of history, the internationalist aspirations and purposes of the Russian autocrat may be viewed in their true sense and value. His contemporaries, however, may well be pardoned for considering his policies as contradictory and irreconcilable. Metternich and the reactionary statesmen of his school saw in Alexander a dangerous dreamer, a "crowned Jacobin" at almost the same time that Canning and Monroe were uniting the policies of the "Constitutional Powers" to protect the principles of free government from the interventions he set on foot in the interests of monarchical legitimacy *ab antiquo*. But in order to understand the Tsar's conception of his own diplomacy, a brief biographical study of the varied personal influences and relation-

ships which accompanied the changing phases of his political beliefs becomes essential.

Alexander was born in St. Petersburg on December 12, 1777. His celebrated grandmother, the Empress Catherine, undertook the entire direction of his early education, to the exclusion of his father, the morose and unpopular Tsarevitch Paul. With his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, his studies were regulated by an elaborate plan, drawn up by the great Tsarina herself after a long correspondence with the philosophers Grimm and Diderot in Paris. It seems to have been the deliberate intention of this remarkable woman to make the young heir of the Romanovs—if not a prodigy of learning¹—at least a well educated man, an attainment far above the level of the court circles surrounding him! That this intention was even in a measure carried out was largely due to her fortunate choice of a tutor for the little princes in the person of a French Swiss scholar, Frederick Cesar Laharpe, whom she found was occupying a subordinate position in the household of a brother of the reigning favorite, Count Landskoi.²

Laharpe was at this time thirty years old. He was an avowed republican, strongly influenced by Voltaire in his youth, and later an enthusiastic disciple of Rousseau. Strangely enough, none of these qualities were likely at this time to injure his prestige in the eyes of the autocratic Catherine. When, at a later date, the excesses of the French Revolution had disillusioned the Empress, her fashionable approval of liberalism (which she shared with the aristocratic salons of Paris) changed to a violent hatred of all that recalled the doctrines of Jacobinism. Until 1789, however, she saw no contradiction in choosing, for the important position of tutor to the heir of the absolute Tsars, a man of Laharpe's ultra-liberal convictions.³

From the beginning of their intimate relationship, the young master and his pupils appear to have been charmed with each

¹ Rain, *Un Tsar idéalogue Alexandre I^{er}*, pp. 7 et seq.

² For a vivid picture of the dissolute court which surrounded the youth of Alexander, notably the régime of Catherine's ignoble "favorites," see *The Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury*.

³ Rain, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19. Laharpe must not be confused with the critic Jean Francois de Le Harpe (1739-1803), whose *Correspondence with the Grand Duke of Russia, now Emperor* (the Emperor Paul), was published in five tedious volumes in 1801. This work, generally concerned with the petty jealousies of the French literary world, was probably addressed to Paul in a spirit of pure *snobisme*.

other. Laharpe, filled with youthful enthusiasm for his task, recognized its importance and the responsibility it entailed. In order to fulfil his mission to the best advantage, he soon obtained entire direction of all matters touching the education of the young Grand Dukes. History and a philosophical interpretation of the events it records was a favorite method of study for both the republican teacher and his imperial charges.

Besides Laharpe, several other foreign "governors" and teachers were attached to their household. Kraft taught them experimental physics and "science." Pallas taught them botany and took them on long excursions near Pavlovsk. Masson taught them mathematics. But regarding matters essentially Russian, Catherine wisely insisted that her grandchildren should remain under the control of their own compatriots. Muraviev taught them Russian history and "moral philosophy," while their religious education was placed in the hands of their confessor, Father Andrew Samborski. Alexander's devotion as a pupil foreshadowed the generally "suggestionable" character which he developed in after life. His teachers not only found him a diligent student—a great contrast to his brother Constantine—but he also appears to have become ardently attached to all those who could satisfy his precocious curiosity.¹

In 1791, when Alexander was barely fourteen, the Empress Catherine decided upon his marriage. Besides the importance of assuring the succession in direct line, she impatiently awaited the moment when it would be possible to give the Grand Duke a separate court and household, thus increasing his prestige at the expense of the Tsarevitch, his father. Catherine's choice fell upon the Princess Louisa Augusta, the third daughter of the reigning Grand Duke of Baden. The princess and her sister were subsequently invited to visit the Court of St. Petersburg, where the docile Alexander promptly fell in love, with a sincerity which at least did honor to his grandmother's perspicacity.²

Alexander's marriage, which took place September 25, 1793, at first scarcely interrupted Laharpe's philosophic discourses.³

¹ Bogdanovitch, *Alexander I*, p. 16.

² The story of this imperial idyl is charmingly told in Elizabeth's own letters. See *Les Lettres de l'Impératrice Elinabeth*, published with an introduction by Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhallowitch.

³ Czartoryski, *Mémoires*, vol. 1, p. 53.

But in 1794, the year of Thermidor, the young teacher's Jacobinism began to offend the Tsarina, and his dismissal was suddenly signified to him "without rank or cross"¹ or any of the distinctions usually accorded a royal tutor who had completed his task. Probably, through the intervention of his pupil, he obtained a postponement of his enforced departure. He used the opportunity which this unexpected delay afforded him to complete his work, impressing upon the receptive mind of Alexander the lessons of democracy and liberalism which had already fired the imagination of the future autocrat. The Grand Duke had now become a disciple rather than a pupil. Laharpe alone could influence the curious blending of gentleness and stubborn determination which, even at this early age, formed the basis of Alexander's character.

The moment of separation arrived May 9, 1795. Alexander's grief and resentment at the departure of his friend and preceptor was manifested publicly and without reserve. Czartoryski in his *Mémoires* records that "he was heard to declare himself with unmeasured harshness respecting his grandmother's actions, using terms of almost inconceivable abuse."² The sincerity and constancy of this ideal friendship was only proved by time. Laharpe left behind him directions for the guidance of his pupil, which specified in detail remedies for the faults which his interrupted education might develop. In these instructions he advised Alexander to overcome his natural timidity and to mingle as often as possible with his future subjects. Only thus, he declared, could the Grand Duke hope to win their love and devotion. That his misgivings were not without cause is shown by the sequel.

Catherine died suddenly in 1796, and was succeeded by the Tsarevitch, whose chief ambition was to make the heir of the Romanovs a soldier. In the company of the young garrison blades who now surrounded him, Alexander lost sight not only of his earlier ideals, but also of all that could remind him of the teachings of Laharpe. His friend Czartoryski recounts the efforts he made at this time to surround the Grand Duke with more sympathetic and profitable influences. With this unselfish end in

¹ Rain, *op. cit.*, p. 42, quoting the proceedings of the *Société Impériale de l'Histoire Russe*, vol. v, remarks on Laharpe's unrepentant indignation at this slight.

² Czartoryski, *Mémoires*, vol. I, p. 111.

view, he asked leave to present to his patron two young men, Novosiltzov and Count Stroganov. In this fashion the nucleus of what became known as the "Young Liberal Circle" was introduced to the Tsarevitch during the Emperor Paul's coronation at Moscow. These new friendships deserve more than passing notice in considering the development of Alexander's character.

Novosiltzov, somewhat pedantic and overconscious of the advantages of this new connection, soon "prepared in Russian the translation of a French work filled with good advice for a young Prince about to mount the throne." This was read by Alexander with characteristic "attention and satisfaction." Under these new influences, Czartoryski¹ notes with approval that "the philosophic and idealistic side of the Tsarevitch's character quickly recovered its ascendancy." These new friendships brought him into renewed contact with the political philosophy of the French Revolution. Stroganov, a pupil of the philosopher Rom and a disciple of Rousseau, had visited Paris during the Terror and listened to the dangerous eloquence of the Jacobin clubs. Novosiltzov, sent to Paris by the elder Count Stroganov to rescue the aristocratic young liberal from this dangerous atmosphere, had himself become infected with the doctrine of "liberty and equality." He returned to Russia almost as great a revolutionary as his ward. Thus, in the company of these more traveled compatriots, Alexander heard reechoed the lessons of Laharpe—and the voice of the spirit of liberty.

The influence of these friendships was to become the determining factor of the "liberal phase" which marked Alexander's early career. The Young Liberal Circle, as they were called, planned a campaign of propaganda to educate public opinion. Suitable books were to be translated into Russian, but at first only those for which official approval could be obtained. It was hoped that the minds of Alexander's future subjects would thus, by slow degrees, be prepared for the measures of reform to which he already looked forward as the glory of his coming reign. "How happy I could be were you only by my side at this moment," he writes to his old master. And Laharpe, filled with honest pride at his own part in the education of so generous a prince, wrote in

¹ Czartoryski, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 156-157.

reply long letters from his quiet retreat in Switzerland. But the classical maxims and sage advice of a confirmed *doctrinaire* of the republican era were unequal to the task of guiding his disciple through the fast approaching crisis of his father's reign.

While the Tsarevitch and his companions were busying themselves with their philosophical program of internal reform, impending events were to bring him face to face with the stern realities that beset a ruler. A palace revolution—a sudden, fierce reversion to the customs of the Byzantine court on which the early Tsars had modeled their own—was suddenly to clear the way to Alexander's throne and to place him face to face with problems whose theoretical solution had amused his leisure. The part which he played in the preparation of the plot which ended in his father's assassination has been the subject of long and bitter controversy. Of a guilty foreknowledge of this tragic event, history has, on the whole, absolved him.¹

The impression which Paul's character and the circumstances of his death left upon Alexander during the brief period of their relationship as sovereign and subject must be noted in considering the development of the character of the future author of the "Holy Alliance."² In spite of a striking physical dissimilarity, there was a curious resemblance between the two autocrats, father and son.³ In both Tsars we find the same tendency to generous impulse marred by an almost morbid egotism; the same restless zeal for governmental reform accompanied by an equal disregard of the prejudices of those most likely to profit by their acts. Finally, a wholly false conception of the historical task of a

¹ Joyneville, in his *Life and Times of Alexander I*, analyzes Alexander's responsibility for his father's death in the light of the *Memoirs of Mme. Svetchine*, Bulau's *Narrative*, etc. According to the former, the appeal made to Alexander by the conspirators was merely for aid in "constituting the Emperor a state prisoner," (conversation between Count Pahlen and General Svetchine, quoted in Joyneville, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 118). It must also be remembered that at that time Portugal and Denmark were both ruled by regents in the name of imbecile sovereigns. Joyneville (p. 142) also recounts that Pahlen revealed to Alexander that Paul had ordered his arrest, together with the Empress Marie and the Grand Duke Constantine. "The business," according to the British Attaché, Ross, "took more than three-quarters of an hour." Joyneville believes this to be a direct proof that the murder of Paul was not decided upon in advance (pp. 147 and 152). See also Waliszewski, *Le fils de la grande Catherine: Paul I^{er}*.

² Czartoryski, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

³ Joyneville, quoting Rostopchine, says that Paul, during his first campaign against the French, desired to form a permanent league for the "suppression of anarchy and democratic principles," a forerunner of the "Holy Alliance" in its later phase.

"benevolent despot" and an unwavering belief in the high-mindedness of their own motives led them both to perform the most astounding and contradictory acts and to adopt policies which were often carried through with ruthless conviction rather than statesmanlike foresight.

Alexander was but twenty-three years old when he succeeded to the throne of the Romanovs. Prince Czartoryski was summoned to the capital to assume the rôle—but not the office—of Prime Minister, which the Tsar had promised him in their youthful conversations. The new ruler soon found himself surrounded with the friends upon whom he might most naturally depend for encouragement and support. The members of the "Young Liberal Circle," the intimates of his boyhood, returned to St. Petersburg from the four quarters of Europe, where the desire of the Emperor Paul to separate the Heir-Apparent from their liberal influences had dispersed them in semi-official exile. From England came Novosiltzov, filled with renewed admiration for the constitution and political life of the British commonwealth. Stroganov, the aristocratic admirer of the French Revolution, returned from the interrupted "grand tour" upon which his over-democratic ideas had embarked him. Perhaps most welcome of all these unofficial advisers was Alexander's old tutor, Laharpe, who hastened from Switzerland at the new Tsar's summons.¹

International questions, however, rather than policies of internal reform, so dear to the "Young Liberals," now forced themselves on the attention of the new government. Just before the Tsar Paul's assassination, that monarch had formed an ill-considered alliance with Napoleon, reversing Russia's former policy. This had resulted in a renewal of the "Armed Neutrality," and an embargo was placed upon all Russian, Swedish and Danish vessels in the harbors of Great Britain.² Orders were also given to the West India fleet to attack the Danish possessions in

¹ Laharpe was now somewhat disabused of many of his youthful enthusiasms for unrestricted "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity." On his return to Switzerland he had taken a prominent part in inviting the French Revolutionary government to interfere in the civil quarrels of his native cantons. But the victories of the French troops over the armies of the Bernese oligarchy had been marked by such scenes of pillage and disorder as to trouble even the "pure" republicanism of Rousseau's pupil. Moreover, his fellow countrymen had, not unnaturally, held him responsible for his share in bringing about their predicament.

² For a full account of this revival of Catherine's policy of the "Armed Neutrality," see Garden, *Histoire générale des traités de paix*, vol. v, pp. 347 and 361.

the Gulf of Mexico, while another squadron, under Nelson and Parker, set sail for the Baltic (February, 1801). On April 2, after a heroic defense by the Danish Admiral Fischer, the British fleet won a crushing victory at Copenhagen. After offering terms tending to separate Denmark from Russia, which were loyally rejected, the victorious expeditions proceeded up the Baltic with the avowed intention of capturing Kronstad and St. Petersburg.

Thus, during the first days of his reign, the Emperor Alexander found himself faced with an international crisis of the first magnitude. Little time remained to weigh in the balance abstract problems concerning "the rights of neutral nations," which the "Powers of the North" had sworn to defend. The first duty was to find some immediate remedy which might safeguard Russia's national interests and his too accessible capital.

In considering the somewhat inglorious settlement to which Alexander now gave his consent, several factors must be taken into account. His desire was to obtain a respite during which he might devote himself to the task of securing essential internal reforms.¹ He was constitutionally averse to war (though affected by what his courtiers called "paradomania") and was under the peaceful influence of Czartoryski's idealism.²

It was a cruel irony of fate which during the first weeks of his reign placed the Tsar in the dilemma of choosing between a forced abandonment of cherished principles of "international action" and an undignified flight from his royal residence! Yet the principle embodied in the "League of Neutrals" was one of the few results of the Empress Catherine's foreign policy which his idealistic conceptions could approve. He, therefore, caught eagerly at the suggestion of the British Government for a "conference." This was a form of negotiation which Alexander seems gen-

¹ Nevertheless, Alexander's first impulse was to defend "the rights of neutrals" from respect "for the opinions of his august father." It was Vorontzov, his Ambassador in London, who urged upon him the necessity of an Anglo-Russian alliance to meet the situation. See an article by F. de Martens, in the *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, vol. VIII, 1894.

² In considering Czartoryski's influence at this time it must be remembered that he was above all else a patriotic Pole, and that all his hopes of renewing the early, generous enthusiasm that Alexander had shown for that much wronged nation lay in stressing the duties of an unselfish international viewpoint. This powerful personal influence was to be exerted during the whole period of the Tsar's "liberal phase," the period covered by the later "Instructions to Novosiltzov." See Czartoryski, *Mémoires*, vol. I, p. 101.

erally to have found irresistible. All the powers interested were invited to send representatives in order to arrange the differences concerning the "rights of neutrals," and in response to this overture Admiral Hyde Parker was notified by the Russian authorities of the new Emperor's disposition for peace. To his own conception, Alexander's "ideals" were actually to offer a convenient solution to his difficulties! The Prussian King was desired to evacuate Hanover for reasons which were "a distinct advance upon the international morality of the day," and, while costing the Tsar nothing, enabled him to meet the views of Great Britain. Alexander wrote that he was not only "desirous of pacifying the North," but also of establishing a "continuing world peace." He ended with the pious hope that in view of the high object to be accomplished, Frederick William "would place no difficulties in the way."¹

On June 17, 1801, a Congress of the "Powers of the North," viz., Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia, assembled in St. Petersburg. The protocol agreed upon, with the exception of a clause forbidding paper blockades, was wholly favorable to the contentions of Great Britain. The parties agreed: (1) That a neutral flag should *not* cover enemy goods, and (2) that visit and search were permissible even when vessels were under the convoy of a vessel of war.

If the Scandinavian allies of Russia, one of whom had gloriously suffered the loss of her fleet in defending the rights of neutrals, could see in this arrangement little else than a base betrayal of the principles which the "Armed Neutrality" had sworn to defend, Czartoryski might at least console the Tsar with the thought that he had given an example of philosophic devotion to the cause of international peace and had saved his capital from invasion.

Soon after this rather inglorious settlement of Russia's difficulties, in 1803, Alexander appointed Czartoryski, whose influence becomes more and more traceable in ensuing events, as his Minister of Foreign Affairs. In spite of the clouds gathering on the horizon, notably an estrangement with France, the new Minister announced a program of peace and a foreign policy that eminently suited Alexander's ambitions. Said Czartoryski:

¹ See Garden, *op. cit.*, vol. VI, p. 376.

I firmly believed that it might be possible for me to reconcile the tendencies of the Russian nation with the generous ideas of its ruler, and to make use of the Russian craving for glory and supremacy for the general benefit of mankind. The object was a great but a remote one, to be pursued consistently and with perseverance, and to be executed with patience and skill. I thought it was worthy of the national pride of the Russian people. I would have wished Alexander to become a sort of arbiter of peace for the civilized world, to be the protector of the weak and the oppressed, and that his reign should inaugurate a new era of justice and right in European politics.¹

Soon after Czartoryski's appointment, in 1804, the Duke of Enghien, grandson of the Great Condé, was treacherously seized by Napoleon's orders, within the territory of the Grand Duchy of Baden, and dragged across the French frontiers. After the mockery of a court martial, he was shot to death in the moat of the fortress of Vincennes. The disregard for international rights shown by this violation of neutral territory and its accompanying judicial murder aroused all Europe to a fury of protest.

Two months later, Bonaparte notified the Powers, still aghast at this unnecessary tragedy, of his formal assumption of the Imperial title. The new Emperor of France could hardly have chosen a more unfavorable moment for entering the ranks of the sovereigns of Europe. Although in practical effect the abolition of the Consular title was a mere matter of form, Russia refused to recognize Napoleon's usurpation. Only Austria and the subservient Hohenzollern dynasty, both of whom had felt the weight of his displeasure, acquiesced in the monarchical pretensions of the ex-revolutionary general. The way was prepared for a fresh coalition of the Powers of Europe, in which the Tsar of Russia was to play the rôle of mediator which Czartoryski so ardently desired him to assume. Their ideals and dreams of international polity were, moreover, about to receive definite form through the medium of the "Instructions to Novosiltzov."²

The instructions follow the policy of a carefully written opinion dated April 5, 1804, in which Czartoryski sought to define the Tsar's attitude towards a government which "tramples under foot the most generally accepted principles of international law." The duty of Russia and the Powers "to decry and avenge"

¹ Czartoryski, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 370.

² These instructions are too well known through the studies of Sorel and Phillips to be quoted *in extenso*.

such action was discussed at length.¹ In the opinion both of Czartoryski and the Emperor a preliminary understanding between Great Britain and Russia promised the surest guarantee for the success of their international program and the proposed alliance against the hegemony of France. In September, 1804, Alexander was prepared to lay before the British Cabinet a scheme not only for immediate military action, but also for an eventual rational settlement of the entire diplomatic situation. The understanding between these Powers was to form the basis of a wider coalition. Such, indeed, was the only means which might conceivably place a limit upon Napoleon's ambitions.

"Novosiltzov's Instructions" outline the plan which Alexander now proposed to the British Cabinet. Long buried in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office, these were first made public in their complete form through the publication of Czartoryski's *Mémoires*. They had previously been known only through a partial quotation by Tatistcheff and notably through Pitt's reply couched, doubtless from reasons of policy, in a language similar to the Emperor's own.²

The opening paragraph of Novosiltzov's Instructions contains an eloquent recognition of the growing force of public opinion in international affairs:

The most effectual weapon which France now wields—one with which the French continue to menace their neighbors—is their ability to persuade public opinion that their cause is that of the liberty and prosperity of all nations.

As a condition preceding the "moral union" he sought with Great Britain, he next asks the latter's adhesion to a "New Order," which must be brought about. The "New Order" was a highly practical program of "self-determination," the outlines of a reconstruction of Europe on "national" lines. The King of

¹ Czartoryski, *Mémoires*, vol. II, p. 2.

² The Instructions to Novosiltzov are given in full in Czartoryski, *Mémoires*, vol. II, p. 27, and Appendix. In reading them, the truth of Czartoryski's contention, that history has neglected both their importance and significance becomes apparent. Modern writers have in a measure repaired this error, recognizing that they laid the foundations upon which, ten years later, rested the program of intervention and reconstruction contained in the Treaties of Kalisch and Chaumont. "Compare this language," says Sorel, speaking of Novosiltzov's Instructions, "with that which Koutousov addressed to the Germans in 1813, and with that which Alexander addressed to the French liberals in 1814. It will be seen that all forms part of the same program. The same may even be said of the measures planned in 1804 and 1814 for the reconstruction of continental Europe." Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, part VI, p. 39.

Sardinia, who had been unjustly deprived by Napoleon of his throne, was to be reestablished, but not until he had promised to give his people the benefits of "a wise and free constitution." The importance of maintaining Swiss neutrality was also recognized "as an essential factor in the peace of Europe." In restoring Holland to national existence the modern theory of self-determination is recognized: "The character of the national desires must be considered before deciding upon the form of government to be established."

A paragraph respecting the attitude to be adopted by the Anglo-Russian Alliance towards France herself is equally significant at the present day:

I now come to the language which, in my opinion, it will be necessary to hold with respect to France herself. After having imposed our will upon her, and after, through just, benevolent and liberal principles, having manifested our intentions (giving her confidence that she can count upon the promises made by our Alliance), we should declare that it is not upon France that we make war, but only upon a government as tyrannical towards France as towards the rest of Europe.¹

There is no suggestion in the Tsar's plan of a superstate (the favorite remedy of the eighteenth century philosophers for all international ills) nor any hint of the doctrine of intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states (the policy which was later to render the pretensions of the Holy Alliance most hateful in the eyes of the "Constitutional Powers").²

Perhaps the most important paragraph of Novosiltzov's Instructions is the one in which the Tsar, after a brief historical notice of former proposals to organize humanity, finds the guarantee of future peace in a pact binding the nations of Europe by means of a general treaty or confederacy—a League of Nations—whose guiding principles would be those of international law and wherein mediation would be substituted for war:

¹The Tsar's insistence that the Allies war only against Napoleon and not against the French people finds a parallel in President Wilson's declarations that "the real enemy is not the German people so much as the military masters who enchain them as well as the foreign territories they have conquered."

²"It seems evident that this great aim can only be considered as attained when we shall have succeeded in reconciling the nations with their governments, and in making the latter capable of action tending to the best interests of their people. We must also fix the relations of the states among themselves by means of well-defined rules, which it will be in the interest of all to respect. Profound examination of these matters and the lessons of history will prove that these two results can only be obtained when the interior order of all states is based upon free institutions, protected against the passions and ambitions of the individuals who may be placed at their head."

I can see no reason why, after peace has been declared, we should not undertake to negotiate a general treaty which might become the basis of the reciprocal relations between the States of Europe. This indeed will almost inevitably suggest itself at the moment of a general pacification, especially if no incomplete and partial peace be allowed to interfere, an end to which both powers are equally interested in devoting all their efforts and designs.

When the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, a similar proposal was entertained. But the degree of political development and other circumstances paramount at the time would not allow the consummation of this great work, in spite of the fact that for a long time this pact formed the basis of foreign relations. Modern diplomacy should be adequate to meet the situation which presents itself. Impossible though the attainment of a state of eternal peace would appear to be, nevertheless in many ways this end might be forwarded if the treaty, which should conclude the present general war, will embody clear and precise principles and prescriptions with respect to international law. Why should not a law of nations be evolved assuring the privileges of neutrality and consecrating as an obligation never to commence war without having exhausted all the means of mediation by a third party?—a mediator who, having through the proper means examined the respective wrongs of the litigants, will seek to compound them? It is by applying such principles that a true and lasting pacification of the world might be obtained.

It is, moreover, interesting to note that membership in the proposed League of Peace was based upon a voluntary decision by its members. Alexander evidently believed that the advantages to be obtained through becoming a party to this general treaty would be patent to all the civilized states of Europe:

After having experienced the drawbacks and inconveniences of a complete—though precarious and illusory—dependent existence, the majority of all Powers would probably desire to belong to such a League. This would not only guarantee as far as possible their external tranquillity and safety, but also (especially in the case of states of a secondary order) would offer them internal guarantees of protection.

Nor does the Tsar avoid consideration of the practical details of his problem. An interesting paragraph in the "Instructions" has reference to questions of political geography and of strategic and—even of economic—frontiers:

In order to secure our ends, it would be necessary to fix the frontiers which properly belong to each separate state. It would thus appear especially desirable to follow the boundaries which nature herself has laid down, i. e., mountain chains, seas, etc. Finally, the proper means of access should be assured to each nation for the interchange of the products of their soil and industry. It might also be advisable if possible to obtain that each state should consist of homogeneous people in agreement among themselves and with the government that rules them.

Finally, with respect to the old principle of "the balance of power" and the ever-present questions of the lesser nationalities, Alexander offers a striking solution—the grouping of the smaller states into federations which would place them more nearly on a par with their neighbors:

The disturbances which have shaken Europe almost continually for so many centuries have only taken place because so little attention has been paid to any system of natural equilibrium. Just how far this principle could be made to govern the new arrangement which should follow the general pacification it would be difficult for the present to decide. It would depend largely upon what powers would be admitted to these councils and the logical outcome of events. Nevertheless, it is even now possible to recognize the necessity of strengthening as far as possible the secondary powers in order that these may be capable of self-protection, at least until the protecting powers and the other members of the League can come to their assistance. For the same reason it is evident that the existence of very small states would not be in accord with the ends desired. Since these are without the necessary powers of resistance, they can only serve as temptations to the ambitions of larger states without contributing in any way to the general good. A means of remedying this inconvenience might be found by uniting them to larger states, or in grouping them in small federative unions.

Although the defeat of the Allies at Austerlitz was to postpone for nearly ten years the possibility of any practical application of the principles contained in Novosiltzov's Instructions, Alexander had every reason to believe that they had formed the basis of the proposed general European settlement which was the avowed object of the Third Coalition. The British attitude was, in substance, a cordial acceptance of Alexander's proposals.

Pitt's reply to Novosiltzov (made public on May 15, 1805), read as follows:

It would seem from the views advanced by H. I. M., views to which H. M. adheres, that three principal purposes are to be sought: (1) to free from the dominion of France the countries conquered by her since the outbreak of the revolution, and to restrict her to her former frontiers; (2) to ensure to the countries released from the French yoke not only their continued peace and happiness, but also to erect them into a barrier against further French aggression; (3) to establish (with the renewal of peace) a convention and guarantee for the protection and mutual safety of the Powers, and to establish in Europe a general system of public law. . . . His Majesty would consider this noble plan as incomplete if the restoration of peace were not at the same time accompanied by measures tending to secure the system thus brought into existence. It would appear desirable when the general pacification occurs that a treaty be concluded to which all the great powers of Europe might become parties. Through this means

the possession of their respective territory, as now established, would be fixed and recognized. To secure this end the powers must engage themselves reciprocally to maintain and support each other against all efforts to disturb and infringe upon their rights. Such a treaty would endow Europe with a common law and tend as much as possible to repress all enterprises troubling the general peace.¹

The diplomatic history of the epic struggle between Alexander and Napoleon, which, except for the precarious duration of the Tilsit Alliance, was to continue for more than a decade after the date of Novosiltzov's Mission, has been studied in detail by Sorel² and Vandal.³ Their scholarly interpretation of new material and the examination of archives not available to earlier students have revealed the story of these momentous years, probably in a form approaching finality. Yet everywhere in the pages of these historical masterpieces the glory of the vanquished outshines that of the victor. In their revived enthusiasm for the Empire, the authors have done but scant justice to what may well appear at the present day the most significant feature of the campaigns that ended in the downfall of the French Emperor: the Tsar's determination, again and again apparent, to dedicate the victories of the Alliance to securing an organized peace and the establishment of a European System. In the negotiations to induce the Courts of Vienna, Stockholm and Berlin to join in a *levée en masse* of Europe against the pretensions of Napoleon there was no question of the sweeping plans of international reconstruction which had preceded the signing of the "Treaty of Concert" between the Tsar and the King of England. Nevertheless, "the young monarch firmly believed that he was fulfilling an international mission in becoming the military Champion of Humanity."⁴ Even when the Third Coalition went down in defeat (1805) at Austerlitz—and the Tsar instead of maintaining the rights he had championed in Novosiltzov's Instructions found

¹ See Garden, *Histoire générale des traités de paix*, vol. VIII, p. 317. Until the publication of Czartoryski's *Mémoires*, Pitt's reply was the only public document with respect to this important negotiation except for a brief notice by Tatichév. Novosiltzov's negotiations in London during January, 1805, were continued throughout February by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The result was the Alliance or "Treaty of Concert" of April 11. For a full account of the diplomatic negotiations preceding the Third Coalition against France, see Garden, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, pp. 302 *et seq.*

² A. Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*.

³ A. Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}*.

⁴ Tatistcheff, *Alexandre I^{er} et Napoléon*, p. 86.

himself defending the frontiers of his own Empire against the victorious armies of the greatest political "realist" of all times—Alexander still clung to his ideals of European solidarity. The Russian disaster at Friedland (1807) was the result of his chivalrous devotion to Frederick William III of Prussia, an effort to save him from the consequences of his belated adhesion to the Third Coalition.

When a way was opened for the conquerors to the heart of Russia, the peace which Napoleon imposed upon the Tsar at Tilsit was offered in the form of an Alliance, and the methods used by the French Emperor to attach Alexander to his "Continental System" recall the irresistible appeal he had made to the morbid vanity of his father the Tsar Paul.¹ Tilsit was the negation of every policy and principle that Alexander had heretofore professed.² The treaty laid down a program of opportunism: a "free hand" granted to Russia in Finland and a rectification of the Turkish-Russian frontiers were little more than an Imperial bribe. In the moment of the Tsar's greatest military peril he was thus offered an opportunity to resume the imperialistic policies of Catherine the Great,³ which the reactionary advisers of his court had accused him of abandoning. But Tilsit was from the beginning an alliance merely in name. Beneath the surface, in spite of the assurances and compliments exchanged between the Emperors, French and Russian diplomacy continued a struggle without truce or common advantage. Neither sovereign could obtain the fulfilment of the essential features of a pact which only joined their real interests for a few brief months. The meeting at Erfurt, scarcely a year after the historic interview on the Niemen, showed Alexander ready to plot the destruction of his Imperial "ally" with the latter's most treacherous foes.⁴ After more than three years of deceit and diplomatic evasion, it was almost joyously that the Tsar abandoned the plan of sharing the dominion of the universe with Napoleon. Resuming the dialectic

¹Sorel, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 73.

²Paul at least was persuaded that his alliance with the "Corsican tempter" was to "ensure the Peace of Europe." *Ibid.*

³Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}*.

⁴*Ibid.* At Erfurt Alexander had a famous interview with Talleyrand, who more than hinted his willingness to betray Napoleon. See Dupuis, *Le Ministère de Talleyrand en 1814*, vol. i, p. 27.

of his earlier negotiation with Pitt—the language of Novosiltzov's Instructions—we find him (1812) assuring his new ally, Bernadotte (the former Napoleonic General, elected Crown Prince of Sweden) that their common task is “to revive in Europe the régime of liberal ideas and to save her from the abyss of barbarism to which she seems hurrying.”¹

Into the details of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, the burning of Moscow on the approach of winter, which made a withdrawal, if not a retreat, inevitable, and the loss of the *Grande Armée*, it is unnecessary to enter for the purposes of this introduction. Suffice it to say that Alexander's mind was busied with far-reaching schemes long since prepared, which were to make of the victories gained but the starting point for a second international crusade. He brushed aside governments, and appealed directly to the people,² and warned their rulers that if they remained abjectly persistent in their system of federation, it was the voice of the people which must be heard. It was with the peoples of Germany, rather than with their rulers, that the Treaty of Kalisch, uniting Russia and Prussia, was signed.

Through a series of agreements anticipating both political and military action, the links of the Grand Alliance were one by one solidly forged. The Treaties of Reichenbach, the second link in the great system which was to control the destinies of Europe during the ensuing years, were signed on June 14 and 15, 1813. These constituted a formal treaty of alliance between Great Britain, Russia and Prussia, by the terms of which a new coalition came into being. At Reichenbach (June 15), England also renewed her continental policy, strengthening the bonds of the alliance with her generous subsidies. Pitt promised to pay the enormous costs of the armies of Russia and Prussia, but at the same time insisted upon a renewal of Alexander's earlier proposals, that none of the Powers were to permit themselves to enter into any separate negotiations with the enemy. In Articles

¹ Alexander to Bernadotte, quoted by Rain, vol. I, p. 208.

² “We now appeal to the *people* through this manifesto in the same terms that our envoy will use toward their rulers. If these latter remain abjectly persistent in their system of federation it is the voice of the people which must be heard. The rulers who have plunged their subjects in oppression and disaster must be forced to embrace the cause of vengeance and glory. Let Germany but recall her ancient valor and the tyrant will cease to exist.” Garden, vol. XIV, p. 181.

I and II of the Treaty of Reichenbach the return of the "lands in Germany held by the French Princes was declared to be the object of the common efforts." Toeplitz (September 9, 1813), the third link in the chain of alliances, ranged Austria on the side of the Allies. The "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (October, 1813) sealed the military fate of Napoleon. The era of diplomacy was about to begin.¹

After Leipzig, even Schwartzemberg, the Austrian military commander, believed the greatest obtainable military results to be achieved. "All . . . are of this opinion," he wrote, "but the Emperor Alexander . . . !" Words failed the horrified Austrian tactician on his attempts to describe the determination with which the Tsar continued the pursuit of his enemy. Without a complete military victory the international peace he aimed at was impossible. The advance towards Paris continued, "the army dragging forward, the diplomats murmuring and conspiring."² At Châtillon, where Napoleon was negotiating for peace, the conflict of selfish interests broke out afresh.³ It was already becoming manifest that to find a common ground of agreement among the victors would be a task almost as difficult as Napoleon's overthrow. The French success of Montmiriel and Châteauneuf-Thierry caused these differences to be momentarily forgotten. But the battles of Arcis-sur-Aube and La Férée-Champenoise, while restoring the military equilibrium of the coalition, renewed the dissensions of their councils.

The conference at Châtillon was in fact little else than a poorly staged diplomatic comedy which deceived neither antagonist. Napoleon's eagerness to negotiate rose and fell with the varying fortunes of his military campaign. The Allied proposals—purposely made more and more unacceptable to France—were not even presented until February 17. Badly beaten at the engagement of La Rothière, Napoleon had authorized his representative to make "the broadest concessions." It

¹The text of the Treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach and Toeplitz are to be found in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil des Traité de Paix*, vol. III, p. 234; vol. I, pp. 568, 571.

²Sorel, *op. cit.*, part VIII, p. 257.

³These discussions turned upon Napoleon's successor, the question of the "natural limits," the plan of campaign, etc. The Tsar only consented to take part on "the basis of Frankfort," communicating his reservations in a memoir to Metternich. See Sorel, *op. cit.*, part VIII, pp. 250-255.

required but a few slight successes, however, to encourage him again to resist the Allies' demands.¹

One ominous fact must have convinced Napoleon's envoy, Caulaincourt, that his mission was more difficult than ever before; the negotiations of Châtillon were carried out "under a general instruction" wherein the Allies "considered themselves as maintaining one and the same interest."²

This was the policy to be formally adopted by the important Treaty of Chaumont, an event of the deepest significance to the inauguration of a new political system for Europe, which occurred on March 10. The signatures of all the Allied Powers had been affixed to the same document after Leipzig. But no formal League of the Allies as yet existed, except such as arose from a complicated system of politico-military protocols and treaties, notably those of Reichenbach and Toeplitz. These mainly contemplated military action against the "Enemy of Europe," and only hinted at political arrangements. When the negotiation of a final peace became imminent, the necessity of consolidating the basis of some future common policy binding on all the Allies became apparent.³

It was to secure this important end that the Treaty of Chaumont (bearing the date of March 1) had been proposed. In the preamble it was declared that the high contracting parties,

having offered to the French government terms for the conclusion of a general peace (in case of the refusal by France of these conditions) desire to strengthen the bonds which unite them in the vigorous prosecution of a war undertaken with the intention of bringing a close to the misfortunes of Europe.⁴

Having thus clearly stated its main objects, the Treaty sets forth its intention "to insure the future tranquillity of Europe by reestablishing a just equilibrium of the powers."

After fixing the subsidies to be advanced by Great Britain, Article V continues:

¹ See Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, vol. II, p. 151, and A. Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe*, vol. I, pp. 6-7. Napoleon always believed himself on the eve of a Marengo or Austerlitz. After a theatrical tirade, he had pronounced for a peace at any price on January 4th. Caulaincourt was somewhat disconcerted at the extent of these powers and hampered by ignorance of the military situation. See Sorel, *op. cit.*, part VII, pp. 259-262.

² Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*, pp. 72-79.

³ Metternich was even believed to be negotiating separately with France. Sorel, *op. cit.*, part VIII, p. 289.

⁴ This treaty is given in Martens, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 48.

The contracting parties will agree after the conclusion of the peace with France . . . to take defensive measures for the protection of their respective territories in Europe against all attempts on the part of France to trouble the results of this pacification.

This was nothing less than the "mutual guarantee" which the Tsar had long advocated. But in order not to raise premature differences between the Allies, the "order of things which shall be the happy outcome of their efforts" was purposely left vague.

Certain broad lines of policy were, however, laid down. It was determined that Switzerland should be raised to the rank of an independent state, that Spain should be restored to the Bourbons, and that Germany should form a federal union. In order to carry out these provisions the means to be used were further set forth as "amicable intervention" (Article VI) and, this failing (Article VII), an international army might be raised, each party furnishing a contingent of 60,000 men.

The Treaty of Chaumont thus became an elaboration of the policy determined upon at Toeplitz. While directed against France, it also furnished a treaty basis for future concerted action. Formally renewed at Paris in 1815, and at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, it may be said to constitute the foundation of the "system" which formed the groundwork of European diplomacy until the year 1848.

A great change is observable, however, in the language of this document when it is compared with the generous sentiments embodied in Alexander's Kalisch pronunciamento, or with the liberal ideas contained in his tocsin appeal to the "peoples of Europe." The diplomats of Europe could find no place in a formal agreement for a league to maintain European peace "based on a new conception of public law," which Novosiltzov had discussed with Pitt. The Treaty of Chaumont was the resultant of contending forces and drew its future strength and usefulness from the purposely vague language of the articles dealing with matters which were a subject of controversy between the Powers. The future of Poland was ignored, as well as the question of Napoleon's successor; on the other hand a "balance of Europe" was definitely guaranteed (Article XVI) for a period—which might be extended—of at least twenty years. Although France was the power ostensibly aimed at as a possible disturber of this highly

desirable equilibrium, the terms were general enough to raise the issue to the rank of a great European principle.

With this general affirmation of the solidarity of the great Powers, a principle which he was to affirm with increasing enthusiasm during the ensuing period of diplomatic reconstruction, the Tsar was obliged to be content. Castlereagh, however, had been the controlling influence of the debates and the attitude which he adopted from the beginning had been guided by the terms of definite instructions, which clearly show the limitations England was about to place upon her Continental policy. "The Treaty of Alliance," he declared, "is not to terminate with the war, but is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations to support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of stipulated succours. The *casus foederis* is to be an attack by France on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties."¹ It was the development of this policy of "reservations" which in the end was to wreck the whole framework of the Tsar's idealistic proposals for a European confederation. To offset Great Britain's determination to remain aloof from the internal quarrels of Continental Europe, Alexander was soon to propose a plan of action having for its basis a definite recognition of the duty of international solidarity. This policy, "consecrated" in the mystical pact of the Holy Alliance, was to serve ends wholly foreign to the Tsar's earlier ideals.

Accompanied by the King of Prussia, Alexander entered Paris in triumph on March 30, 1814, and Napoleon's abdication was signed a few days later.² The first Treaty of Paris followed the signing of a convention, dated April 23, 1814. The article forming the basis of both the convention of April 23 and the ensuing Treaty³ guaranteed to France "the frontiers as they actually existed on January 1, 1792." This deprived the restored monarchy of all the conquests made by the Republic and the Empire, with the exception of certain territories belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine.

¹ These instructions, quoted by Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*, p. 66, from the Foreign Office Records, are contained in a Cabinet Memorandum, dated December 26, 1813.

² Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhaïlowitch, *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, vol. 1, p. 134.

³ The details of the negotiation of this treaty are given in full in Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, vol. II, pp. 172 *et seq.*

The keynote of Bourbon diplomacy was to ignore past events. When Alexander visited the Paris mint, a medal was struck in his honor which bore on one side the inscription: "To the restorer of peace in Europe"; on the reverse was emblazoned the arms of France, with the words: "In the month of April, 1814, France joined the Grand Confederation of the Powers of Europe."¹ Many months, however, were to elapse before these words had any real significance. The real terms which defined the allied policy toward France were contained in secret articles annexed to the Treaty of Paris.² These stipulated:

The disposal of the territories which his Very Christian Majesty has renounced by the terms of Article III of the Treaty (of Paris), an arrangement from which a real and durable European equilibrium must arise, will be decided at the Congress along lines which shall be determined among themselves by the Allied Powers.

Although the intention of the Treaty of Paris was several times declared to be that of "effacing all traces of the recent unfortunate events,"³ it was in fact little else than the enumeration of the terms imposed by victorious conquerors upon a fallen enemy.

In addition to the Allies of Toeplitz and Chaumont, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were invited to accede to the Treaty, although—a derogation from the Tsar's favorite principle of "united action"—identical treaties were signed separately with France by each of these Powers. By the terms of these treaties eight of the principal Powers of Europe found themselves parties to a general agreement. Their alliance was still chiefly aimed at keeping a ninth great Power in a state of military inferiority, yet the Tsar might well feel that the foundations of his confederation of Europe had been well and truly laid. With the exchange of the ratifications the sovereigns and their representatives dispersed. An era of good feeling, recalling the atmosphere of international solidarity which had reigned during the earlier conferences of the war, once more united the Allies. But as Sorel significantly remarks: "All important matters were but adjourned until the Congress."⁴

¹ Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, *Memoirs*, p. 177. This incident is significant as showing the quick apprehension by the restored government of Alexander's favorite "international" policy.

² Martens, *Nouveaux Suppléments*, vol. I, p. 329.

³ Talleyrand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 197.

⁴ See Sorel's important appreciations, *op. cit.*, part VIII, p. 346.

Vienna at the opening of the Congress presented an impressive spectacle. Besides two hundred and sixteen chiefs of diplomatic missions, representing with few exceptions all the Christian Powers of Europe,¹ this great "international parliament" was attended in person by four kings and two emperors. While the civilized world awaited, with a natural anxiety, the result of the deliberations of the assembled statesmen, a series of balls, carnivals and tournaments varied the monotony of these debates and furnished entertainment for the host of courtiers and their ladies who surrounded the assembled monarchs.²

No one had awaited the formal opening of the great Congress with more eager anticipations than the idealistic Tsar of Russia. His brief stay in St. Petersburg had convinced him that he was once more autocrat, not only by right of law, but also in the hearts of his subjects.³ It was fortified by the knowledge that his acts were approved by the people of his whole vast Empire that the Tsar had proceeded to Vienna. He was, moreover, confident that the debt which Europe owed him for Russia's powerful intervention in the late wars would make him the natural arbiter of the debates which were to organize a permanent peace.⁴

Alexander was accompanied on his journey by a complete diplomatic staff. Gentz in his letters criticizes the Tsar's intention to negotiate in person rather than to depend upon the training and experience of his entourage. His determination to do away with intermediaries had resulted in a quarrel between the Tsar and his Grand Marshal, Count Tolstoy. "Persuaded that his kindness towards him could have no bounds, Tolstoy opposed Alexander's appearance at the Congress. His idea was that the Emperor could only play an undignified rôle. Worn out by these representations, his Majesty . . . decided to part with his Grand Marshal."⁵ He had early reason to regret his neglect of their excellent advice. The necessity of making rapid decisions amidst the heated debates of the council chamber deprived him of the advantage always maintained by a deputy acting *ad referen-*

¹ Talleyrand, vol. II, pp. 275 *et seq.*

² For an account of these festivities, see La Garde, *Fêtes et Souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne*.

³ His natural modesty prevented the Holy Synod from conferring upon him, according to the ancient Russian fashion, the title of "Blessed of God" in recognition of his victories. See Rain, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁴ Sorel, *op. cit.*, part VIII, p. 384.

⁵ La Garde, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 197.

dum. This egotistical pretension to override the accepted customs of diplomacy was to place the Tsar, on more than one occasion, in a position of inferiority. Equally disquieting was his dependence on individuals like Czartoryski, Capo D'Istria and Laharpe, personally sympathetic advisers rather than sources of information and counsel to which the traditional policy of the Empire required him to give weight.¹

The deliberations of the Congress of Vienna may be studied in detail in the memoirs of the French and Austrian representatives, Talleyrand and Metternich. For the purposes of our subject they need only be considered in so far as they concern the ensuing era of the international congress and the upbuilding of the "System of 1815." The members of the Grand Alliance were loath to admit new influences to their debates. They preferred to consider the Congress as a council of the Allies. As late as November 1, one month after the assembly of the delegates, Metternich still maintained that "the Congress is not a Congress; its commissions are not commissions." Indeed the only advantage which he consented to accord to the Vienna gathering was that "it seems an opportunity to remove the physical distances that divide Europe."²

A few days later he declared that the "very word of Congress terrified the Prussians" and that it would be preferable to call the conference together only after some agreement had been reached with respect to the principal questions involved.³ In other words he proposed that this great "European" gathering should only be allowed the power of ratification after a division of the spoils of Napoleon's Empire had been made by the victorious Allies.

The Tsar's intentions were from the beginning distrusted by many. There was indeed in his policy a curious blending of international idealism and practical advantage to Russia. Behind all his fine phrases a determination was evident to draw profit from the military situation. "The only reward which I ask," he repeated with somewhat affected enthusiasm, "is to be allowed to repair in a measure the great crime committed by Catherine II." By uniting the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, endowed with a liberal constitution, to his own autocratic domain, he planned to restore the ancient

¹ Cf. Lansing, *The Big Four*, p. 38.

² Talleyrand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 420.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

Kingdom of Poland.¹ England and Austria, however, were unalterably determined not to permit any change of frontier which might allow a Russo-Prussian entente to become a preponderant force in Europe. Poland according to their plans was again to be called upon to play her historic part as a buffer state.

Thus when the Tsar, strengthened by his own conceptions of the debt which Europe owed in return for his sacrifices in the cause of the Alliance, formulated his demands, he found himself faced by a firm coalition determined upon refusal. A series of stormy personal interviews ensued; horrified rumor affirmed that in his conversations with Metternich strong personalities were indulged in on the part of the Tsar² and that the Austrian envoy's rejoinders had been made in a tone of respectful but ill-disguised contempt. On October 1, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the Tsar, setting forth at length his opposition to the latter's views with respect to the Duchy. This resulted in a sharp interchange of "extra-official notes," wherein Czartoryski was called upon to defend "the right of Poland to nationality," a contention in convenient accord with one of the principal "points" of Novosiltzov's Instructions. This extraordinary debate, carried on by private correspondence, finally exasperated the Emperor, who refused to continue further negotiations by this means.³ Tolstoy's prophecies respecting the "personal negotiation" of his sovereign were being fulfilled.

Above the clamor of contending ambitions and particularistic interests now sounded a new rallying cry, Talleyrand's famous formula of "legitimacy." This principle indeed appeared the only one generally applicable to a situation complicated by so many contending interests. One cause which had restrained Castlereagh from openly opposing the military power wielded by the Tsar was the fact that Great Britain was still embarrassed by the long-drawn-out war with the United States. With the signing of the Peace of Ghent (December 24, 1814), full liberty of action was restored to England's forces. Castlereagh immediately declared himself ready to adhere to Talleyrand's plans, and the latter had the satisfaction of concluding the secret alliance which

¹ Debidour, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 22.

² Talleyrand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 509.

³ Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhaïlowitch, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 147.

he had so long desired to form between France, Austria and England (January 3, 1815).¹

Thus a few weeks after France had been dragged to the bar to hear the sentence of Europe passed upon her misdeeds, she found herself, through the surprising diplomatic abilities of her chief representative, party to a secret treaty wherein two of her principal opponents formally engaged themselves to act with her in common against "the pretensions recently manifested" by the two remaining members of the great coalition. "In case certain circumstances shall arise," read this document, "from which may God preserve us, Great Britain, Austria and France agree to unite their strength in order to maintain the principles formulated in the Treaty of Paris."²

Only the return of Napoleon from the Island of Elba restored a semblance of harmony to the debates. The alliance and principles of Chaumont were reaffirmed and all the Powers joined in a manifesto decrying the Emperor's treason to the cause of Europe.³ The end of Napoleon's great adventure of "The Hundred Days" left the Allies in an awkward and ill-defined relationship toward France. A tendency was manifested to hold the twice-restored Bourbons responsible for their failure to prove the blessings of "legitimacy." Moreover, the rivalries and differences which had arisen at Vienna seriously separated the Allies. The secret Treaty of Alliance between France, Great Britain and Austria—forgotten by Louis XVIII in his hasty flight—was known to Alexander. The Tsar, in spite of this proof of Bourbon duplicity, was still disposed to be lenient towards France. Motives of altruism, judged by his allies to be wholly exaggerated, and a kind of mystical piety (which, as we shall later see, resulted in the negotiations leading to the pact of the Holy Alliance), now guided his policy. But the Russian troops had taken only a minor part in the Waterloo campaign and the Tsar found his prestige sensibly diminished.

The Prussians now demanded an indemnity of 1,200,000,000 francs, but compromised on a permission to occupy Luxembourg. The situation was also improved by the dismissal of Talleyrand.

¹ See Talleyrand, *op. cit.*, p. 550, and Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 36. Debidour recognizes the full importance of the influence exercised by the War of 1812 upon European affairs during this period.

² See Talleyrand, *op. cit.*, appendix, p. 561.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

The latter, informed by Royal decision that his services were no longer needed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disappeared from the scene. A new minister, the Duke of Richelieu, acceptable both to Russia and the Allies, was installed in his place. It was on these terms that the second Treaty of Paris was signed on November 20, 1815.¹

On the same day, another treaty of the utmost significance in the development of the System of 1815 was signed between Austria, Russia and Great Britain. This was known as the Treaty of Alliance and contained the following important clause:

Article VI. In order to consolidate the intimate ties which unite the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under their own auspices or by their representative ministers, meetings consecrated to great common objects and the examination of such measures as shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of Europe.²

The above article (which was a substitute for one proposed by the Tsar calling upon the Allies to give proofs of the "permanency and intimacy of their union") had been modified by Castlereagh to suit the reluctance of the English Cabinet to ally themselves definitely to any system of "European action" indefinitely prolonged or even to indorse permanently "the principles consecrated by the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna."³

No reference whatsoever was made in the highly practical terms of the articles of either the "Treaty of Alliance" or the Treaty of Paris to a treaty signed on September 26 by the sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia, a pact subsequently known as the "Holy Alliance." It now remains for us to consider the significance of this manifesto and its relation to the System of 1815.

Had Alexander rested upon his military laurels as the conqueror of Napoleon, his fame would have been safe for all time. His experiences during the debates of Vienna were in many ways a bitter disillusion to the Tsar-Idealist. As Rain remarks:

The aureole of triumph that had long hovered about the head of the Emperor of Russia grew pale during the Congress. He had arrived in Vienna like a conqueror, expecting to play the rôle of arbiter of Europe in the old capital of the Holy Roman Empire—and to hold the position he had assumed since the beginning of the coalition. He had, however, only triumphed among the ladies and in the salons. In the conference

¹ Martens, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 682.

² *Ibid.*, p. 737.

³ Phillips, *op. cit.*, pp. 134 *et seq.*

he had been tricked—bamboozled¹—and his diplomacy mastered by that of Metternich. He found his life-long dreams opposed and misunderstood by his closest advisers, and even under the most favorable conditions impossible of realization.²

It appears certain that Alexander had planned to bring to the attention of the assembled sovereigns the generous schemes for international organization and “concerted” action which he had first proposed in his Instructions to Novosiltzov and embodied in the military treaties preceding the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont. But at Vienna the inopportune return of Napoleon, coinciding with his diplomatic struggles to revive Polish nationality, prevented any elaboration of these plans. Moreover, Alexander was absent with his armies at the time most appropriate for the consideration of such matters, during the closing days of the conference, and the “Final Act” of the Congress, drawn up by Gentz and edited by Metternich, was a triumph of their cold-blooded system of “real politics.”

Concerning the period of Vienna, Alexander later wrote to his friend Golytzine. From this letter we learn of his desire to secure from the representatives of the Powers assembled in the old capital of the Holy Roman Empire some definite recognition of the principles to which he believed himself committed. He felt—not without reason—that so favorable an opportunity might never again recur to lay the foundations for a general treaty of peace. This letter (dated February 15, 1822) is also highly interesting because it contains Alexander’s own version of the origin of the Treaty of the “Holy Alliance:”

. . . You tell me to return to my policy and ways of thinking such as these existed between the year 1812 until my departure for Vienna. You appear to suppose that in some way I have changed my manner of thinking since that time. What stay in Vienna have you in mind? (Do you refer to that which I made during the congress of 1814?) . . . You seem to forget that the plan of the “Holy Alliance” came into my mind at that time. I have frequently told you it was to crown all my work there. It was only the return of Napoleon from Elba which, by bringing our stay in Vienna to a close, forced me to postpone the execution of this plan until after a new period of struggle which was happily ended through the aid of Providence. At Paris, when Napoleon, through the grace of God, was overthrown for the second time, the Most High enabled me to realize the plan which I had cherished since the Congress, and permitted me to trace upon paper the Act of which you

¹ Rain, writing in 1910, here uses the word *bafoué*.

² Rain, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

have knowledge. As soon as I returned to Petersburg I composed my manifesto, by which the act of the "Holy Alliance" was made public, and which a little later, on January 1, 1816, I published to the world . . .¹

In the first days of September, 1815—not without intention of restoring the prestige which the Russian armies had lost by their absence from the glorious field of Waterloo—Alexander decided to display their well-trained strength as a diplomatic reminder to his allies.² A great review of the entire Russian force was held upon the Plain of Vertus, near Châlons. This spectacle the Tsar also determined was to be the dramatic prelude to what he now considered the most important political act of his career, the manifesto of a Holy Alliance of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace.

On September 10 the magnificent troops of Alexander's guard and line (drilled even in war to a state of precision, for which the Emperor Paul's "paradomania" was largely responsible) passed before the Russian sovereign and his guests, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia. Following the straight files of the grenadiers came the turbulent ranks of the Cossacks, the wild cavalry of the steppes, whose exploits during Napoleon's retreat had given them a wide reputation throughout Europe. The religious ceremony was perhaps the most remarkable part of the spectacle. On the broad plain seven altars had been erected, where the imposing ritual of the Greek service was celebrated in the presence of this reverent host. Their thundering responses to the chanting of the priests showed them ready to die with fanatical zeal at the word of their Autocrat.

Still under the powerful influence of this significant military pageant,³ the sovereigns present at the review were invited by Alexander to affix their signatures to the famous document subsequently known to history as the "Holy Alliance."⁴ On September 14/26 the Tsar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia formally declared that henceforth their united policy had but a single object:

¹ Given in full by the Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhailowitch, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 221 *et seq.*

² This great review is considered by Pasquier to have been held with the generous object of "bringing the Allies to adopt a more moderate conduct towards France." *Mémoires*, vol. iv, p. 22. See also Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, *Mémoires*, p. 202.

³ See note, Rain, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

⁴ While detailed to the French Fourth Army, in 1917, the author came across a monument—shattered by German shell fire—which was erected near Châlons to commemorate the Tsar Alexander's dream of perpetual peace.

To manifest before the whole universe their unshakable determination to take as their sole guide, both in the administration of their respective states and in their political relations with other governments, the precepts of religion, namely, the rules of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace.

These precepts, far from being applicable only to private life, should, on the contrary, govern the decisions of Princes, and direct them in all their negotiations, forming, as they must, the only means of giving permanence to human institutions and remedying their imperfections.

Following this unusual preamble came the terms of a diplomatic agreement, no less extraordinary in the eyes of contemporary statesmen:

Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the three contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity. Considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions and in all places lend each other aid and assistance; towards their subjects and armies, they will extend a fatherly care and protection, leading them (in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are themselves animated) to protect Religion, Peace and Justice. [Article I.]

In consequence, the sole principle in force, whether as between the said Governments or as between their subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by an unalterable goodwill the mutual affection with which they should be animated. They will consider themselves as members of one and the same Christian nation; the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family. The rulers of Austria, Prussia and Russia thus confess that the Christian world of which they and their people form a part has in reality no other sovereign than Him to Whom alone power rightfully belongs . . . Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind. [Article II.]

All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act—and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations . . . that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them—will be received with equal ardor and affection into this Holy Alliance. [Article III.]¹

The language of the pact thus suddenly presented by the Tsar to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia for their signatures had no parallel in the archives of diplomacy. In adhering to the Holy Alliance these sovereigns bound themselves to nothing

¹ This version is made from the French original in Martens, vol. II, pp. 656-658. Cf. also, *British State Papers*, vol. III, pp. 211-212.

more than a promise to observe in their foreign and domestic policy "the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind"; yet, as Gentz reports, they were "amazed and terrified"¹ by the possible consequences of their act. Reliance upon moral principles so general and widesweeping were indeed to lead to policies and events unforeseen at the time by their author.

But in order to understand aright the meaning which the mystical invocation of the Holy Alliance connoted in the mind of Alexander, it now becomes necessary briefly to consider some of the later inspirations of the Tsar's internationalism. Alexander's early training under Laharpe, a follower of that Rousseau who had summarized and put in his own persuasive language the principles of the Abbé de St. Pierre's project for perpetual peace, accounts for the clear and lucid argumentation of the secret Instructions to Novosiltzov. His letter to Golytzine (1822), which recounts, in retrospect, the origins of the Holy League, is also significant. Golytzine's mystical and religious influence began during the days of the invasion of Russia by Napoleon's Grand Army. It is beyond the purpose of this study to consider, at length, Alexander's later relations to the Baroness de Krüdener and the French reactionary philosopher, Bergasse, in whom contemporary historians saw the direct inspiration of the Act of September 14/26, 1815.² These relations, of great interest in themselves, belong rather to an intimate and personal biography of Alexander. To the student of psychology—especially the psychology of the reformer—they have a value which it would be difficult to overestimate. But in a study of the real influences of the Holy Alliance upon the organization of Europe, they need only to be mentioned in passing.

It was shortly after the return of Napoleon from Elba, while the Tsar was hastening through Germany to join his armies in France, that he first met this extraordinary woman who was to be so strangely associated with his preparation and promulgation of the Holy Alliance. It was by a combination of circumstances, probably not wholly fortuitous, that the "sibyl" found herself for the first time face to face with her sovereign and future pupil.³

¹ Gentz, *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, vol. 1, p. 216.

² See Metternich's statement in the following chapter; also Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 23.

³ Madame de Krüdener's life has been written in two volumes by Eynard. An entertaining biography largely drawn from the above, *Life and Letters of Madame de Krüdener*, has appeared in English by C. Ford. She was also the subject of two of St.

Following this first brief interview, during which the Tsar seems to have been much impressed by Madame de Krüdener's personality, he invited her to join him in Paris when her prophecies concerning the overthrow of Napoleon should be fulfilled. On July 14, 1815, she appeared in that capital, her arrival almost coinciding with that of the victorious Tsar. She was lodged in quarters in convenient proximity to those occupied by Alexander himself. Her salons soon became the scene of an almost continual "prayer meeting." While Madame de Krüdener still assisted publicly at the elaborate services of the Greek rite, celebrated in the Tsar's chapel at the Elysee, the private reunions in her own home were modeled on the simple gathering of the early Christians.¹ Whenever the Tsar honored her gatherings with his presence, Madame de Krüdener, falling on her knees, would commence a long prayer, generally reciting the triumphs of religion as exemplified in Alexander's victories, together with pressing demands for the general repentance and conversion of mankind. Her aims seem to have included a general reconciliation of all the churches of Europe. It was to aid her in this work that she appealed especially to the repentant Tsar, a task he may well have believed related to his own international aims.

Mystified by the strange relationship between Madame de Krüdener and her Imperial "disciple," contemporary writers have undoubtedly exaggerated her influence. Extravagant stories were told concerning the mystical ceremonies that attended their interviews. The language used by the "initiated" was in itself calculated to excite suspicion and ridicule. The vocabulary of Madame de Krüdener finds an echo in Alexander's letters and even in his official documents—a fact which probably gave rise to the rumor that she either wrote with her own hand or inspired many of his political acts. That she was responsible, however, for any of the Tsar's political theories is not only denied by contemporary

Beuves' literary "portraits." Barbara Julie de Weitinghov was born in Riga in the year 1764. When their first meeting took place, she was therefore considerably older than Alexander (born 1777) and certainly well past the bloom of her former beauty. (Ford, *op. cit.*, p. 4.) Her father was a Senator of the Empire, sincerely pro-Russian in spite of his Baltic ancestry. Her early religious environment was that of the Greek Orthodox Church. She was married at an early age to Baron de Krüdener—and after a youth of pleasure and frivolity became a mystical *religieuse* and devoted to good works.

¹ These were attended, however, principally by members of the highest society. Among her congregation were the Duchess of Bourbon and Duras, Mme. Recamier (who was asked to make herself "as ugly as possible so as not to trouble souls"), Chateaubriand and Benjamin Constant. Eynard, *Vie de Madame de Krüdener*, vol. II, p. 30.

writers,¹ but is also rendered highly improbable from all that is known of her teachings. It is difficult, moreover, to conceive that an experienced statesman like the Tsar should have been more than superficially influenced by such a source of political advice. Recent evidence tends to prove that another member of Madame de Krüdener's circle was infinitely more influential than the Baroness in this respect.

The part played by the reactionary philosopher Bergasse in the preparation of the Holy Alliance is defined by another contemporary writer, Leopold de Gaillard.² Bergasse was a political writer of some note under the first Bourbon restoration. However reactionary his theories may have been, they were at any rate the result of scientific inquiry, not of mystical inspiration. From Gaillard's account, it becomes evident that Bergasse furnished the "political" theories, while Madame de Krüdener furnished the language and inspiration of the Tsar's manifesto. Bergasse seems to have dreamed of a system of theocracy, vicariously asserting itself through the institution of legitimate monarchy. The reign of universal peace he believed might be secured through an active cooperation between the Kings of Christendom, the "Lord's anointed" on earth. The rights of man with difficulty found a place in this new order of ideas, although their rulers were bound by higher laws to respect them. However mystical and impracticable such a doctrine might appear to the statesmen of Europe, it was, nevertheless, to be the principle he besought Alexander to apply to the adjustment of international differences.

The influence of Bergasse long outlasted that of the "Lettonian sibyl." Even during the Congress of Verona he continued in correspondence with the Tsar, urging that he use the might of the "Holy League" to stamp out the power of the revolutionary "sects." There is also evidence of somewhat stilted and formal

¹ "I do not know upon what foundations the authors of the two histories of Alexander have been pleased to attribute to the exalted imagination of Madame de Krüdener the idea of the Holy Alliance and the League of universal peace,—a noble project, which could only have had birth in the mind of Alexander himself. Neither at that time nor afterwards, when on several occasions he conversed with me, did the Emperor pronounce the name of the author of *Valerie*, although he often spoke of the celebrated literary men of past times and of the present, and even of women distinguished for their wit and intelligence, such as Madame de Stael, whose great talents he admired." Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, p. 153.

² Quoted in *Bergasse: A Defender of Old Tradition under the Revolution*. This interesting collection of family papers has a valuable introduction by M. Etienne Lamy, member of the French Academy.

requests on Alexander's part for further light upon the subject.¹ It soon becomes evident, however, that the Tsar was tired of the torrent of advice poured out by this loquacious valetudinarian. The influence of Nicholas Bergasse—an influence which has perhaps not been sufficiently reckoned with in judging of the reactionary phase of Alexander's policy—appears to have ended in much the same way as other momentarily preponderating influences in the life of the great idealist. Like Czartoryski, Speranski, Madame de Krüdener and other lesser oracles, Bergasse "became a bore" and was somewhat brutally discarded in consequence. The Tsar possessed to a finished degree the faculty of taking advice when he needed it to support his own faltering judgment. But once his course was decided upon, he became suspicious and intolerant of anything that savored of direction. Like all convinced doctrinaires, he abhorred sermons unless he himself occupied the pulpit.

¹The "sects" in this correspondence seem to have played the rôle of the "reds" in our own time. Alexander's note of acknowledgment dated 4/16 August, 1822, admits that he has "only been able to consider these matters *hastily*." *Bergasse*, p. 383.

CHAPTER I

THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE

"A Congress of Kings was to be held at Cambray. It was to consist of Maximilian the Emperor, Francis the First king of France, Henry the Eighth of England, and Charles, the sovereign of the low countries. They were to enter, in the most solemn manner, into mutual and indissoluble engagements to preserve Peace with each other, and consequently, Peace throughout Europe . . . But certain persons, who get nothing by Peace and a great deal by War, threw obstacles in the way, which prevented this truly kingly purpose from being carried into execution." Erasmus, *The Complaint of Peace* (1517).

Through their adhesion to the "Act of September 14, 1815," on the Plain of Vertus, the chief Continental Powers had reluctantly signed the acknowledgment of an obligation to "common action."¹ If the mystical language of the "Holy Alliance" contained any practical meaning this lay in its affirmation that the sovereigns of Europe should "on all occasions and in all places lend each other aid and assistance." Nor was this to be a "partial and exclusive alliance." All Powers who should choose solemnly to avow its "sacred principles" were to be received in its bonds "with equal ardor and affection." Before noting the effect of this invitation upon the non-signatory Powers, it would be well to consider certain evidence concerning the attitude of the signers themselves toward the vague program to which they found themselves pledged.

The spirit in which Alexander's cherished scheme for a Christian League of Peace was received by his allies is perhaps best shown in Metternich's own account of the events just preceding the signature of the manifesto:

During the course of the negotiations which brought about the signature of the second Peace of Paris, the Emperor Alexander asked me for an interview. He then informed me that he was busy with a great enterprise concerning which he especially desired to consult the Emperor Francis. "There are certain matters," said the Tsar, "which can only be considered in the light of intimate beliefs. Moreover, such beliefs are entirely subject to influences and considerations of a personal character. If this matter were purely an affair of state, I would immediately have asked for your advice. The subject, however, is one of such a

¹ The name of Holy "Alliance" or "League" was a popular designation. With reference to the much discussed adhesion of the Prince Regent of Great Britain, Gentz observes: "The Prince Regent, either carelessly or to be agreeable—or even to make fun of his August Ally (the latter is very possible in view of the fact that his signature had no value without a countersign) answered with an autograph letter adhering to the pact." Gentz, *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, vol. I, p. 217.

nature that the council of official advisers can be of no use. It is one requiring the decisions of sovereigns themselves” Several days afterwards, the Emperor Francis sent for me and informed me that he had just returned from a visit to the Tsar, who had asked him to come alone to discuss matters of high importance. “The subject of our conversation,” said the Emperor, “you will understand, after reading the document the Tsar has submitted to me with the request I give it my earnest attention For my own part, I have no sympathies with the ideas it contains, which have given me food for great unrest.”

It did not require any very serious study to convince me the document had no other value or sense except considered as a philanthropic aspiration cloaked in religious phraseology. I was convinced it could in no way be considered the subject of a treaty between sovereigns, and that it might even give rise to grave misinterpretations of a religious character.¹

Metternich found the King of Prussia, who had also been consulted by Alexander, averse to thwarting the desire of his powerful ally, but equally doubtful as to the propriety of signing the manifesto in its original form. It was only after Metternich had, not without difficulty, secured the Tsar's consent to a number of changes that the promised signatures of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia were finally obtained. In the case of Emperor Francis this act was executed (as Metternich states) “in spite of a natural antipathy with which the whole project inspired him.” In closing his account of the above transaction, Metternich adds the following significant, though somewhat disingenuous, paragraph:

The irrefutable proof of what I have detailed above is found in the fact that subsequently there never was any question among the Cabinets of Europe of a “Holy Alliance”; that no such questions indeed could arise. It was only those hostile to the monarchical party who sought to exploit this act and use it as a weapon of calumny against its authors. The Holy Alliance was never founded to restrain the liberties of the people, nor to advance the cause of absolutism. It was solely the expression of the mystical beliefs of the Emperor Alexander; the application of the principles of Christianity to public policy. It is from this strange mixture of religious and political theories that the conception of the Holy Alliance arose. It was developed under the influence of Madame de Krüdener and Monsieur Bergasse. No one knows better than myself the true meaning of this empty and sonorous document.²

Metternich (who at a later date was to turn to the purposes of Austrian diplomacy the bond of indiscriminate solidarity which Alexander believed to be the essence of the Holy Alliance) always insisted upon the essential difference between the League of Sover-

¹Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. 1, pp. 209-210.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 211-212.

eigns and the "conventional" agreements of the System of 1815. Posterity, he believed, would ascribe to his "system"—rather than to the Tsar's manifesto—the credit for the long peace enjoyed by Europe from the downfall of Napoleon to the outbreak of the Crimean War. Perhaps the truest conception of this much-misunderstood document may be obtained from the writings of the two philosophers to whom Alexander was chiefly indebted for his political theories—Bergasse and Laharpe.

Two fundamental ideas (wrote Bergasse) appear as the basis of the Treaty of the Holy Alliance: The Sovereignty of God, the Brotherhood of Mankind.

The spectacle offered by the events of the Revolution has afforded a terrible lesson both to the nations and their rulers. The catastrophes which have shaken the foundations of Europe had one fundamental cause: the weakening of the bonds of religion and the resulting corruption of both peoples and princes. This corruption of public morals brought with it inevitable disorder and anarchy. The systematic repudiation of all Divine Law—and the pretensions advanced by those who believed only in the sovereign rights of man—were the fundamentals of revolutionary doctrine. According to these theories (had such a result been possible) organized disorder would have been permanently established, thus inaugurating a period of fresh disasters.

In the presence of such a possibility it became a great and solemn necessity to proclaim as a guiding principle the sovereignty of the Divine Will—and the essential doctrine that nations as well as individuals must obey His laws if they desire to continue in a state of peace and prosperity.¹

In the face of the general criticism which the mystical language of Alexander's manifesto aroused, even his old teacher Laharpe was moved to defend the good intentions—and good sense—of his Imperial pupil. There was little in common, however, between the theories of the Holy Alliance and his own philosophical precepts. His half-hearted explanations are chiefly interesting because of his early relations to the Tsar.

In answer to an article on "Alexander of Russia," by Impeytany, Laharpe wrote:

Although intrepid in the midst of danger, Alexander had a horror of war. Thoroughly aware of the abuses that excite the discontent of nations, he hoped that during a lengthened peace, the want of which was generally felt, the governments of Europe, recognizing the importance of undertaking such reforms as the necessities of the age called for, would seriously apply themselves to that work. To this end a state of profound tranquillity was indispensable; and as the confusion of the

¹ Bergasse: *A Defender of Old Tradition under the Revolution*, pp. 261-262.

past thirty years appeared to have greatly weakened the old ideas of order and subordination, he thought to offer a remedy by making a solemn appeal to religion. So far at least as this monarch is concerned, no doubt such an appeal was an emanation proceeding from his own noble heart; but the genius of evil soon took possession of these philanthropic conceptions, and turned them against himself. The assemblage in the "Plaine de Vertus" (14 September, 1815) of a Russian army of 160,000 men ready for the field, struck with amazement the diplomatic corps of Europe, who were present at the imposing spectacle; but such an exhibition of the military strength of a vast empire alarmed them much less than the invisible power and perfect moral influence which the greatness of soul and well-known principles of the monarch who now reviewed his troops had created. At this period, indeed, from north to south, from east to west, the eyes of the oppressed were turned towards Alexander I; but from this moment also is to be dated the conspiracy which secretly plotted to strip him of that formidable moral power, which gave him for auxiliaries every friend of enlightenment and humanity—the universal cooperation of honest men. Disposed by the native moderation of his character to consent to anything which might remove fears of his preponderating influence, and willing at any price to dissipate the alarm that was feigned or felt, he consented to the establishment of a court of Areopagus, where a majority of votes should decide the measures to be taken in common for the maintenance of the general tranquillity. The genius of evil quickly caught a glimpse of the advantage he might reap from so generous an abrogation of this preponderating influence. Thanks to the troublesome and vexatious turn the members managed to give to the progress of ordinary affairs, the confidence of the nations was impaired, and the magnanimous monarch who had so well deserved it saw it lost, amid the impious acclamations of the enemies to his glory, who did not hesitate to impute to his obstinate and absolute will, measures the most unpopular which they dictated in their Areopagus.¹

The suspicions and distrust with which his declaration of peace and good will was received by the Powers of Europe² caused Alexander to take decisive measures to correct the impression that his "Great Enterprise" was intended to hide a policy of self-interest. On March 18, 1816 (following an Imperial *ukase* ordering that a manifesto summarizing the treaty of the Holy Alliance be read in all the churches of the Empire), Alexander wrote a long letter to his Ambassador in London, Count Lieven, disclaiming any intention of hostile action "against non-Christian nations." He protested with pathetic vehemence

¹ Schnitzler, *Secret History of the Court and Government of Russia*, vol. 1, pp. 70–72.

² Writing under date of October, 1815, de Maistre describes the effect produced in St. Petersburg by the signing of the Holy Alliance: "This document has not yet been printed, but has been read at Gastchina in the presence of the Empress . . . Its author is Alexander himself, who writes with great facility and elegance." Joseph de Maistre, *Lettres*, vol. 1, p. 360.

against the calumny which persisted in considering this act of Christian love and fraternity as masking a plan for further conquest.¹

In this declaration, written by Alexander's own hand, we may recognize not only the spirit of mystical ardor which lay at the root of the "Holy Treaty," but also the very style and dialect of this extraordinary document.

The letter to Lieven was, moreover, a renewed appeal to Great Britain to join the chief Powers of Europe in their Pact of Peace. At the time the Holy Alliance was promulgated the Prince Regent had refused to become a party to this supplemental treaty, "not because of the principles set forth," but because (as he declared in a letter of October 6, 1816) "the Act of September 26, 1815, was personally concluded by the signatory sovereigns while the British Constitution demanded that treaties should be signed by the responsible Ministers."²

Liberal opinion in Great Britain had shown itself immediately suspicious of this Brotherhood of Sovereigns, and indeed of the whole language and tone of the "Holy Pact." Partisan spirit and a desire to embarrass the government were undoubtedly at the bottom of many of the fiery speeches made by the Liberals in

¹The letter is given in full in Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhaïlowitch, *L'Empereur Alexandre Ier*, vol. I, pp. 171-172:

ST. PETERSBURG, March 18th.

TO MY AMBASSADOR, COUNT LIEVEN, Sir:

Having considered it advisable to give wide currency to the Act of Fraternal and Christian Alliance concluded the 14th of September last (old style) with my Allies, H. M. the Emperor of Austria and H. M. the King of Prussia, I have decided to expose both its spirit and true meaning to the persons who, like yourself, are charged with interpreting my intentions, at the courts allied with Russia. The explanations which I will now give, will allow of no further misconceptions with respect to the act itself, nor of the manifesto announcing it to my people.

The mass of rumors which have reached me respecting the false interpretations given to this guarantee of union and harmony show the high importance of some more precise explanation regarding the motives upon which it is based. The Genius of Evil, overthrown by the hand of a Providence which disposes as it wills of both sovereigns and their people, now makes a final effort to besmirch the terms of this Declaration by suggesting political motives as incompatible with the intentions which have inspired it as they are contrary to the salutary end it is destined to fulfil. My allies and myself, moved by the same noble purposes which inspired the last great European struggle, have had no other end in view than the means of applying more efficaciously to both the civil polity and external relations of States the principles of Peace, Concord and Love, which are the fruit of the Christian Religion.

It has been our pleasure to consider this act a means of associating ourselves with the very essence of these saving precepts—rules of conduct which have been too long confined to the sphere of private relationships.

²Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 22. Except for this obvious and informal approval of the Christian principles affirmed in the Holy Alliance there is no other ground for the statement that Great Britain ever adhered to this pact.

Parliament and the denunciations that soon appeared in the newspapers of the day. During the two brief sessions of Parliament which considered the question of the new treaty it is doubtful whether the opposition fully realized the importance of the subject upon which they poured forth their critical eloquence. This was particularly true in the case of Brougham. It was the old grievance of "secret diplomacy" and the "clique" directing the policy of the Foreign Office which excited his wrath.

In the session of the House of Commons held February 8, 1816, Mr. Brougham stated that he

would now move for the production of two papers which, though he had reason to believe they existed, were not to be found in the great mass laid before the House. The first he considered with great jealousy and alarm, coupled with the speech made from the Throne and the declarations of the Noble Lord. It was a treaty (dated September 25, 1815)¹ between Austria, Russia and Prussia, a treaty to which this country was not a party, nor yet France. It was ratified the 25th of December, a day ostentatiously mentioned as the Birthday of our Saviour. The treaty was of a very general nature and seemed to have no definite practical or secular object but professed to relate to the interests of the Christian nations. He suspected more was meant by this than met the eye.²

Formally answering the above statement, Lord Castlereagh merely stated: "I believe the treaty had no evil views whatsoever."

Referring to a treaty alleged to have been signed between France and Austria and some other Power "to which Mr. Brougham had referred in an earlier part of his speech," Lord Castlereagh somewhat superciliously declared "he could not understand to what paper the former referred." He closed his formal acknowledgment of Brougham's interpellation by declaring that the treaties as he understood them were "concluded in the mildest spirit of Christian tolerance," although he admitted "that they were drawn up in a manner rather unusual."

During the session of the House of Commons held on February 9,³ Brougham renewed his attack upon the treaty, which, it is to be noted, still remained unnamed. "The sovereigns," he began, "have *merely* bound themselves to observe their mutual engagements and to promote the Christian faith." "What engagements," he asked, "are these, and why is it necessary to protect the Christian faith?"

¹ The "Noble Lord" was Castlereagh—the treaty, that of September 14/26, 1815.

² London Times, February 9, 1816, p. 2, col. 2.

³ Ibid., February 10, 1816, p. 2, cols. 3-4.

"Something in the very language adopted, though it professed no practical or secular object, bears in itself a character of suspicion." Continuing in the same tone of biting sarcasm he referred with telling effect to the fact that the very Powers which had become a party to the League were those which had joined in the great international infamy of the partition of Poland. "Even the language of diplomacy," he declared, "can not disguise the fact that a similar intention is probably maintained at the present moment." Here the speaker was interrupted by loud Liberal cheering. When this had died away, Brougham moved an address to the Prince Regent, asking both for the production of the treaties and of another treaty dated January 26, 1815, concerning "guarantees against Russia."

Castlereagh's reply was a model of moderation and debating skill. "If the sovereigns had not coalesced," he advanced, "Europe would never have been relieved." The success of the Confederation was due "entirely to the present conferences of the sovereigns. At Chaumont the sovereigns had expressly reserved the right to make separate engagements not contrary to the general objects of the war." Castlereagh felt he could even admit that the Emperor of Russia had shown him a rough draft of the agreement referred to, before it was submitted to the other sovereigns, and at the same time had requested him to invite the Prince Regent to accede to the treaty. His answer to this request had been that it was not usual for the British Government to be a party to treaties concluded in such a form. At the same time he added his assurances that every good disposition was felt toward the object of the arrangement, which was not directed against "an un-Christian Power," as was very generally believed.

Mr. Bennett, another prominent leader of the Liberal opposition, now took up the line of attack where Brougham had left off. "Lord Castlereagh's arrogant tone," he declared, "seems to consider independent states at his disposal so that he *decides* their fate according to his will; one to be weakened, the third divided, etc." He then censured the Noble Lord for the tone of eulogy which he had used in connection with the Alliance which Mr. Brougham had brought to his attention. He characterized it as a compact "conspicuously against the freedom and rights of the subjects of the sovereigns concerned."

This brief outburst of Liberal hostility to the first announcement of the Holy Alliance appears to have been without immediate result. For many weeks all further discussion of the matter was avoided in Parliament. By a party vote of 30 against 104 (a division along party lines), Brougham's motion was defeated. The deep waters of the ministerial majority closed silently over the whole matter. A brief editorial appeared in the *Times* of February 9, generally unfavorable in its tone to the principles of the Holy Alliance. But even the Thunderer kept silence in the face of the governmental policy which counseled Great Britain to consolidate a necessary friendship between Great Britain and the Tsar of Russia.

* * * * *

Just one hundred years ago the young philosopher Emerson wrote concerning the states of Europe in his Concord Diaries:

Aloof from contagion during the long progress of their decline, America hath ample interval to lay deep and solid foundations for the greatness of the New World.¹

Let the young American withdraw his eyes from all but his own country, and try, if he can, to find employment there . . . In this age the despots of Europe are engaged in the common cause of tightening the bonds of monarchy about the thriving liberties and the laws of men; and the unprivileged orders, the bulk of human society, gasping for breath beneath their chains, and darting impatient glances towards the free institution of other countries. To America, therefore, monarchs look with apprehension, and the people with hope.²

During the great crisis of reconstruction following the Napoleonic Wars, Emerson in voicing the liberal opinion of New England but repeated the warnings of Washington. Yet many reasons insistently urged a "moral participation" in European affairs. Moreover, the invitation extended to the United States to share in the councils of Europe, as we shall have cause to note in the present chapter, was no less insistent than at the present day.

The decision which the statesmen of the Washington Cabinet were called upon to take with respect to American participation in the affairs of Europe during the period from 1815 to 1818 recalls the no less momentous problems of the present time.

During the period of reconstruction preceding the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Alexander was apparently convinced that in

¹ Emerson, *Journals*, vol. 1820-1824, p. 201.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

order to obtain the "universality" which he desired for his system, the "Holy League" must include not only the Christian Powers of the continent, but also Great Britain and the United States. His efforts to persuade the two English-speaking nations to adhere to his pact of "Justice, Christian Charity and Peace" form an interesting chapter in the development of internationalism. It soon became evident that, in spite of the duties laid upon her by the Treaties of Chaumont, Paris and Vienna, England was determined to return as quickly as possible to her policy of independent action—and as Canning subsequently announced, to "resume her isolation."

Conservative opinion in England may have leaned to the side of the Powers of the Holy Alliance when these concerted their measures against revolution.¹ So far as revolution against the Bourbons in France was concerned they were indeed bound to concerted action by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance.² It was not until after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle that the British Cabinet were called upon to draw fine distinctions between what a constitutional government might or might not do to assist a group of reactionary allies in applying broad measures of repression in every corner of Europe. But from the beginning Alexander seems to have been suspicious of the spirit shown by the opposition in Parliament³ towards his League, and to have sought to exploit the differences between Great Britain and the United States in a sense favorable to his own policy of an "unalterable" union among the Great Powers.

In the United States the policy debated by the Monroe Cabinet and the conclusions arrived at were to fix the course of American foreign affairs until our own day. When the repeated appeals of the Tsar's envoys had failed to obtain results which their master so ardently desired, Alexander's sensitive pride caused

¹ But even Lord Castlereagh was early "obliged to pretend to disapprove of the continental system of the Holy Alliance." Greville, *Memoirs*, vol. I, p. 105. See also Hansard's Debates, vol. II, p. 359.

² Article II of the Treaty of Alliance bound the signatory Powers to common action against the "same revolutionary principles that caused the recent usurpation in France." Martens, *Nouveau Recueil des Traites de Paix*, vol. II, pp. 735-736.

³ The confusion of modern writers with respect to British policy towards the Quadruple Alliance which she signed and the Holy Alliance which she diplomatically opposed is scarcely understandable. Often, however, in writings of the time "the expressions Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance are used synonymously." Cf. Boyce, *The Diplomatic Relations of England with the Quadruple Alliance, 1815-1830*, University of Iowa Studies, vol. VII, no. 1.

him to bury in the limbo of his secret official *dossiers* all traces of these negotiations. But in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office proofs are not lacking of the long and patient efforts made between the years 1816 and 1819 to induce the great American Republic to abandon her policy of "isolation" and to play a part in an "international" system.

At a time when the fear of Napoleon had united the powers of Europe in common measures of political and military action, the United States were already separated and estranged from the victorious Powers of the Grand Alliance by reasons arising from the great war itself. The neutrality of the principal American state, maintained with the greatest difficulty, had ended in a quarrel with both antagonists. The problems which arose from the enforcement of the British Orders in Council (May, 1806) and of Napoleon's retaliatory Berlin Decrees (November, 1806) had found a poor solution in Jefferson's Non-Intercourse Act (1809). Yet in 1810 Napoleon's ready diplomacy had successfully committed the United States to a course favorable to the French view of this doubly declared "blockade." Although in practice the Emperor had relaxed none of the severity of the Rambouillet Decrees under which American shipmasters groaned, the wrongs of the "quasi-war" with France were forgotten in an open breach between the United States and Great Britain. During the War of 1812 the ports of Havre and Brest became the home stations whence American privateers sailed forth to prey upon British commerce.¹ When two years later the treaties of Kalisch, Toeplitz and Chaumont had gathered the Powers of Europe in progressively strengthening bonds of international solidarity, the young American Republic found itself internationally "suspect"—bound by an unsatisfactory and informal truce to the tottering Napoleonic colossus and at open war with one of the principal members of the coalition.

It was, however, Great Britain's desire to sit with her allies at the council table of Vienna, backed by the full force of her land and sea power. This desire, indeed, was a chief factor in bringing to a close the indecisive quarrel of 1812. Lord Castlereagh, on

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, pp. 324-332. An interesting proof of the care with which the development of Anglo-American relations was followed by the Tsar is afforded by the long report drawn up by the diplomatic free lance Gentz for Nesselrode, in April, 1812, re the Orders in Council. Nesselrode, *Letters and Papers, 1760-1850*, vol. iv, p. 223.

his way to attend the Great Council at Vienna, had stopped at Ghent (in August, 1814) to hasten the British negotiations toward the signing of a treaty.¹ In view of his own friendly efforts to bring about an earlier reconciliation² between his ally and the young republic, Alexander may readily have believed that it would be no difficult task to persuade the American Government to adhere to a wider system of world peace.

The general invitation addressed to "all Powers who shall choose to avow its sacred principles" contained in the final articles of the Holy Treaty had now been accepted by an imposing number of "minor Powers." The first among these was the liberal-minded King of Württemberg (August 17, 1816). The King of Saxony adhered to the declarations (in May, 1817), as well as the Kings of Sardinia and the Netherlands. Soon the Free Hanseatic cities and the Republic of Switzerland—precedents of interest to the United States—followed their example.³ Moreover, one of the chief objections made in England to the terms of the Holy Alliance lacked force in America. This was the reference to "Christian Powers" so often repeated in its phraseology—a reference which was believed by the diplomatic circles of the Tsar's capital to contain some secret menace against the Ottoman Empire. Yet even this threat gave no apprehension to the Government at Washington, where Russian support of our policy in the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates was not forgotten. The personal popularity of Alexander and the aureole of liberalism which, though growing fainter, still hovered about the head of the pupil of the Republican philosopher Laharpe, probably caused phrases and expressions of his manifesto, considered ominous by liberal opinion abroad, to pass unnoticed.

The Holy Alliance was formally made public through the Imperial *ukase* of January 1, 1816. Although its obscure intentions caused a stir all over Europe, several months elapsed before the matter was noticed in the American newspapers of the day. On August 26, 1816, the New York *Evening Post* announced that "the King of the Netherlands has acceded to the Holy League; considering that it will have a beneficial effect on the state

¹ Dunning, *The British Empire and the United States*, p. 9.

² For the details of this negotiation, see Golder, "The Russian Offer of Mediation in the War of 1812," in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxxi, No. 3.

³ Martens, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 659. The Pope from reasons of religious policy still refused to join the "Pact."

of society and the reciprocal relations between nations." On September 4 of the same year a meeting of the sovereigns of the Holy Alliance is reported by the same paper "as likely to take place at Carlsbad." To this notice was added the following comment—certainly far from hostile in tone: "No doubt matters of great importance will be discussed at this assembly, and if discussions run upon the means of consolidating the peace of the world . . . and removing the burden of taxes and unwieldy military establishments which press at this moment upon every country, the members of the Holy League will establish an imperishable claim on the gratitude of mankind."¹

In *Niles Register*, a gazette published in Baltimore, may be found (April 6, 1816) definite expression of the generous approval which public opinion in America seems always ready to accord to schemes promising an increment of international solidarity and good will. The Massachusetts Peace Society, writing to the Emperor Alexander under date of April 9, "recalls to the attention of His Imperial Majesty that the Society was founded in the very week in which the Holy League of the three sovereigns was announced in Russia," and has as its object "*to disseminate the very principles avowed in the wonderful Alliance.*" In the same issue appears an announcement that the American Minister at St. Petersburg "is treated with great distinction. It is thought important negotiations are in progress."¹

The not unfavorable impression which the Tsar's project made in American diplomatic circles is shown in the correspondence of Levett Harris, the American chargé d'affaires at the Court of St. Petersburg:

The Treaty of triple alliance concluded at Paris will, before this comes to hand, be already known to you . . . This treaty, which originated with the Emperor Alexander, and *which does equal honor to his head and heart*, I fear will not answer the *magnanimous* purposes for which it was designed. If such were the case we should behold Europe ready to embrace the arts of peace, and see dissolving at once those monstrous combinations which have already lifted the world from its axis and now threaten to consummate the work of human woe.²

Levett Harris was one of the body of trained and experienced

¹ Files, New York Public Library.

² Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American Embassy, Petrograd.

diplomats who founded on a solid basis of good sense and good will the early foreign relations of the United States. He was too well aware of the deep rivalry separating the Allied Powers to believe in the cementing power of fine phrases—but he nevertheless seems to share the hopes entertained by a large number of his countrymen that Alexander's League might result in some permanent guarantee of European tranquillity. Harris, however, did not fail to note in his dispatches the commonly credited rumors that the six hundred thousand Russian troops still under arms "proved that the Tsar was meditating offensives in the Danubian provinces, if not elsewhere."¹

The task of maintaining the friendly relations which already existed between Russia and the United States and of obtaining their accession to the League was actively pursued by Alexander during the summer of 1816. On July 24/August 5, 1816, Mr. Levett Harris further reported to Secretary Monroe the following interesting conversation held the day before with one of the Tsar's principal advisers:

The Count Capo D'Istria, who engaged me at this interview in a conversation of an hour and a half's length, closed it by acquainting me that he had been preparing a communication to me relative to the Tripartite Treaty of the Sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia (the treaty called the "Holy Treaty") with a view to know the sentiments of the American Government on the subject. That if the United States chose to yield their assent to this treaty the Emperor would receive it with deference. That notwithstanding many opinions had gone abroad, on the subject of this League, it was none the less a solemn compact formed to preserve the peace of Europe, and that whilst Russia continued to hold her present power this peace would not be troubled. I observed that it was notorious that peace had been a leading feature of our policy, and that we had reason to hope that we should not again be soon forced to depart from this policy. As Mr. Pinkney, I trusted, would soon feel himself justified to repair here—I begged that any communication of the nature now suggested might be reserved for the period of his arrival.²

From his correspondence with Dashkov, the Russian envoy to the United States (1817), the Tsar appears to have had every reason to suppose that his overtures were meeting with a friendly reception in Washington. "It is assured," wrote Dashkov to

¹Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American Embassy, Petrograd.

²Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, July 24/August 5, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American Embassy, Petrograd.

Lieven, the Russian Ambassador at London, in an important dispatch, "that the American Government intends asking to be associated with the Holy League."¹

Dashkov, a diplomat of mediocre intelligence, was perhaps unduly impressed by the expressions of approval with which American idealists welcomed his master's policy. A pact which in its actual form merely obligated its signers to render each other vague "reciprocal service" and to cooperate "in accordance with the direction of the Holy Scriptures" for the attainment of the better practice of "religion, peace and justice," would naturally appeal to the generous sentimentality so often controlling public opinion in the United States with respect to foreign affairs. The absurdity of being treated as "brothers" by the three most reactionary sovereigns of Europe would probably have deterred but few among the kindly majority of the Massachusetts Peace Society from expressing their sympathy for the Tsar's "League of Peace." The vague and impracticable language in which this manifesto was couched might appear ominous to diplomats, but uninformed public opinion could hardly foresee the true meaning and inner significance of a pact apparently so generous, or that the future policy of the Holy Alliance, as applied during Alexander's later reactionary "phase," was destined to become an unqualified support of "legitimist principles" abhorrent to American ideals.

Dashkov neglected the fact that public opinion in the Republic during the existing internal "Era of Good Feeling" had little time to worry about foreign affairs. With respect to such matters the Tsar's envoy complains to Lieven that "they do not worry any more about me than if I were the Emperor of Japan."² He also complains that his opportunities for negotiations were nearly nil.

In the same connection he noted in an earlier dispatch his own version of the attention with which the cautious diplomacy of Adams and Monroe was following the development of the European situation. "It would seem that the government is not without anxiety concerning the effect that some of its actions will

¹February 22/March 6, 1817. MS. *United States*, Russian Foreign Office. Many of the MS. documents quoted relating to the United States have been listed in Golder's *Guide to Materials in American History in Russian Archives*.

²Dashkov to Lieven, MS. *United States*, 1817, Russian Foreign Office.

have upon Europe, and the way in which their aggressive projects will be considered. However, a certain cunning and great ability characterizes the present administration."¹ He also noted the significant fact that "an increase of the naval forces and a more direct interest in the commerce of the American continent forms the basis of the President's policy with respect to the other nations."¹

In spite of the apathy and lack of interest in European affairs which Dashkov had reported, the Tsar now decided to recall the young Republic to a sense of international obligations. In the instruction addressed to Baron De Tuyll, the Russian Minister, whom he intended to send to the United States, in May, 1817,² to succeed the unpopular Dashkov, the following minute directions were given to guide him in his policy with respect to this matter:

The relations existing between the United States and Russia are commercial rather than political. The only exception occurs through the proposed mediation which the Emperor has been asked to undertake as between Great Britain and the United States.³ America is geographically out of the European system. Her only political bonds are with England, the Spanish Colonies and France.⁴

Referring to the latter historical bond, Tuyll was directed to proceed to his post by way of Paris. If the occasion permitted he was to see Richelieu, "and to obtain some notion from him of his ideas respecting the desirability and utility of renewing relations between the Cabinet of the Tuileries and the United States."⁵ With respect to Spanish relations, Tuyll was also to use the utmost circumspection. The Emperor's interest concerning this matter is to be expressed, but "the Envoy of H. M. must not allow himself any direct intervention unless especially authorized."⁶ With respect to Anglo-American policy the instructions are equally specific, if obviously less sincere. Baron De Tuyll is to confine himself to expressing His Majesty's "pleasure" should any improvement occur in the relations existing between Great Britain and the United States.

¹ Dashkov, MS. *United States*, 1816, Russian Foreign Office.

² Hildt, *Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia*, p. 110.

³ As regards certain clauses of the Treaty of Ghent.

⁴ MS. *United States*, 1817, Russian Foreign Office.

⁵ See later Richelieu's invitation to the United States to send a representative to Aix-la-Chapelle.

⁶ MS. *United States*, 1817, Russian Foreign Office.

The instructions quoted now enter at length into an interesting discussion of the policy which the Tsar's Minister should follow in order to reconcile the Russian and American views concerning the "Holy Alliance":

In respect to the policy set forth in this agreement, which was entered upon in a spirit of Christian and fraternal alliance between the states who were signatory to the Acts of Vienna and Paris, a difference is apparent between the latter and other states, who by their isolated positions or on account of the desire of their government, have abstained from this act. It is scarcely necessary to observe that the United States belongs to this second category. Nevertheless, as the United States is to be considered a Christian Power, they should necessarily accede to the Act of 14th/26th September. On the other hand, however, such adherence should be characterized by a purely spontaneous desire, and should arise from a wish inspired by a sincere conviction that the spirit of this agreement is not only salutary for the powers of the world but also in no ways coercive. As the Emperor has not had any opportunity of judging of the true disposition of the American Government, and is also ignorant of the obstacles which the Constitution of that country might oppose to an agreement of this character, His Majesty has not extended any formal invitation to the United States. Nevertheless, the Envoys of His Majesty are now authorized to make a careful inquiry concerning the opinions of the American Government. In treating of this matter, he should bear in mind that a similar invitation might be extended along the line of the overtures made to the Swiss Diet. Before taking any final steps he will, of course, enter into negotiations with the Secretary of State. In these negotiations he will advance the fact of the desire manifested by several of the Cantons to be admitted to take part in the Act of 14th/26th September and of the enthusiasm with which they have signed—fully convinced of its utility. Following the above routine, (in case the proposal should appear acceptable to the American Secretary), the Minister will develop more at length the purposes of the Treaty of Brotherly and Christian Alliance, pointing out the motives which lay at the bottom of this Pact and especially indicating that its main purpose is to preserve peace. In this exposition he may make use of His Majesty's circular dated March 22, 1816, and the considerations contained in the document dated May 4, 1817. He will accompany his explanation by the assurance that the Emperor would receive with great pleasure the adherence of the United States to the act mentioned.

He must, however, take no steps without first assuring himself that the adherence of the United States will not be opposed by public opinion in that country . . . In a word, it is important that he should be convinced of the success of his mission before entering into any long discussions concerning the matter, a discussion which would be unworthy of the united spirit and purity of intentions which have dictated the Act of 14th/26th September, 1815.¹

While Baron De Tuyl's mission to the United States was interrupted by the unfortunate diplomatic situation arising from the

¹ MS. Instructions, *United States*, 1817, Russian Foreign Office.

imprisonment of the Russian Consul Koslov in Philadelphia by a local judge, his instructions show the interest felt by his Imperial master in securing the adherence of the United States to the Holy Alliance. Dashkov's efforts to win the approval of the young Republic not proving satisfactory, he was replaced by the Chevalier Polética (June, 1819),¹ whose instructions, as we shall later observe, were even more urgent in their appeal to the Washington Government to join the European "League of Peace."

¹Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 3, 1819. MS. Instructions, *Russia*.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE: THE AMERICAN MONARCHY

In ancient times among the more civilized peoples it was held to be the greatest of all crimes to make war upon those who were willing to submit to arbitration the settlement of their difficulties; but against those who declined so fair an offer all others turned, and with their combined resources overwhelmed them, not as enemies of any one nation, but as enemies of them all alike. So for this very object we see that treaties are made and arbiters appointed. Grotius, *Mare Liberum*, 1608.

Although no formal declaration of policy accompanied the signing of the Holy Alliance, this very reticence had aroused general distrust in the liberal circles of Europe and the United States. The growing suspicion that the "Act of September 14, 1815," was but the credo of a revived dogma of legitimacy was proved by subsequent events to be well founded in fact. Metternich, even while turning to his own devious and complicated diplomatic purposes the bond of indiscriminate solidarity which bound the signers of this Pact of Kings, feigned to distrust the Tsar's "Jacobinism," yet he alone among the statesmen of Europe appears to have held this belief. He was, moreover, confident of his ability to control the Autocrat's liberal vagaries.¹

Alexander's early liberalism had in fact given place to a new concept: the "Divine Right" of rulers "placed in the same relation to their people as a father to his family."² Moreover, in a clause of the Quadruple Treaty of Alliance, the Tsar saw a means to make effective this paternal spirit through "reunions devoted to the great common interests."³ He now urged that the sovereigns of Europe and their representatives should continue the practice developed by the politico-military conclaves which had followed the wars of the coalition. In following out this international policy, Alexander was the first to show an example to his fellow monarchs by his constant willingness to make

¹ During a long journey from Frankfort to Paris (July 1/12, 1815) upon which the Tsar and the Austrian statesmen were traveling companions, Alexander, "talking about the matter for hours at a stretch," had developed his new theories with all the enthusiasm of a convert. He now believed "that a sacred bond should join the *sovereigns* of Europe to the exclusion of all other influences." Conversation with Metternich quoted by Baron Josika in his "Mémoires" in *Revue de Hongrie*, vol. II, Aug.-Dec., 1908, p. 542.

² Regarding the Tsar's "liberalism," Levett Harris reported at that time from St. Petersburg: "There appear no responsible Ministers. He now acts by the exclusive influence of his own judgment and opinions." Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, December 13, 1816, MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

³ The Treaty of Alliance, Art. VI, Martens, *Nouveau Recueil des Traités*, vol. II, p. 737.

the journey from his distant capital whenever the needs of Europe seemed to require the assembling of a Congress. And Europe, following the great meeting at Vienna, seemed likely to profit by these ministrations.

With the disappearance of the Napoleonic danger the motive of mutual defense had disappeared. But another international peril soon presented itself. Like the so-called "wave of Bolshevism" which followed the recent World War, Europe after the Napoleonic struggle believed itself menaced by the workings of an occult and world-wide conspiracy fomented by the "Sects" and other revolutionary societies. The monarchs of Europe were again to be united in the face of revolution.

Metternich's criticisms—that Alexander's policy during this period was contradictory if not opportunistic—were to a great degree justified. In Spain the Tsar tolerated the political follies of Ferdinand VII, even when that reactionary monarch restored the prerogatives of absolutism and reestablished the Inquisition. Again, in France, where Louis XVIII was attempting, honestly enough, to restore the prestige of "legitimacy" and to govern under the limitations of the "Charter," his growing fear of revolution caused him to interfere with Richelieu's electoral reforms in an "aristocratic sense." In Poland, where the mandate of the Congress of Vienna had given him full right to indulge his earlier ideals for reform, he adopted a contrary policy. In the latter country, moreover, Metternich felt that the Tsar's liberal "expansions" were directly opposed to the interests of the neighboring Austrian Empire.

He did not fail to point out that Alexander's example in Poland furnished renewed support to the fast-reviving liberal spirit in Germany. Without great difficulty the Austrian statesman had succeeded in bringing the wavering policy of Frederick William III entirely within his own control. The Prussian monarch had solemnly promised a constitution to his people (on May 22, 1815, just before Waterloo), but under Metternich's influence he indefinitely postponed the fulfilment of his pledge.¹ The Liberal group which surrounded him during the heroic days of the Napoleonic struggle—Stein, Hardenberg and Humboldt—saw their influence rapidly give place to that of more reactionary Ministers. The

¹ Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*, vol. 1, p. 114.

first Federal Diet, which was held on November 5, 1816, was, in fact, a mere diplomatic gathering of the Princes of Germany. In all the minor German states a profound irritation was felt throughout all classes of society with respect to the Austro-Prussian policy of repression.

The Sultan Mahmoud of Turkey (who, judged even by European standards, might well have considered himself a "reformer")¹ could not contemplate without natural anxiety the Emperor Alexander's appeal through a Holy Alliance to the "Christian" nations of Europe. This was considered by the Sublime Porte, and also by the nations interested in the integrity of the Turkish dominions, as hiding a secret menace toward the Caliph of the Mussulmans.²

Aside from the traditional Oriental policy pursued by the Tsars of Russia, there was additional cause for anxiety to the supporters of the *status quo* in the East from the natural sympathy openly expressed by the Russian Orthodox Church in the fate of their coreligionists of Serbia, now openly struggling for liberty against the Turkish Government. Capo d'Istria, Alexander's favorite adviser with respect to Eastern affairs, was already forming the Pan Grecian Association of the *Hetairie* in St. Petersburg, whose agents and propaganda were active in all the countries bordering the Aegean. The Sultan's growing anxiety regarding a possible Orthodox crusade was shared by Metternich and Castlereagh, who were determined that questions of sentiment must be rigidly excluded from their policy towards the Ottoman dominion.

The traditional policy of the English Cabinet since the days of Pitt had considered the integrity of the Turkish Empire as the cornerstone of England's colonial hegemony in the East. Even the action of the Congress of Vienna respecting the pirates of the Barbary Coast—who acknowledged the Sultan as their suzerain—was opposed by Great Britain on the ground that such a step would menace her self-appointed guardianship of the Mediterranean.³ In the pretensions now advanced by Alexander (December, 1816) that the "Great Family of Christian nations" should

¹ Debidour, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 101.

² The armies which the Russian Emperor maintained upon a war footing, long after the other nations of Europe had demobilized their forces, with the exception of the armies of occupation in France, amounted in all to nearly 600,000 men. Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American Embassy, Petrograd.

³ See Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, p. 226.

take their part in repressing these piratical outrages upon the world's commerce, England saw another attack upon her jealously guarded supremacy.¹

As the first united action to be taken by the Powers of the Holy Alliance and the European Directorate, Alexander formally proposed that unless the Sultan was prepared to give immediate guarantees for the good behavior of his vassals, the Beys of Tunis and Algiers, the European Powers should proceed, without further formalities, to destroy their fleets and "remove all means whereby they might reconstruct the same."

The opposition of Great Britain and Austria caused the Tsar to withdraw this proposal, but during the month of March, 1817, rumors spread among the Courts of Europe that a secret treaty had bound the King of Spain to cede Port Mahon to Russia, and possibly other naval bases in the Mediterranean. It was, indeed, only by some such tangible advantage to Russian policy that the growing intimacy between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Madrid could be explained.² Tatistcheff, the Russian Ambassador to the Court of Ferdinand VII, had been instructed (in spite of Alexander's scarcely concealed personal antipathy to this narrow-minded and reactionary Monarch) to cultivate Ferdinand's good graces even to the extent of approving his stupid and brutal administration in interior affairs. Another reason for this intimacy soon became apparent.

During the early revolt of the *juntas* of South America in 1810 "to preserve the rights of King Ferdinand" against the power of King Jerome, Great Britain had profited by the state of practical autonomy existing in the Spanish colonies to break down in favor of her own commerce the profitable trade monopoly which the Spanish Crown had always rigorously maintained.³ In this matter the Tsar saw a fresh cause of future difference between Great Britain and the United States. It was especially as an ally against the preponderating influence of Great Britain in the councils of the nations that he desired the Government at Washington to join his new League of Peace. Besides appealing to the

¹ See the report of an interview between Levett Harris and Capo d'Istria contained in the former's dispatch No. 19 of July 24, 1816, American Embassy, Petrograd, the Russian Minister expressing his indignation that "Lord Exmouth had neglected nothing at Algiers to have the American treaties changed."

² Debidour, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 100.

³ Shepherd, *Latin America*, pp. 72-74.

hostile feelings that persisted after the Peace of Ghent, and to the ready jealousy between the mother country and her former colonies (a sentiment whose depth and nature has always been misunderstood by outside Powers), Alexander probably believed that he could count on this new cause of difference to secure the acquiescence of the Washington Cabinet in an antirevolutionary program in the Spanish colonies.

Following the Congress of Vienna the particularistic views and "traditional interests" of the Great Powers had further postponed the consideration of the Turkish question and the affairs of the German Confederation. Intervention in America doubtless appeared to Alexander a less dangerous source of possible international friction. Indeed, as we shall later see, American affairs became not only a convenient issue but also the first matter with which the newly constituted "Confederation" was to concern itself during the three years preceding the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and throughout the succeeding Era of International Conferences. The policy favored by the Tsar led to the formal mediation which the European monarchs now undertook with respect to South American affairs.

Spain, Russia and Great Britain were all at this time great American Powers. The King of Spain was nominally (actually, in the eyes of legitimist Europe) the ruler of a territory geographically the most important in the New World. His title of Emperor of the Indies represented a claim which, although disputed by a vigorous minority, was still respected by a large part of the population of South America. In the beginning of this struggle, hardly a fraction of the population was interested in throwing off the Spanish allegiance. The dominant classes, including an all-powerful clergy, were generally hostile or indifferent to a revolution which, in its natural course, would eventually attack their own privileges. The Indians and half-castes forming the bulk of the population were neutral or inclined to favor the home government.¹

On the northern continent of America the Tsar of Russia was the ruler of vast possessions whose vague frontiers stretched from Alaska far down the coast to California. In 1812, Baronov, the Russian governor whose aggressive policy had earned for him the name of the "Little Tsar," succeeded in establishing a colony

¹ Shepherd, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

not far from Bodega Bay, but 30 miles to the north of San Francisco.¹ The Russian-American company (instituted by the *ukase* of July 8, 1799) had been granted exclusive jurisdiction of the American coast north of the 55th degree of north latitude. These claims had been the basis for Russian diplomatic protests in 1808 and 1810 against the encroachment of traders from the United States,² which had received respectful attention in Washington.

While the Government at Washington was prepared to treat with consideration the claims of Powers long established on the American Continent, this toleration had no application to Powers like Austria, Germany and France, who now began to consider Ferdinand's plight with sympathy. The influence of all Europe—except a negligible minority—was to be exercised to counteract the growing triumph of the republican spirit.

The unavowed principle underlying the attitude of the Powers of the Holy Alliance towards the revolutionaries of Venezuela and La Plata was their interest in maintaining the monarchical principle.³

In this connection it should be borne in mind that long after the tyranny of Ferdinand VII had rendered his further rule odious and impossible, a strong sentiment persisted throughout South America for a monarchical form of government. Even Bolivar, the Liberator, was far from being a convinced republican:

Would to God (he exclaimed in a letter which foreshadows an American "League of Peace") that some day we might enjoy the happiness of having there an august congress of representatives of the republics, kingdoms and empires of America to deal with the high interests of peace and of war, not only between the American nations but between them and the rest of the globe.⁴

In a work entitled *La Monarquía en América*, Señor C. A. de Villanueva has considered at length the early history of this movement. The first separatist movement "to preserve the throne of the Indies for Ferdinand VII" found itself without a leader

¹ Cleland, "The Early Sentiment for the Annexation of California." Reprint from *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, xviii, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (1914-1915), p. 7.

² Hildt, *Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia*, p. 47.

³ Writing at a somewhat later period, Chateaubriand, the French Ambassador in London (May, 1821), voiced their policy as follows: "If Europe is obliged to recognize the *de facto* governments of America, its whole policy should be aimed toward the encouraging of the establishment of monarchies instead of republics, whose principal exports would be their principles." Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d'outre tombe*, vol. vii, pp. 400-401.

⁴ Moore, "Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism," *Columbia University Quarterly*, September, 1915, p. 347.

after the abdication of Bayonne and the assumption of the royal authority by Joseph Bonaparte. A strong desire was, however, manifested all over South America to replace the dethroned Bourbons by monarchs of the same dynasty.¹ The monarchical movement was, however, defeated by the partisans of the *Junta* of Cadiz in Buenos Aires; while in Caracas (December, 1811), acting under the advice of the American Consul Lowry, the revolutionists adopted a republican form of constitution.² According to the same author, the Congress of Tucuman (1816) "was openly monarchical,"³ although it eventually decided for a republican form of government.

At a later date Hyde de Neuville, Louis XVIII's Minister at Washington, filled his dispatches to Richelieu with plans for founding one or more monarchies in South America—thrones which should be occupied by princes of the House of Bourbon. He even entertained hopes of securing the acquiescence of the United States in this plan in exchange for the good offices of France with respect to the cession of Florida.⁴

Until the real situation was revealed after the opening of the debates at Aix-la-Chapelle, the policy followed by Russia with respect to South America (rather than that pursued by their commercial rival Great Britain) was believed in the United States to be most favorable to the cause of "Liberty." This was largely due to a persistent belief in the Tsar's liberalism. Instructions from the Department of State to John Quincy Adams in London (December 10, 1815) report with apprehension the rumor that "Spain had ceded Florida to Great Britain," and that a British expedition was on its way to that quarter.⁵

Referring to the revolution already "making rapid progress in South America," Mr. Adams is directed to inquire: "What are the views and intentions of Great Britain regarding this important subject? Is it not to the interest of Great Britain that the

¹ A strong royalist faction in Buenos Aires entered into negotiations with the court of Portugal (which had found refuge in Rio de Janeiro,) seeking to come to an understanding with the Prince Regent which would enable his Consort, Carlotta (sister of the dethroned Spanish monarch), to assume the government "pending the return of Ferdinand." In Venezuela the patriots sought "to erect the old Captain-Generalcy into an independent province with a king of its own—choosing preferably a prince of the old Spanish dynasty." Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín (La Monarquía en América, vol. 1), p. 10.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴ Hyde de Neuville, *Mémoires*, vol. 1, pp. 267–279.

⁵ MS. Instructions, Department of State.

Spanish provinces become independent? . . . In case of a rupture between the United States and Spain at any future time what part will Great Britain take in the contest, it being understood that we shall ask in regard to the Spanish provinces no privileges in trade which shall not be common to all nations?"¹ The Secretary of State soon after informed the American chargé that "a strong suspicion is entertained here by many that the Spanish Government relies on the support of the British."²

Instructions of the same date direct Levett Harris in St. Petersburg to confirm the views that he had previously expressed of the Tsar's disposition regarding the independence of the Spanish provinces, viz., that he was "believed to favor it." At the close of the year 1816 Harris reported from St. Petersburg that the Tsar was more interested in preserving the tranquillity of Europe than in inviting the hostility of the Government of the United States by representations concerning the conduct of private individuals and the depredations of the so-called revolutionary privateers.³

Thus in 1817 the Tsar's dilemma lay between his desire to secure the support of the United States against Great Britain and his fear that both with respect to Florida and in their conduct towards the South American insurgents the American Government might act in a fashion to contravene the monarchical "mediation."⁴ Dashkov, the Russian representative at Washington, reported to his government through Count Lieven (February 22/March 6, 1817) that "Monroe is proclaimed President and is resolving to seize Florida by fair means or foul. The fleet will be employed in the Mediterranean before Spain can expect it."

¹ MS. Instructions, Department of State.

² Secretary of State to Mr. Adams in London, February 2, 1816. MS. Instructions.

³ "The only object of high interest that has recently attracted attention here is the difference which at present exists between Spain and Portugal. The Emperor showed great solicitude on this occasion, and at the last circle spoke to the Envoys of those Courts, especially the Portuguese, in a tone to lead to the impression that any attempt made to disturb the tranquillity (sic) of Europe would not be overlooked by His Majesty. Each of these ministers have made official communication to the Russian Ministry of the views and pretensions of their respective courts." Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, December 14/26, 1816. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

⁴ Re the Tsar's foreign policy. In a rare anonymous pamphlet entitled *A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817*, published in New York by Kirk and Mercein (1817), a copy of which is preserved in the files of the Library at West Point Military Academy, occurs an interesting contemporary appreciation of the rôle played by Alexander during this period: "Alexander now wields the huge sceptre of Russia, and displays an ability equal to the task. His philosophical views have indeed been enfeebled by pernicious advisers, but those who have known him in other days still cling to the hope that he will not substitute an unfeeling policy, of which the pillars are *tyranny, ignorance and fanaticism*."

In September, 1817, the newly-appointed Minister Pinkney wrote from St. Petersburg as follows:

Very friendly relations (displayed occasionally with some parade) exist between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and although it might naturally be expected that out of Europe the Emperor would leave him to manage his own affairs as he could, this case of resistance by subjects to the King's rule, and of an effort to multiply republics may be thought to call for a general combination in Europe to discourage and repress it. . . . If it is true that a New Congress or rather interview of sovereigns is to take place next summer at Aix-la-Chapelle (as I confidently said and as I believe) the affairs of South America will, I presume, be talked of on that occasion.¹

Both countries were anxiously alert to each other's moves. In May, 1817, Dashkov had again written to Lieven:

Certainly the moral effect which America can exercise upon the whole world merits more attention than Europe appears disposed to give . . . Pernambuco has declared its independency as a republic. This is certainly no sudden commotion, but a well prepared revolution which should give cause for apprehension to the Portuguese Government and all of Brazil.

And again on September 24/26, 1817, he notes:

The Americans continue to send help to the Spanish insurgents, lending them privateers and helping them in various ways.²

The anxiety of the State Department with respect to the Tsar's rumored intentions to intervene in America's affairs now became more marked. Mr. Pinkney, instructed to study the policy of Russia, reported the following ominous event: "There is no doubt a Russian fleet will very soon proceed to Cadiz."³ This refers to a none too creditable transaction through which Tatistcheff had sold (not without profit to his own purse) five unseaworthy ships of the line to Ferdinand to be used to transport troops to South America.⁴ His subsequent dispatch was more reassuring:

The sale of the fleet mentioned in my last . . . can scarcely be termed a perfectly neutral proceeding with respect to the Colonies, but, if it be a *sale*, it seems to show that the Emperor does not mean to embark as a party in the contest.⁵

¹ Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 13/25, 1817. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

² Dashkov to Lieven, MS. *United States*, 1817, Russian Foreign Office.

³ Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 25/October, 7 1817. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x, p. 210.

⁵ Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 29/October 11, 1817. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

In the beginning of the year 1818 the situation had become further complicated by General Jackson's invasion of the Spanish territory of Florida and his capture of St. Mark and Pensacola. Growing popular sentiment in the United States, under the leadership of Henry Clay, soon demanded recognition by the United States Government of the independence of the South American colonies.¹ It appeared that the United States was prepared to challenge not only the power of Spain but also the monarchical combinations of Europe.

Meanwhile the "mediation" by the great Powers with respect to Ferdinand's differences with his revolted subjects in South America—whose possible consequences were not unnaturally feared in Washington—was actually taking place. The mediators were the Council of the Ministers of the Allied Powers in Paris—now virtually forming a European Directorate. These represented the Cabinets of the Powers who had signed the "Treaty of Alliance." Ferdinand VII, at the instigation of Tatistcheff, had formally asked for their aid in bringing about a forced reconciliation between his throne and the revolted colonies.² In proposing this course the King of Spain also demanded that military measures against Portugal should be taken by the European Powers.³ In these pretensions Alexander and his protégé found themselves checked by the policy of Great Britain. The English Cabinet from the beginning were unalterably opposed to any form of "eventual action" tending to armed intervention. The Tsar chose to consider this policy as deliberately opposing his schemes for international action in the interest of world peace.⁴

During the early part of the Spanish mediation the British envoy was none other than the redoubtable Duke of Wellington,

¹ Hildt, p. 119.

² Debidour, vol. 1, pp. 108-109.

³ The revolt of the South American colonies was complicated by the Portuguese support of the revolutionaries in the Banda Oriental.

⁴ Under the date of June 30/July 12, 1818, Pozzo di Borgo, protesting against Great Britain's attitude, writes to Count Nesselrode: "Jealous of the interest that our August Master has shown in the cause of justice and of the Spanish interest, England has endeavored for two years to prove to the Cabinet of Madrid that further deference to the Councils of Russia would react against their own interest. The plan of the English Minister has been, first, to tire out the Spanish negotiators, using for that purpose the talents of the Portuguese plenipotentiary; then to oblige both parties to have recourse to the arbitration of Great Britain (alone), thus enabling her to control the measures taken to reconcile the two powers of the Peninsula, and for the pacification of America." Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, in Polovstov, *Correspondence diplomatique des ambassadeurs et ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 à 1830*, vol. 1818, No. 387.

who, in spite of the presence of the British Ambassador, personally conducted the negotiations. Pozzo di Borgo somewhat querulously complains of his "colleagues of Austria and Prussia, whose conduct leads me to suppose that their instructions are but directions to adhere to the opinions advanced by Great Britain."¹

The unfortunate Russian envoy during this first essay of the great principles of "International Administration," found his path beset with difficulties. Alexander now believed—and acted as though—these principles legally obtained through the signature of the Treaty of Alliance, "consecrated" by the "Holy League." Pozzo di Borgo was manfully striving in the face of formidable opposition to direct the debates in a sense that would not only satisfy the ends of Russian policy but also his own ideas of the preponderating deference due to the "internationalist" theories of his August Master. In comparing the Russian contentions with those of Great Britain, he declares: "Those emanating from our Cabinet appear simple, easy and intelligible, and offer a means to attain their end, frank, mutual and friendly. I hope I shall not be accused of prejudice in admitting that those of our allies appear to me to be equivocal, filled with the marks of jealousy and tending to desire ends impossible to reconcile."²

He also complains that "the whole policy pursued by the Allied Powers seems to tend towards maintaining the principle of a quadruple alliance, excluding France and Spain, an arrangement whereby Russia would be reduced to a minority of one against three." With frank satisfaction he now noted that in the face of Great Britain's support of the Portuguese demands, M. Pizarro, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, had communicated to the mediators that he had found it necessary to consider an arrangement with the United States with regard to Florida, "allowing it to be understood that this not impossible transaction could not but react contrary to the interests of Great Britain's systematic policy in the New World."³

At this juncture, "with the prospect of a close to this tedious negotiation," the Duke of Wellington, in a fit of impatience, hastened off to London, leaving Sir Charles Stuart in his place. Freed from his Jove-like presence, a lively squabble immediately

¹ *Ibid.*

² Pozzo di Borgo to Count Capo d'Istria, in *Ibid.*, No. 663.

³ Capo d'Istria to Nesselrode, in *Ibid.* (June 30/July 12), No. 752.

arose between the envoys of Spain and Portugal, wherein, by the use of subtle dialect and the transparent arts of intrigue proper to a diplomacy already passing out of date, each sought to gain some slight advantage over his adversary. "Despairing of any issue from this labyrinth of duplicity, ineptitude and extravagance," writes Pozzo, "the mediators (at least those whose dynamic was the spirit of Justice and Right) wishing to carry out the mandates of their respective courts (and rather with the end of complying with their instructions than with any hope of satisfying the parties interested) . . . applied themselves to the elaboration of a treaty and convention the terms of which appeared to them the most likely to conciliate the rights with the interests of the two Peninsular Sovereigns in the New World."¹

Shortly after, Pozzo di Borgo writes to Nesselrode concerning the progress of the mediators:

The mediation to put an end to the differences existing between Spain and Portugal has until the present brought forth only voluminous notes and sophistical and dilatory arguments. The plenipotentiaries of Spain and Portugal had at last agreed to exchange confidential notes to be reciprocally signed, by the terms of which Brazil bound herself not to recognize the insurgents of Buenos Aires, and to cooperate by every means short of war to determine them to submit to the mother country. The representative of Spain at the same time gave assurances that in view of the services offered by his Very Faithful Majesty to His Catholic Majesty, the latter was willing to make certain territorial concessions which would rectify the frontiers of the two countries in America.¹

The dispatch closes with a long account of a personal quarrel which had unfortunately arisen between Tatistcheff and the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the following eloquent lament concering the spectacle offered to the mediators by the two Peninsular Kingdoms, once the greatest colonizing empires of the world, now reduced to undignified impotency. "The Cabinet of Madrid assisting like a mere spectator at the demolition of its own greatness, wastes its time combating phantoms in the midst of the deluge which is sweeping it away, while the Court of Brazil busily sets up for itself a terrible neighborhood of 'demagogy and disorder.'"¹

In September, Pozzo communicated to St. Petersburg the important news that "after three weeks of delay the British Government

¹ Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, in Polovstov, *op. cit.*, vol. 1818 (July 25/August 6), No. 698.

has finally pronounced an absolute negative with respect to the Spanish proposition." This refers to Ferdinand's desire to be present at a Congress where the Tsar wished to submit the Spanish case to a solemn conclave of the Powers assembled. The Spanish envoy, with a curious misunderstanding of the situation, had even "made his demand for the participation of his Master at Aix-la-Chapelle conditional upon another, viz., 'that Great Britain should promise to declare itself openly against the insurgents in case these latter should refuse to accept the means of conciliation offered them.'"¹ Pozzo closes his dispatch with a prophetic warning regarding the influence of the United States on European affairs:

The result of these misunderstandings is, on the one hand, the progress of the insurrection, on the other, the advantages which accrue therefrom to the United States. For a long time I have had the honor to announce to the Imperial Ministry that the dismemberment of the Spanish-American Continent would result to the advantage of the Federal Government. There is no longer doubt that the Floridas will be ceded to them, and that the Union will extend its possessions along the Gulf of Mexico, until it has developed and dominated through the possession of the neighboring positions the whole extent of that vast body of water which is destined to become its absolute property.¹

The European debates regarding the mediation between Ferdinand and the Portuguese Government (together with their differences in the Banda Oriental) and the "pacification" asked for by Ferdinand with respect to the revolted Spanish colonies were to be continued at Aix-la-Chapelle. The Tsar, with increasing obstinacy, persisted in his view that the Spanish King's troubles in South America offered an opportunity for the Powers of Europe to apply and assert the principles of "concerted action" a view which he had been the first to advance in his Instructions to Novosiltzov and now believed to be binding upon the signatories of the Holy Alliance. The whole question of a European Directorate and the "mutual guarantee" it might afford to the *status quo* was about to be formally raised. Alexander was determined that his "Great Idea"—which through the force of events he had seen thrust aside at Vienna—should receive the consideration it deserved. To "organize Europe" was, in his conception, the first step towards securing the reign of "Justice, Christian Charity and Peace."

¹ Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, in Polovstov, *op. cit.*, vol. 1818 (August 27/September 8), No. 713, p. 812.

CHAPTER III

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

If it were allowable for the Allies freely to separate themselves from the Alliance there could be no permanent Society of Nations. But no ally, in this case, may hope to separate himself . . . and not be considered the common enemy of all the Allies. Abbé de St. Pierre, *Projet pour Rendre la Paix Perpétuelle en Europe*, 1713.

In April, 1818, a circular was prepared by the Russian Foreign Office, under the Tsar's direction, setting forth at length the beneficent ends already attained through the recognition of the principle of international solidarity. The Powers were exhorted not only to continue an unalterable devotion to the system set up by existing treaties, but also to unite in closer bonds. In the form of a "Confidential Memoir,"¹ this document was communicated to the Cabinets of Europe. As proof of the reactionary spirit already prevailing in the councils of the Russian Emperor, and as a credo of his intimate beliefs, the following extract is of the highest interest, especially when compared with the declarations that subsequently completed the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle:

During this memorable epoch, a united Europe has been able to smother the spirit of revolution and to create a new order of things safeguarding the general interest, under the aegis of Universal Justice. The means by which this end has been accomplished are: (a) The alliance of the Powers, unalterable in its principles, yet conformable to the progress of events, so that it may develop into a great confederation of all the states. (b) The restoration of the legitimate government in France fortified by institutions² which unite indissolubly the rights of the Bourbon dynasty with those of the people. (c) The declarations following the Congress of Vienna. (d) The subsequent declarations made at Paris during the year 1815.³

Two of Alexander's favorite ideas, grouped in the following sentence, find a prominent place in the "Memoir":

The wrongs under which all humanity groaned during the *revolutionary* struggle were the inevitable consequence of the errors of the past, viz., *individualism* and *partial or exclusive political combinations*.³

The conservative nature of the bond which formed the basis of the European system is shown in the concluding paragraph.

¹ This "Confidential Memoir" is given in full by Polovstov, *Correspondence Diplomatique des Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 à 1830*, vol. 1818, p. 832.

² The Charter imposed upon Louis XVIII.

³ Polovstov, *op. cit.*, p. 833.

This was intended only for the perusal of the diplomatic chancelleries of the Allied Powers:

This association of states has assured the inestimable advantages of civil order and the inviolability of persons and institutions. It has consecrated and guaranteed everywhere legitimacy,¹ *ab antiquo*, and recognized by the treaties now in force, the territorial possessions of every state. In order to maintain this end, the principle of a General Coalition must be established and developed by further eventual action.²

Alexander's conversion from republican liberalism to a philosophy of monarchical paternalism was now complete. Yet a private letter from Count Capo d'Istria to General Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Minister in Paris, written just before the Congress now proposed, proves the Tsar's high-minded intentions towards his allies. In connection with the Memoir it shows Alexander's real aspirations regarding a concert of Europe at this critical time. Quoting the Tsar's own words, Capo d'Istria wrote:

I desire the prosperity of the French Monarchy and the progressive strengthening of its influence, not for myself, nor for Russia, but in the interest of the entire universe. It is Europe that has suffered from the loss and misfortunes of France, and Europe is therefore greatly interested in the future happiness of France and the maintenance of the order there established. All the Powers, consequently, should cooperate to this end, at the same time respecting the plighted faith of treaties. This is the chief aim to which the efforts of each one of the Foreign Ministries should be directed, and aside from it, there is no hope either for France or for Europe.

While General Pozzo endeavors to follow these principles, so often impressed upon him, he feels otherwise. Read his dispatches. They are written in the language of a devoted and zealous servant of the Crown who seeks by his foresight to profit by every possible combination the future may hold. He knows that Austria, England and Prussia have always disputed our right to share in affairs of general interest. In anticipation of the condition of affairs which may arise after France is wholly restored, he prepared to oppose them by winning to our side the support of French diplomacy, and if necessary that of Spain as well. With these auxiliaries, he looks confidently upon the future.

This fashion of judging of men and affairs can not but impede the progress of the general system, and is not consistent with the purity of its guiding sentiments. Once known to the other Ministries, such conduct will infallibly engender jealousy and suspicion. In adopting such a line, we should be drawn in spite of ourselves into a by-road. Instead of working towards eminently disinterested ends, and by legal and avowed means maintaining concord and union between the Great Powers, our efforts would become devoted to a line of conduct entirely selfish, veiled in mystery and moving by devious ways. We should inevitably

¹ For an interesting discussion of the principle of Legitimate Monarchy, see Goebel, *The Recognition Policy of the United States*.

² Polovstov, *op. cit.*, p. 834.

be driven to aim at Power, in order to make the other chancelleries dance to our tune. We should begin by thinking that all this was to preserve Europe in the way of Peace. But where would such a path lead us? ¹

It must be borne in mind, in judging these utterances, that they were not part of a public manifesto. They are, indeed, but the report of a private conversation between the Tsar and the writer. They were addressed to one who, from the nature of the rebuke they implied, would probably be the last person to publish them abroad. As such, they offer valuable evidence of Alexander's good faith and sincerity of purpose at a time when his motives were—and still are—most frequently called into question. They explain why, even in the face of a policy they could not but deplore and oppose, the Tsar maintained the respect and admiration of such men as Monroe and Adams. They lead us to understand the verdict of Chateaubriand, whose faculties of criticism, at least, no one can deny, that Alexander of Russia, after Napoleon, was the greatest man of his time.

The difficulties of continuing a common direction to the foreign policy of a group of states differing widely in political development and civilization became every day more apparent. From the very beginning, the Tsar's conception of a fraternal pact general in its terms—such as that uniting the monarchs of the Holy Alliance—was opposed by the decision of the British Cabinet to base its whole course of action on the actual text of the agreements signed at Chaumont, Vienna and Paris. Castlereagh, at first far from hostile to the Holy Alliance, was soon convinced that in following such a course lay the only means of remedying the defects of a system largely based on "eventual" decisions. Great Britain from the first found it hard to reconcile parliamentary principles and a traditional foreign policy with the Tsar's ideals of "European action." ²

It was the Tsar's contention that the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815, had provided (Article VI) the machinery for a real European government. In a series of congresses—wherein the representatives of the Powers might deliberate in common upon all matters concerning the general welfare—he saw the inception of a European legislature. In spite of the example afforded by the Congress of Vienna, he would apparently set no

¹ Letter from Count Capo d'Istria to Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, July 10/22, 1818, quoted by Polovstov, *op. cit.*, vol. 1818, p. 774.

² Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv, pp. 254-255.

limits to the usefulness of international debate. But in the application of this policy he found himself opposed not only by Great Britain but even by Austria and Prussia.¹ Both of these Powers believed that a Congress such as the Tsar proposed—one including Spain and the lesser Powers—might readily lead to embarrassing complications with respect to the participation of France. Persistent rumors emanating from St. Petersburg even affirmed that the Tsar, dissatisfied with the conduct of his allies, was meditating an alliance with the restored dynasty of the Bourbons.² The outcome of this situation was a compromise: Alexander obtained the Congress he so ardently desired, set for September 30, at Aix-la-Chapelle. But in spite of Spanish protests and Ferdinand's complaints that Russia had abandoned him, it was decided to restrict this gathering to the representatives of the four great Powers. Before this tribunal Richelieu, the French Prime Minister, was invited to appear to give an account of the state of affairs existing under the restored monarchy.

Although the conduct of the Bonapartists and other "revolutionaries" still gave cause for serious anxiety to all the signatories of the Treaty of Paris,³ Richelieu by this time had gained the entire confidence of the Tsar. This was the end aimed at when the former Russian official was chosen by the politic Louis XVIII to replace Talleyrand.⁴ For nearly a year Richelieu had flattered Alexander's favorite theories by pointing out that on all occasions the federal system of Europe which must grow out of the present state of things could always force France to be just in case she sought to be unjust. He insisted, however, that to secure this end, France must form part of this system.⁵

The growing intimacy between the courts of France and Russia was viewed by the Powers with some apprehension. But after an interview with the Tsar at Aix, Castlereagh reported with some relief the fact that Alexander had declared to Wellington as well as to Metternich and himself: "My army, as well as myself, is at the disposal of Europe."⁶

¹ Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*, vol. 1, p. 118.

² Gentz, *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, vol. 1, pp. 398-400.

³ Richelieu had for some time been Governor of Odessa, while an *émigré* in Russia.

⁴ For the details of this negotiation, see Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 254-255.

⁵ Dispatch, Castlereagh to Bathurst, October 3, No. 2, quoted in Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*, p. 168.

Since the signing of the treaty of November 20, France had shown every disposition exactly to fulfil the terms of the financial arrangement imposed upon her by the Allies. Not only had the scheduled payment of the indemnities—considered enormous at the time—been rigorously fulfilled, but internationally her financial position was even sounder than before. By the end of April, 1818, her debt to the Allies (500,000,000 francs) was completely liquidated.¹ Through the reorganization of the army, the government of Louis XVIII was firmly established upon the throne. No real excuse could now be invoked for maintaining the great Army of Occupation within the borders of France. Moreover, signs were becoming apparent of a dangerous Liberal disaffection among the foreign troops long quartered in France—in not unfriendly contact with the people who had led the revolutionary movement throughout Europe.²

But before finally relinquishing their hold upon the French Government, the Allied Powers desired to exact from Richelieu some guarantee of future good conduct. The first sessions of the Congress were, therefore, almost entirely devoted to securing this end.

The discussions with respect to the evacuation of French territory by the Allied armies were brief and to the point. Nearly all the requirements determining this action had been carried out. A protocol, dated October 2, informed Louis XVIII that the foreign garrisons would leave not later than November 30. This news was received with joy throughout the whole country.³

The question now arose upon what terms the representatives of Louis XVIII might be admitted to take actual part in the council. To make France a party to the treaty of Chaumont would associate her as an ally in an agreement aimed chiefly against her own interests—and her own possible military rehabilitation. On October 3, Castlereagh made a formal proposal "that France be admitted under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance," which had established "a deliberating system for the purpose of consulting at fixed periods and upon common interests."⁴

¹ Debidour, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 117.

² Cretenau-Joly, *Histoire des Traités de 1815*, preface.

³ Debidour, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 120.

⁴ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil des Traités de Paix*, vol. II, p. 737.

On October 8 a Russian memorandum, drafted by Pozzo di Borgo, was presented to the Allies, and on November 1 a protocol openly concluded with Richelieu declared that France was "admitted under the terms of Article VI of the treaty of November, 1815."

In the eyes of Europe, Louis XVIII was thus allowed, through his representatives, to take a full share in the ensuing debates. After Richelieu had formally accepted the Allied terms (November 12), a further protocol, dated November 15, establishing the mutual relations of the Five Great Powers, was considered secret.¹

Pasquier, referring to Richelieu's answer of November 12 and of the protocol of November 15, says:

These two remarkable documents should be studied by all who desire to form an exact opinion of the affairs of this period. They are filled with the principles of the Holy Alliance.²

The terms of this protocol, wholly in accord with the Tsar's theories of concerted action, were, however, accompanied by certain significant reservations on the part of the British representative. Castlereagh presented a Memorandum to the Congress setting forth the views of his Cabinet. After recalling the terms of the previous agreements that bound the Allies, he declared that Great Britain could only consider as a *casus foederis* the return of Bonaparte or an attempt to restore his dynasty. In every other situation that might arise she would be guided by circumstances.³ The Island Empire was already tending towards the policy which Canning afterwards characterized as "resuming her isolation." In Castlereagh's opinion it was time to call a halt on Concerted Action. The Tsar was already planning an Allied General Staff. In this idea he was warmly supported by the Prussians, and was only dissuaded by Wellington.⁴ In the eyes of all the Allies of Chaumont, however, except the Tsar, the return of France to the European system was contingent on her good behavior. As Gentz

¹ Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv, p. 501. This document, described by Gentz, as a "protocol reservé" (*Dépêches inédites*, vol. i, p. 410), is quoted in full in Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 501-502: "The five Powers have decided not to depart, either in their relations with each other or with other states from the principles of intimate union which until now have presided over the common interests, a union become more strong and indissoluble from the bonds of Christian Brotherhood which join them." Article 2 states, "that this union is only more real and durable because it has in view no particularistic interests or temporary combination."

² Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 262.

³ Gentz, *Dépêches inédites*, vol. i, p. 409.

⁴ Gentz, *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 413.

remarks in his account of the proceeding, "it was not a Quintuple Alliance. Indeed the idea came to no one's mind."¹

It soon became evident that Great Britain also desired a definite understanding with respect to the limits of her future policy concerning the mediation the Powers had undertaken in South America. American affairs were indeed inevitably to become the chief concern of this formal gathering of European Powers. On October 27, "Lord Castlereagh first brought to the attention of the Congress the question of the mediation desired by Ferdinand between Spain and its revolted colonies."²

In the report of the proceedings of the Congress addressed to Alexander we read of the difficulties encountered in the course of this mediation, the progress of which was closely followed by the Tsar:

The long statement of the British Plenipotentiary made all present feel that the British Government would consult only its own interests in the matter. His point of view was echoed by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia . . . Richelieu remained silent, but the Russian Plenipotentiaries now made the following statement: 'At a moment when the eyes of all Europe and the interest of two hemispheres are fixed upon Aix-la-Chapelle, Spain again asks the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia to consider her case. She has proposed a general basis of settlement and asks to participate in their councils. Russia has not taken any attitude in this matter, but is nevertheless desirous of supporting the King of Spain. Great Britain has sought to develop the same ends through negotiations with the Duke of San Carlos. If a plan can be agreed upon, Spain appears willing to forward its execution through friendly negotiations with her colonies. It is only in case that these offers of mediation should be refused that Spain

¹ Gentz, *Dépêches inédites*, vol. 1, p. 408.

² See MS. Russian Foreign Office, *Archives d'Etat*, 1818. The following unpublished documents referring to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle are contained in a Folio marked *Precis du Travail de la Conférence d'Aix-la-Chapelle*. The report to the Emperor, quoted above, is contained in Cartons 2 and 3 of this Folio. The Tsar's misgivings with respect to English support of his plan for a "Confederation of States" is shown by the terms of an interesting document presented by the Russian plenipotentiary to the Ministers of Austria, France, Great Britain and Prussia (dated November 11/23, 1818). In this document Alexander reiterated with doctrinaire persistency the ideals of solidarity and "brotherhood" of nations and sovereigns contained in the manifesto of the Holy Alliance. He once more expressed his belief that "reciprocal guarantees" alone could insure the *status quo* of Europe. At the same time he suggested as the surest basis for future peace a "Territorial Guarantee" of the respective possessions of the Allied Powers and the following significant clause with respect to British participation was added: "They agree to notify the Government of Great Britain of the above clause, inviting H. B. M.'s Government to use its good offices to obtain the results desired if necessary without requiring its active cooperation or full adhesion." This treaty draft, which does not appear to have been seriously debated by the Congress, is highly interesting not only as showing the Tsar's persistent devotion to the principles set forth in Novosiltzov's Instructions but also as a serious attempt to make a territorial guarantee the basis of a general treaty. (Compare Article X of the Treaty of Versailles.) See Appendix.

will desire the intervening powers to furnish more effectual and imperative cooperation.¹

Spain, as a party to the proceedings, continued to insist on being admitted to the Congress. To such a step—and to the “intervention” hinted at in the Russian statement—the British representative strongly objected. “Castlereagh explained that Great Britain would only ‘intervene’ with good offices, and refused to consent to the Spanish envoy being admitted to the debates.”¹ The Russian representatives were to continue, to the end of the Congress, their attempts to draw the English Foreign Minister into the Tsar’s plan of a European Directorate. But besides their objections to vague “eventual action,” the British Cabinet felt, not without reason, that the solidarity between the Russian Court and the Courts of France and Spain would but set up a condition of “equilibrium” wholly to the Tsar’s advantage. Alexander’s efforts to force Ferdinand on the Congress defeated his own ends.²

At the second conference, held on October 24, consideration of these important questions was continued. “No one cared to open the discussion”—or to oppose the Tsar’s desires. France and Russia were alone in favor of making an “international question” of Ferdinand’s domestic troubles. It was Castlereagh who finally proposed a solution. “Let us,” he said, “decide *collectively* that the rôle of Mediator be accepted by the Five Courts, at the same time announcing to Spain *that only good offices* are possible; let us propose that she begin by granting to the colonies still under her sceptre the advantages she is disposed to offer, and make similar offers to those which are in a state of insurrection.”³ Greatly to Alexander’s chagrin, Austria and Prussia seconded Castlereagh in the above proposal.

Richelieu, inspired by the Tsar’s interest in Spain, now made a last attempt to include Ferdinand in the debates. He

¹ “Report to the Emperor,” Carton 2, *loc. cit.*

² Pasquier is careful to point out that this meeting in which sovereigns and their plenipotentiaries took part remained in reality a reunion. It had been “positively announced that it was not the intention of the sovereigns to hold a Congress.” “In London it was feared that Russian influence in a Congress would be preponderant.” Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv, pp. 254–255. The Tsar’s doctrinaire efforts (renewed at Laybach) to give a formal, legislative tone to the debates but aroused opposition on the part of Great Britain and Austria. This was perhaps the chief cause that made Aix-la-Chapelle the closing chapter of the “coalition” rather than the opening of a new era.

³ “Report to the Emperor,” Carton 2, *loc. cit.*

opposed the British plan for the following reason: "In using such language to Spain she will be forced to refuse the mediation." His closing reason—in view of subsequent events—is also significant: He objected to Castlereagh's attitude because "this will be serving the purposes of the growing democracy of the other hemisphere."¹

The discussions "now became general and vague." The Russian envoy (Capo d'Istria) fell back on a classic strategem of diplomacy. After speaking at length in support of Richelieu's motion, he desired "an adjournment pending further instructions from the Emperor."¹ The latter evidently still pinned his faith to the form which the "mediation" should assume. Indeed, from the very beginning the real interest of the sovereigns grouped in the "Holy Alliance" was evident. Their anxiety for Ferdinand was dependent on preserving the institution of European monarchy in the New World.

Capo d'Istria now proposed as a substitute for the English scheme a collective note asking Madrid to "suggest remedies in detail," adding, in a burst of frankness: "It is realized that no one knows the real situation in America or the circumstances of the insurrection well enough to judge whether the remedies proposed would be effectual."¹

The indispensable Gentz—who was considered an authority on American affairs—was charged with drawing up a full "report" for the Congress. This High Priest of Legitimacy² was, therefore, to frame the solution by which Europe might crush the growing Constitutional movement—based on the example of the United States—which was threatening all South America!

The French proposal regarding the form which the mediation should assume (contained in the instructions given to Richelieu) but continued the monarchical thesis. It laid down the following propositions:

¹ "Report to the Emperor," *loc cit.*

² Gentz in his youth had written a remarkable thesis on "The Effect of the Discovery of America on Europe." See de Clery, *Un diplomate d'il y a cent ans: Frederick de Gentz*, p. 27. See also a pamphlet in the Congressional Library in Washington concerning *The Origin and Principles of the American Revolution compared with the Origin and Principles of the French Revolution*, written by Gentz and translated by J. Q. Adams. Gentz' later anti-Americanism is shown in his reports to the Russian Foreign Office. See Nesselrode, *Letters and Papers, 1760-1850*, vol. v, p. 39.

(1) The recognition of the independence of Buenos Aires, on condition that a *constitutional monarchy* be established with a Spanish Prince occupying the throne, and of certain concessions being granted, favorable to Spanish trade.

(2) Political and commercial concessions to be granted to Caracas, Venezuela and the provinces of Grenada which have achieved independence from Spain.

(3) The immediate adoption towards Peru and Mexico of a more liberal system of commerce, and especially the appointment of native Americans to public office.

Commenting on the above "points," King Louis made the following admissions:

His Majesty believes that these are the three means of preventing the general conflagration by which America is menaced, a disaster whose reactions on Europe would be terrible. Thus the progressive emancipation of this great continent, because it is in line with the inevitable order of things, will be restrained and rendered less dangerous to the European system by conserving the forms of monarchical government.¹ The important matter is to have (the above) adopted as the basis of Aix-la-Chapelle. The details of the plan can only be elaborated in accord with Spanish views, and at a reunion where, in order to secure the widest discussion, not only the envoys of Brazil, *but also those of the United States*, should be invited to attend. The King is persuaded that by admitting the latter Powers to a conference when this important question will be treated, measures best calculated to insure its success will have been taken.

The concluding paragraph of the instructions was wholly in accord with the desire of Alexander to open these debates directed by the spirit of the "Holy Alliance" to the Christian and civilized nations of the world. Richelieu, as Castlereagh had foreseen, was working "in combination" with the Russian delegation. The French instructions show that Alexander still hoped to obtain not only the adherence of the United States to the "Holy Alliance" but also their participation in the "World Congress," where they might act as a counterpoise to British policy.

* * * * *

As will be seen from the above instructions, Franco-Russian policy was not opposed to including the principal American Powers—notably the United States—in the European debates concerning the Spanish insurgents. Sound as this policy appears upon the surface, there were reasons which caused it to be viewed with

¹ "Instructions de Louis XVIII au Duc de Richelieu, Plenipotentiaire Français au Congrès l'Aix-la-Chapelle," Polovstov, *Correspondence Diplomatique des Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 à 1830*, vol. 1818, No. 367, p. 820.

suspicion by the Washington Cabinet. We may now consider some hitherto unpublished evidence of the dangers which confronted the young Republic in formulating a policy with respect to European affairs. The secret *dossiers* of the Russian Foreign Office offer proofs that the trained diplomacy of Adams and Monroe, in clinging to the policy of isolation set forth by Washington and refusing their adhesion to this earlier League of Peace, adopted a course in accord with the best interests of the whole American Continent.

The Russian plan of mediation (complementary to the above) is a highly interesting document. It brings to the attention of the European Powers the importance of a new factor in international affairs: the growing power of the young American Republic. The original is marked "Confidential," and "Submitted by the Plenipotentiaries of France and Russia to their colleagues as wholly confidential and reserved for their own information." It was also further stated that this document is "in no case to be inserted in the Protocols of the Conference."¹

A cautious preamble set forth the Tsar's views of the attitude to be adopted by the Powers of Europe towards America. The general line of policy thus laid down was probably no secret to the Washington Cabinet. It was a policy which, as the Russian Memorandum admits, was more suitable for "verbal communication" than for written notes:

Spain's confidence must be gained, not forced. This is indispensable because she alone has the power to act directly . . . An event which would cause irremediable differences in the development of the situation would be the recognition by any power of the government set up by the insurgents. Unfortunately, this is not an improbable event. The popular party in the United States, much strengthened of late, is preparing to make a strong effort to secure the recognition of the independence of Buenos Aires during the next session of Congress. Consideration of their actions reveal their ambitions to make of the American Continent one Grand Confederated Republic at the head of which will be found the United States. In the actual state of affairs, the United States centralizes all its efforts in developing its resources and population. It is directed by a moderate policy and does not offer a menace to Europe. This would not continue to be the case should a large portion of South America adopt its institutions. A whole republican world, young, ardent and enriched by the production of every climate, will then set itself up in opposition to an old monarchical Europe, overpopulated and shaken by thirty years of revolution. This is a perspective worthy

¹ MS. *Aix-la-Chapelle*, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd.

of the earnest consideration of all European statesmen. The consequences of all this might be incalculable.

The Russian Memorandum then proceeds to prove with what care Europe should seek to prevent, or at least retard, the growing relations between North America and the new states formed in the south:

The essential point is to gain time; a united representation by the Powers of Europe would undoubtedly have a great effect on the American Government . . . It is believed that the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers at Washington should take the steps necessary to persuade public opinion in the United States, as well as the Executive, to adopt their point of view. This delicate negotiation should be conducted with much care. Verbal communication would be preferable to written notes—in order to avoid giving ammunition to the opposition, who would seize upon the idea of foreign influence as contrary to American institutions . . .

The closing paragraph of this extraordinary diplomatic document is not without a certain enduring significance:

It would be advisable that these overtures be made only with the intention of examining more carefully—before taking action—the results which might follow an intervention in America. These results would probably be obtained most easily should the United States finally be invited to send a Plenipotentiary to confer with the other Powers. They could be told they were themselves a European people, Christians, and, therefore, like Europe, interested in questions of a general nature.¹

As will later appear, the terms of the Russian secret "Memorandum" present a startling contrast to the tone subsequently adopted by Polética in his renewed negotiations to induce the Government at Washington to accede to the "Holy Alliance." Had the invitation to form part of the European system (already conveyed through Capo d'Istria at St. Petersburg² and Dashkov at Washington) been accepted, the envoys of the United States would have found themselves at Aix-la-Chapelle either in a minority with Great Britain, opposing the mediation asked for by Ferdinand, or else (as Alexander hoped) throwing the weight of their influence in support of the Russian proposals. To accede to the latter would have ended in limiting the action of the United States in America, while the Powers of the Holy Alliance imposed their own policy through "concerted action."

¹ MS. *Aix-la-Chapelle*, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd.

² See *supra*.

Early in the sessions of the Congress (October 24) Castlereagh had cleverly annexed to the Spanish colonial questions (by a reference to Ferdinand's promise to end the traffic in negroes in the year 1820) the whole matter of the slave trade. This was placing the negotiations on a new footing, wherein sentiment rather than expediency determined the issue. Realizing the danger of this line of conduct, the Russian envoys attempted to have the slave trade made the object of a "Special Association," in which all the states would have a part. In this connection they suggested a central international rendezvous for an Allied fleet on the African coast. This proposal for forming an International Maritime Police naturally brought up the matter of the general safety of the seas, and notably the vexed question of the Barbary pirates. In view of the English policy in the Mediterranean, there was a return to debatable ground. The European Powers found it convenient to overlook their own particularistic interests and to join once more with cheerful unanimity in renewed admonitions to the United States.

In the meeting of November 11 the conference took cognizance of a Memoir drawn up by Count Palmella, the Portuguese envoy, concerning "the piracy's exercise by a band of scoundrels navigating under unrecognized flags."¹ By this term was intended not only the insurgents of South America but also alleged privateers fitted out in North American ports to aid the revolutionists. Palmella proposed "that the Ministers of the Five Powers in Washington should be instructed to act in accord with the Ministers of His Most Faithful Majesty (the King of Portugal) in order to obtain the renewal of the Act of August 3, 1793, by which the arming of corsairs in the United States was forbidden, and that such clauses necessary to secure the execution of this act should be added." He also proposed "that all colonial powers of America should take steps to forbid the equipment of corsairs in their ports, the sale of prizes illegally detained," etc. On November 13 the Duke of Richelieu, to whom Palmella's memoir had been referred, reported that the "United States should be included in the proposed League of International Maritime

¹MS. *Aix-la-Chapelle*, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd.

Police." "But such an invitation," he continued, "could not be well extended until Spanish America was pacified."¹

On November 14 the League to Suppress Piracy was considered a proper subject "for a general treaty of alliance, which should determine the ports to which each contingent should be assigned." The latter, it was proposed, should each have a separate cruising ground, which was to be changed at frequent intervals. As a measure of precaution "the whole strength of the squadron should never be united unless necessary for action against the Barbary States."¹

Great Britain's reluctance to lend the support of her sea power to these "international" naval measures ended in their abandonment. Upon her jealously guarded "hegemony" turned, moreover, the whole success or failure of an armed intervention in South American affairs. The "League to Suppress Piracy" was indeed but the Armada of Legitimacy and monarchical solidarity. Had Britain not curtailed the theoretical "freedom of the seas," there can be little doubt that the fleets of the Holy Alliance would have sailed unhampered upon a crusade chiefly aimed at upholding the "European principle" and extending its benefits to the Latin-American Continent.²

¹ MS. *Aix-la-Chapelle*, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. As part of the same debates, Metternich now proposed to restore their island fortresses to the Order of the Knights of Malta as a nucleus of the international fleet operating against the Barbary States. "Such an institution of permanent police," he maintained, "is preferable to a political and military combination." The Emperor of Austria offered the port of Lissa as a base of operations for the Order. Under Metternich's scheme, the old order of Knighthood was to be accessible, not alone to members of the nobility, but also to "youths of good family." It would thus become a school for young sailors and a place where veteran seamen could be usefully employed. "Placed under the protection of a permanent neutrality, the flag of the Order would be respected by all of the other fleets."

² See *supra*, p. 91, Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, April 21/May 3, 1819. Disappointed in his efforts to challenge and control Great Britain upon an element she had made her own, the Tsar nevertheless pursued his intention to open the debates of the Congress to all matters of international concern. The meeting of November 21 was entirely devoted to another question of abiding interest at the present day. This was a communication of a report by Mr. Way "On the wrongs and political disabilities of the Jews in the different nations of Europe." Here again particularistic interests interfered and no practical steps to ameliorate the position of this unfortunate people appear to have been proposed.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE, 1815-1820

"Some days before he left Paris he said to us: 'I am about to quit France, but I wish, before I go, to render by a public act the homage which we owe to God . . . and to invite the nations to devote themselves to the obedience of the Gospel. I have brought with me the outline of this act, and I wish you would examine it attentively . . . You will join with me a prayer to God that my Allies may be disposed to sign it.'" Tsar Alexander to Empaytaz, 1815.

The Tsar's gratification with respect to the accomplishments of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was complete and openly expressed. A document preserved in the files of the Russian Foreign Office contains the following summary of the results obtained:

The conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle have beyond the power of any denial added to the progress of the European system. This system is now based upon existing common transactions, and the Cabinets of Europe have been able to recognize and appreciate its governing principles. *In the future no questions of a general nature can be too difficult or complicated for its application.* Precedents for the treatment of such questions will be found in the Acts and Transactions of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The Grand Alliance, therefore, has gained in two ways: First, a fresh proof has been given of its solidarity, and, secondly, new rules of conduct applicable to the future have been deduced, ensuring the maintenance of peace and union between the Allied Powers.¹

It is doubtful, however, whether even at this time Alexander's optimism was wholly justifiable. Once the question of readmitting France to the councils of Europe had been decided, the arguments of the Tsar's representatives had aimed to secure from their reluctant colleagues of Prussia, Austria and Great Britain some formal recognition of the principle of international duty and solidarity. This policy was viewed with suspicion by the other signatories of the treaties forming the System of 1815. Castlereagh's "reservations" held England obstinately apart from any *Alliance Solidaire*. Metternich's grudging recognition of the advantages of such a pact were of little practical value. A platonic "mediation," not an "intervention," had been the only form of "concerted action" approved by the Powers in the ques-

¹ Contained in the "Report to the Emperor," MS. *Aix-la-Chapelle*, 1818, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd.

tion of the Spanish Colonies.¹ A brief review of the diplomatic policy of the United States preceding Aix-la-Chapelle throws much light upon the European situation.

Although Castlereagh had intimated that an American representative would not be unwelcome at the Congress and the same proposal had been made in Richelieu's instructions, the United States had held resolutely aloof from all participation in the "Acts and Transactions" of Europe. The foreign policy of the Washington Cabinet was one of extreme complication. While public opinion was pressing for some open expression of sympathy with the South American insurgents, the American Minister in Madrid was doing all in his power to secure from Ferdinand some practical settlement of the Florida question.

An interesting contemporary judgment on the conduct of the United States at this time is to be found in the Abbé de Pradt's ² *L'Europe après le Congrès d'Aix-la-Chapelle*. To oppose the European system the author welcomes an American system based on a liberal conception of diplomacy and government. He seems to have been the first European writer to realize the benefits that might accrue to the Old World by the desire of the United States to remain apart from combinations principally concerned with particularistic interests in which it had no share. He summed up this policy as follows:

To remain apart from European affairs; to oppose any intervention of Europe in the affairs of America; and to build up a universal American system.

Pradt's works on foreign policy were widely read and doubtless led liberal opinion abroad to a better understanding of the policy of the Washington Cabinet. But in the opinion of the chief protagonist of "concerted action" the absence of an American representative from the Congress of 1818 was a regrettable neglect of international duty. The Tsar was determined to renew the

¹ Nevertheless the American Minister in St. Petersburg was informed by his British colleague "that an adjustment of the quarrels between Spain and her colonies would doubtless be attempted under the auspices of the Allied Powers." Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1819. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

² L'Abbé de Pradt (Archbishop of Malines) wrote (with truly astonishing prolixity) concerning the relations of Europe and America. His best known works are *L'Europe après le Congrès d'Aix-la-Chapelle* (published in 1819), *L'Europe et l'Amérique en 1821* (published in 1821, with a second enlarged edition in 1822). These studies were quickly followed by another concerning *Le Vrai Système de l'Europe relativement d'Amérique et la Grèce* (published in 1825).

negotiations unsuccessfully carried on by Dashkov to secure the adherence of the United States to the Holy Alliance. Early in the year 1818 he chose the Chevalier de Polética for the difficult task of again urging the Washington Government to form some more intimate connection with the European system. Polética was impressed with the importance of his task. His correspondence, preserved in the Archives of the Russian Foreign Office, shows that before leaving Europe he made a careful study of the American situation in all its bearings; for unlike Dashkov—a careless petty official—Polética had been trained in the most subtle traditions of European diplomacy.

He wisely considered that the key to the mediation regarding the Spanish colonies lay in the hands of the Cabinet in Washington rather than in Europe. Any formal recognition of the insurgents would be fatal to the cause of Ferdinand—and indirectly to the system of “concerted action” regarding South American affairs desired by the Tsar. To persuade the Government at Washington that their duty as members of the great family of nations required them to respect the decisions reached by the common deliberations of the Powers became his chief end.

Before leaving for his post Polética was directed to attend the meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle. The fate of the mediation at this conference was disappointing. But the Tsar was still hopeful of the results that might be obtained by opposing the United States to British policy, not only in the New World but in the councils of Europe. The above aim is developed at length in Polética’s instructions:

At your own desire you have been able to assist at the Congress just ended at Aix-la-Chapelle so that you can judge of the results of these discussions. You will thus be able to use this knowledge in your relations with the Government of the United States. . . . You understand the general system of Europe, both in its details and its general policy. It is a policy of preserving peaceful relations adapted to all civilized states, no matter what their political institutions may be, or the place which they may occupy among the nations. The United States are called upon by their own interest to adhere to this system. The Imperial Chancellor, counting on your zeal, does not hide its appreciation of the difficulties arising from popular prejudices which confront you. The Chancellor knows of the opinion generally held in the United States that it is better not to associate that country with the political systems of Europe. Indeed, it has even been said that the misfortunes of Europe are the cause of American commercial prosperity.

The last war between England and America must be considered as resulting from this system of isolation. That this has ended more happily for the United States than could be expected is, however, due rather to the presumption and mistakes of their adversaries than to any other cause. It seems clear to us that even if the United States should persist in her present system of isolation from the European system, they will inevitably, sooner or later, be drawn within its influence. Thus the state of things which led to the War of 1812 will undoubtedly recur. Upon what does the United States then hope to base her future policy, and what Power will intervene in her behalf?¹

The above instructions were in line with the course already recommended by Polética himself. Proof of the care with which this diplomat had prepared the work of his mission is offered by his earlier personal correspondence with Capo d'Istria, which contains an interesting appreciation of the entire situation:

During my passage through Paris, Mr. Gallatin touched upon this delicate question.² I have every reason to believe that on my arrival in Washington it will be the first subject concerning which I shall have to negotiate with the United States Government. . . . I am aware that the Emperor's political system—as simple in conception as equitable in its motives—desires nothing except the general interest of Europe and hopes to gain this end by a strict observance of the Pacts which form the basis of the European system. The American Government, however, finds itself outside of this center of political action. Like all new states of a democratic character which have succeeded in proving their youthful strength, the United States seems to have arrived at a period of development wherein they find themselves impatient of all peaceful restraint.

The Powers most directly interested feel that both a spirit of justice and their own public interest require that a strict neutrality be observed in the struggle between Spain and her colonies. But public opinion, all powerful in a republic, is always ambitious. The people of the United States demand of their government that it should extend its already immense territory and should, therefore, support the insurgents. It is without doubt a veritable catastrophe that the imprudent conduct of the reactionary Court of Madrid, in the Colon affair and in its general colonial system, should have been the cause of so much exasperation. This furnishes fuel for England's mercantile cupidity and the demagogues of the American Congress.

In the actual state of affairs, it is sufficient to point out that the unconditional return of these colonies to Spanish tyranny has become impossible and that their partition emanating even in absolute independence has become nearly certain. All hypothesis with respect to the future of Spanish America must lead to this end.

¹ The above document forms part of a series transmitted through the Imperial Russian Ambassador, Mr. George Bakhmietiev, published in *American Historical Review*, vol. XVIII, p. 315. The above project is endorsed: "Signed 9th/21st November, 1818." MS. *Aix-la-Chapelle*, Russian Foreign Office.

² The question of the Spanish colonies.

Will Your Excellency give me instructions how, without departing from His Majesty's intentions, I can adjust my own language to these probabilities? It is only the more essential to give a precise and direct statement of our policy, in view of my knowledge of the Spanish envoy in Washington. This leads me to believe that he will make every effort upon my arrival to have it publicly known that a complete conformity of views exists between the Court of Madrid and the Court of His Majesty the Emperor, at least so far as the policy to be followed in the struggle between Spain and her Colonies. The Chevalier d'Onis will presume upon the intimacy of the two Courts (which has been the motive of so many diplomatic explanations). I will not hide from Your Excellency that if the Spanish envoy succeeds in establishing this opinion, our popularity in the United States, where the honored name of the Emperor is so generally respected and venerated, would suffer, in a sense it would be wise to avoid.¹

In a personal letter annexed to the above, Polética states even more explicitly his opinion with respect to European and American affairs. After expressing his conviction that England's policy turns upon (1) the fear of a new general war, and (2) the fear of Russia (shown by her intrigues with Austria, Prussia and even France), he concludes:

England will always be found opposed to Russia and in league with Austria, seeking to isolate us so that we may be without allies. With respect to the conduct of America, they have no expression strong enough to condemn it. The occupation of Florida has a parallel only in the partition of Poland! They die of rage here over it, but these feelings they will control until the day of reckoning. The relations between England and the United States should make our future relations with North America more and more interesting.²

This letter is an interesting confirmation of the view that it was principally with the intention of securing a diplomatic ally opposed in policy to Great Britain that the Tsar continued his efforts to bring the North American Republic into closer relations with the European Powers. Aside from the probability that such a participation might forestall the recognition of the insurgents—an event possibly fatal to the success of the European "mediation" desired by Ferdinand—Alexander at first based great hopes on the mutual opposition of American and British policy in the New World.

¹ MS. *United States*, Carton 8 (1818), No. 13. Diplomatic Archives, dated Moscow, February 27, 1818.

² Polética to Capo d'Istria, London, August 1/13, 1818. MS. *United States*, Russian Foreign Office.

While no actual invitation had been extended to the United States to join in the debates at Aix-la-Chapelle,¹ it is probable that Alexander would have eagerly welcomed an expression of such a desire by the Washington Government. As shown by Richelieu's action at Aix-la-Chapelle, the Tsar seems to have considered, logically enough, that to legislate with respect to American affairs without the presence *pro forma* of the principal American Power was to invalidate the measures thus determined.²

The situation as viewed in Washington may be gathered from the instructions issued by the State Department to the new Minister, Mr. George W. Campbell, who was sent in April, 1818, to St. Petersburg to replace Mr. Pinkney. In spite of the good feeling in the United States towards Russia, there were reasons to suspect that Alexander's American policy was not wholly disinterested. In May, 1818, Correa, the Portuguese Minister, had hinted to Adams not only that the European Alliance was preparing to take a hand in settling the disordered affairs in South America, but also that Russia was seeking to establish her own power more firmly on the American Continent. Correa's "indiscretion" may have been intended to enlist the support of the United States in favor of the Portuguese in the Banda Oriental.

¹ Castlereagh in February, 1819, told Minister Rush "that, during the discussions at Aix-la-Chapelle, he had found France and Prussia laboring under a belief that the United States desired to be associated in the mediation" . . . until undeceived by Rush's communications. Rush, *A Residence at the Court of London*, vol. 1, p. 5.

² It is interesting that a direct appeal to be represented at the Congress had been received by the Tsar from the South American insurgents themselves. While the United States had consistently refused—from reasons of traditional policy—to associate themselves with Alexander's plan of a World Confederation consecrated by a Holy Alliance, Rivadavia, the representative in Europe of the *Junta* of Buenos Aires, addressed himself to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in terms that could only be gratifying to the Tsar's notions of the role reserved for the "August Sovereigns of Europe":

"When the Congress of the United Provinces of South America learned of the principles solemnly recognized in the act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, and perceived with joy that its own procedure was in conformity with the doctrines advanced by the August Sovereigns of Europe, they could not but congratulate themselves on the prosperity they were bound to enjoy through the application of these beneficent maxims. The news of the forthcoming Congress [Aix-la-Chapelle] gives reasons to hope that no object would be considered so worthy of the attention of the August Sovereigns as that of uniting America and Europe by bonds other than those of a colonial system. The Powers will not judge a quarrel upon which depends the happiness of twenty million inhabitants without first learning the circumstances."

Rivadavia then desires Nesselrode to make known to his august master: "I am authorized by the Government of the United Provinces of South America to manifest its sincere desires to establish relations between the Old and New Worlds which will guarantee a sound basis for future peace."

Rivadavia to Nesselrode, Paris, October 14, 1818. MS. *Aix-la-Chapelle*, Russian Foreign Office. In view of the subsequent development of the policy of the United States under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, the above direct appeal by the South American representatives to the assembled Powers of Europe is not without present significance.

It is remarkable (Adams wrote to Campbell) that the European Allies have hitherto withheld from the United States all their proceedings on this intended mediation between Spain and her colonies.¹

Campbell was therefore instructed not only carefully to watch the development of Russian policy towards America, but also to assure the Tsar's Government that the policy of the United States had been neutral between Spain and her colonies and that the United States wished to pursue a course for the future in harmony with that of the Allies. The following significant warning, foreshadowing Monroe's Message, formed part of these instructions:

We can not participate in, and can not approve of, any interposition of other Powers unless it be to promote the total independence, political and commercial, of the colonies.¹

After the Congress of the Powers at Aix-la-Chapelle the all-important question in Washington became: How far the Tsar might be prepared to go in the support of his favorite theories, and whether an active intervention by Europe in American affairs might not result from his determination to impose respect for the conclusions arrived at during this conclave? In December, 1818, Mr. Campbell reported at length with respect to Alexander's probable attitude. It was his reassuring conviction that "he would not separately unite with Spain in war against the United States."²

In considering the probable effect of the influence of the system of congresses inaugurated at Aix-la-Chapelle upon the international situation—and more particularly upon American affairs and the spread of republican principles in the New World—Mr. Campbell also reported at length under date of December 10/22, 1818:

The new quintuple alliance in which the late conference at Aix-la-Chapelle resulted may, and, it is believed, will for some time greatly influence if not entirely control the conduct of all the Powers of Europe, whether parties thereto or not. . . .³

¹ Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 28, 1818. MS. Instructions, *Russia*.

² Campbell added: "It is therefore most probable he will use his great personal influence (for his manner is said to be very prepossessing) as well as that derived from the immense physical force he could command to accomplish his ends by overawing the councils of Europe without hazarding his present high standing. That the views of this great and certainly powerful coalition of crowned heads in relation to the pending contest between Spain and her colonies will soon develop themselves there can be little doubt, and the importance of their being known to our Government previous to its becoming a party to the contest would seem entitled to serious consideration." Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, December 10/22, 1818. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

³ What follows is in cipher.

The diffusion of principles having a tendency to endanger or in any degree weaken the cause of legitimacy—in which the source of that alliance is to be sought for—will be viewed by the parties thereto with jealousy.¹

The same communication refers to Alexander as “the great arbiter of the politics of Europe,” and with respect to his intentions continues:

It is my present opinion that the Emperor of Russia will use his influence to reconcile the Spanish Colonies to the parent state, and that he would view in an unfavorable light an acknowledgment of the independence of these colonies by our Government and would in such an event be inclined to induce the Allied Powers to interpose if there was a prospect of success to prevent the establishment of such extensive independent states and consequent spread of republican principles.¹

It is, moreover, in a tone of considerable relief that this perspicacious observer reported the substance of a long and cordial interview with which the Tsar favored him on his return to St. Petersburg. Alexander spoke in English, in which language, Mr. Campbell reports, “he expresses himself quite intelligibly.”

With respect to the recent Congress, Alexander declared that—
he was happy to say that things went on smoothly . . . that everything depended on the Powers acting up to their engagements. This he expected they would do, with the possible exception of France. With respect to Spain, the Powers had contented themselves with advice. They had proposed the appointment of Wellington as mediator . . . but no answer to that proposal had yet been received.

Campbell concludes:

From what he said there can be no doubt that the dispute between Spain and her colonies was made the subject of formal deliberation . . . that Spain is not inclined to offer such terms for adjusting the dispute as will be likely to induce the Powers to embark in the contest for the purpose of enforcing their acceptance on the part of the colonies. It is, however, still my opinion that this Government would view in an unfavorable light the acknowledgment of the independence of the colonies, at this time, by the United States, and although it would not, in such an event, engage alone on the side of Spain, its influence would be exerted conjointly with that of the other Powers to maintain the cause of legitimacy and prevent the establishment of such powerful independent states.²

In a final dispatch resuming the above matter (written in April, 1819), the Secretary of State was informed of the lengths to

¹ Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, December 10/22, 1818. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

² Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, February 6/18, 1819. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

which the Tsar had been prepared to go in his enthusiasm for a universal peace based upon international action:

There is reason to believe (wrote Campbell from St. Petersburg), that about the close of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle instructions were given on the part of this Government to put into a state of preparation for active service at the opening of spring, twelve ships of the line, besides other vessels. This step was taken with the view of being prepared to cooperate with Spain, should it become necessary in imposing measures relating to her revolted colonies as might be adopted in accordance with the recommendations of the Allied Sovereigns, and under an impression that she would acquiesce in the course proposed by them of mediation, as stated in my last. Not long after the return of the Emperor, however, to this capital, the foregoing instructions were, it is said, countermanded and the usual number of vessels directed to be prepared, in consequence, it is believed, of information received by this Court that Spain was not disposed to pursue the course suggested to her by the crowned heads at Aix-la-Chapelle.¹

* * * * *

There had been every indication that ample grounds existed for the misgivings of the American Cabinet concerning the intentions of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle to "legislate" with respect to American affairs in a sense favorable to a European "system"—rather than in the interests of the colonies. The opposition of Great Britain had been the principal obstacle to such a course.²

The outcome of the Congress had inevitably ranged the United States in line with British policy as opposed to the Tsar's designs of "concerted action."

As Poléтика had foreseen, it was only by sowing distrust between Great Britain and the United States that plans for an all-controlling World System could be pursued after the failure of the "mediation" proposed at Aix-la-Chapelle. The new Minister reached the United States in April, 1819—and immediately laid his program before Adams³ (May 24, 1819).

¹ Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, April 21/May 3, 1819. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

² But Castlereagh's attitude was dictated by other motives than solicitude for "constitutional" liberty. The commercial advantages arising from the existing situation largely influenced British policy. A Tory Cabinet was not unwilling to see the power of a legitimate monarch restored, if these advantages could be maintained. On the other hand, as early as June, 1818, Campbell had been instructed clearly to express the desire of the United States to "promote the total independence, political and commercial, of the colonies," while maintaining "that the policy of the United States, like that of the European Powers, had been neutral."

³ Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 3/19, 1819. MS. Instructions, *Russia*, Dashkov did not wait for Poléтика's arrival, and presented his letters of recall March 6, 1819.

The diplomacy of Monroe had meanwhile profited by the embarrassments of the King of Spain to secure what appeared to be a settlement of the long-standing difficulty with respect to the purchase of the Floridas.¹ Polética, on his arrival in Washington, found a treaty between Spain and the United States already signed, and Spanish affairs, as Adams expressed it, standing under a very different aspect from that which it wore when his instructions were drawn. Said Adams:

The differences between the United States and Spain were assuming a character which threatened the peace of the world. They had reached a crisis which it was scarcely possible could terminate but by a peace or rupture. When Mr. Polética received his instructions they were at the most dangerous and menacing period. When he arrived here, they were all amicably adjusted.²

Almost daily interviews now took place between Adams and Polética, chiefly concerning Spanish affairs. Polética—while assuming a tone of utmost frankness—at first adopted a course curiously at variance (as we may now see) with his instructions. He declared that he had been instructed to prevent the United States from associating themselves with the European Alliance—and at the same time to suggest that they must necessarily follow a course in accord with the general policy of Europe.³

Polética's somewhat coercive tone was accepted in good part by the Secretary of State. Adams declared that it was the earnest desire of his Government not to be associated with the European Alliance, but to follow a policy wholly in unison with it, and that they were deeply impressed with the importance of preserving the general tranquillity of the world. He seems fully to have recognized the fact that so long as Spain, Russia and Great Britain remained American Powers, any real isolation was impossible. Moreover, during the recent Napoleonic struggle, America had become the great "carrying nation," and, in spite of a scrupulous respect for neutrality, had become involved in a war with Great Britain, and in the "quasi-war" with the latter's great opponent. Yet even faced with the active displeasure of the

¹ The Treaty of Washington was signed February 22, 1819, but its ratification was delayed by Spain till February, 1821. Before ceding Eastern Florida to the United States, Ferdinand desired a guarantee that the independence of the revolted colonies would not be recognized. Cf. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. iv, pp. 474 *et seq.*

² Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell. MS. Instructions, *Russia*, 1819.

³ Adams, *Memoirs*, vol. iv, pp. 379-381.

Continental Powers, Adams persisted in remaining aloof from their combinations. In answer to Polética's intimations with respect to possible European action, the Secretary of State ventured, as a private opinion, that if the King of Spain should still decline to ratify the Treaty of Washington, the next Congress would probably authorize the forcible occupation of the Floridas and a recognition of the Government of Buenos Aires. The only way for the Powers to avoid such a course was in forbearing to use force in a sense contrary to the liberties of the insurgents.¹

The weakness of Polética's contentions was becoming more and more apparent. He suggested that Great Britain's breaches of maritime law (notably Castlereagh's proposal of a mutual right of search for the suppression of the slave trade) must range the United States upon the side of the Tsar.² It was intimated that if any questions should arise between the United States and the governments of Europe, the Emperor Alexander, desirous of using his influence in their favor, would have a substantial motive and justification for interposing if he could regard them as allies, which, as parties to the Holy Alliance, he would.

A natural community of interest, however, and the converging policy of Great Britain and the United States with respect to South America were inevitably closing the breach caused by the War of 1812. Polética found that to base his diplomatic policy upon this "ancient grudge" was a matter of increasing difficulty. Not only had the differences arising from the summary execution of two British subjects (Ambrister and Arbuthnot) by the United States forces in Florida been amicably settled, but the British Minister in Madrid had even offered to use his good offices to secure the ratification of the Treaty of Washington.

Polética felt his negotiation losing ground. With respect to any combined action of Russia and Spain against the colonies, Polética said that by *selling* ships to Spain, Russia had not intended to take sides with her against the colonies. Falling back on Alexander's well-known desire for international action, he also declared that the Tsar was utterly averse to all "exclusive or partial alliances."³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

² Secretary of State to Mr. Middleton, July 5, 1820. MS. Instructions, American Embassy, Petrograd. Quoted in full in Moore, *Digest of International Law*, vol. vi, p. 376.

³ Adams, *Memoirs*, vol. iv, pp. 380-381.

His previous attitude with respect to the United States and the "European" Alliance was suddenly changed. A proposal was now renewed that the United States should join the "Holy League."

On June 17, 1819, he mentioned "inofficially and confidentially" the Emperor's desire that the United States should accede to the Pact of September 26, 1815; Adams stated that the same reasons which had caused Great Britain to withhold her signature to this pact governed the policy of the United States; that the agreement was a personal one between sovereigns and therefore not appropriate for the consideration of a constitutional state.¹

Finally when Polética urged that "the treaty was nothing in specific engagement," and that the Holy Alliance was a "league of peace" and had hitherto preserved a universal peace in Europe," Adams—a sound constitutionalist—replied that before taking any further steps in the matter it would be "advisable to ascertain what were the dispositions of the members of the Senate."²

¹ Adams, *Memoirs*, vol. iv, p. 394.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 394-395.

CHAPTER V

THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS

"To a world gone mad must be opposed a new order, a new system inspired by wisdom, reason, justice and correction." (Unpublished letter from Metternich to Alexander, written at Troppau, December 15, 1820. From the Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

In July, 1820, Adams, in instructions to Middleton, resumed the policy of the United States in their relation with the Powers of Europe; and their attitude towards the Tsar's League of Peace:

The political system of the United States is . . . essentially extra-European. To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglements in the European system has been a cardinal point of their policy from the peace of 1783 to this day . . .

Yet in proportion as the importance of the United States as one of the members of the general society of civilized nations increases in the eyes of the others, the difficulties of maintaining this system and the temptations to depart from it increase and multiply . . .

Should renewed overtures on this subject¹ be made, Russia would be answered that the organization of our government is such as not to admit of our acceding formally to that compact. But it may be added that the President, while approving of its final principles and thoroughly convinced of the benevolent and virtuous motives which led to the conception and presided at the formation of this system, by the Emperor Alexander, believes that the United States will more effectually contribute to the great and sublime objects for which it was concluded by abstaining from formal participation in it. As a general declaration of principles, the United States not only give their hearty assent to the articles of the Holy Alliance, but they will be among the most earnest and conscientious in observing them.²

Even this qualified approval of Alexander's pact—a diplomatic evasion of Polética's renewed proposals—would hardly have been made a few months later. The Powers of the Holy Alliance were already entering upon a policy of reactionary repression which was to estrange them from all more liberal states. Taking as his excuse the necessity for prompt and decisive action against the forces of revolution, Metternich had undertaken a campaign of propaganda among all the principal courts of Europe, arguing the necessity of taking common measures to crush out the fast-reviving spirit of "Jacobinism" and the pernicious doctrines of the "Sects." His artful diplomacy was ably seconded by the pen of Frederick Gentz. This living arsenal of gossip, epigram and satirical observations, was a political philosopher of no mean

¹ Polética's overtures to induce the United States to join the Holy Alliance set forth in the preceding chapter.

² Secretary of State to Mr. Middleton, July 5, 1820. MS. Instructions, *Russia*.

attainments. He possessed an extraordinary talent for the technique of diplomacy, and, had he been able to win the respect of his fellow statesmen, might have filled a much more important place than history has accorded him. It is as Metternich's *alter ego* and *familiar* that he is best known.¹

Metternich's first idea had been to allow the newly formed Federal Diet created at Vienna to take action against the "perils" which, he believed, confronted the German Federation. Gentz, however, realized the danger of allowing the voice of Liberalism an opportunity to be heard in public places. His own plan involved a diplomatic solution in line with the Tsar's international programs. Two private reunions of the interested Powers were to be held. In the first of these, the Conference of Carlsbad, only Austria and Prussia were to take part, together with the representatives of four or five minor German states, without influence or voice in the chapter. A second conference, he suggested, might then safely be held in Vienna, formed of chosen delegates from all the member states of the Confederation. This would in turn modify the fundamental laws sufficiently to enable the recommendations of the Carlsbad Conference to be carried out.

Gentz's program was carried out almost to the letter. Metternich's first step was to warn Frederick William that unless he adopted without reserve the plans of the Emperor Francis, the latter would retire from the German Confederation.

Events in Germany again helped to forward this policy. At Toeplitz, the King of Prussia heard that enthusiastic meetings were being held all over Prussia in favor of Liberal reforms, and as a protest against the rumored measures taken by the Prussian Government. In three days Metternich imposed upon the now terrified and repentant Hohenzollern not only the program he had drawn up, but even exacted a promise that he would permanently renounce all plans of granting constitutional representation to his people. The vacillating monarch promised his help to extend these principles of reaction to the whole of Germany. The celebrated "Decrees of Carlsbad" were the fruits of these interviews.²

While the Tsar (together with the Cabinets of Great Britain

¹ De Clery, *Un Diplomate d'il y a Cent Ans: Frédéric de Gentz*, pp. 219 et seq.

² In France, Metternich's reactionary program was forwarded by the political assassination of Kotzebue in Germany and that of the Duke of Berry, heir to the French throne (February 13, 1820).

and France) viewed with growing alarm the preponderating power exercised by Austria and Prussia over the newly "united" states of Germany, their concerted action was nevertheless inevitably forced to follow the reactionary lines laid down by Metternich and Gentz.¹

Alexander still clung firmly to the illusion that he was the champion of international "rights." When his brother-in-law, the King of Württemberg, maintained his determination to grant a constitution in the face of the protests of Austria and Prussia, the Tsar found that his policy needed a new formula. Insurrection and revolution on the part of subjects against their Kings were inadmissible. On the other hand, the voluntary concession of liberal institutions by Kings to their subjects, he held, must be regarded as a sacred privilege. In this connection, it must be noted that the King of Württemberg had addressed his appeal to Alexander "in the name of Liberty and the free exercise of the monarchical principles guaranteed by the 'Holy Alliance.'" This was the last occasion when the principles of this mystical pact were to be invoked in the cause of liberal reform.²

Reactionary fears were justified by the series of revolutions which followed the popular uprising of January 1, 1820, led by Riego in Spain. This constitutional³ movement soon spread over the whole southern part of Europe, and its repression through "intervention" became the chief concern of the Powers confederated by the "System of 1815."⁴

The King of Spain, after his unsuccessful attempt to obtain the intervention of the Powers assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, had found himself almost powerless to stem the tide of victorious Liberalism in his American colonies. All the resources of his Kingdom had been expended in preparing a great military expedition, which during the year 1819 vainly awaited the necessary transports on the Island of Leon, near Cadiz. The

¹ Alexander now asked the Court of London "what steps were to be taken regarding Germany" and that Cabinet replied there was no motive to interfere. Gentz, *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, vol. II, p. 17.

² The Tsar declared "that it was unfortunate when a monarch did not know the proper time to give a constitution to his people." Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, April 10, 1820. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

³ The Constitution forced on Ferdinand was the same which Alexander had applauded in 1812! Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 498.

⁴ Metternich declared he "was able to inform the Princes of Germany" that no differences separated the sovereigns of Europe, whose inviolable intention was to keep the peace. Gentz, *Dépêches inédites*, vol. II, p. 127.

revolution had its origin among these troops.¹ The harsh conditions of military service was the fault alleged. But the misgovernment of Ferdinand throughout the peninsula and the liberal ideas left in the wake of Napoleon's armies caused disturbances to break out with startling rapidity all over Spain. Troops stationed at Coruna in the far north and Barcelona in the south joined the mutineers. Within two short months the revolutionaries obtained their ends. The army proclaimed the readoption of the Constitution of 1812, and the ignoble Ferdinand hastened to accept the situation—pretending to accede as graciously as possible to the popular wishes.

As Metternich had prophesied at Aix-la-Chapelle, Constitutional government now became the question of the day. A few months later, a revolution similar in its aims to that in Spain broke out in Sicily,² where on the 6th of July the Spanish Constitution was accepted by the King. A third Constitutional revolution took place in Portugal, where the same document was again proclaimed (on August 23).

Any interference of the Powers in Portugal, however, was a direct challenge to England's traditional policy to act as sole protector with respect to that state.³

The Tsar now sought an opportunity to propose an intervention between the King of the two Sicilies and his subjects, thus making the Neapolitan revolution a matter of European rather than of exclusively Austrian concern. Metternich, from reasons of policy, at last agreed to Alexander's favorite plan—a European Congress.⁴ This solution once decided upon, the opening of the debates was set for October 20, 1820, at Troppau.⁵

But from the beginning the differences separating the Powers represented were even less likely to result in unity of action than at Aix-la-Chapelle.⁶ Castlereagh refused to join the Congress, as desired by the Tsar, and sent Lord Stewart instead. Troppau thus became little more than a reunion of the three monarchs

¹ "The army, which was ill clothed, ill fed and worse paid, mutinied to prevent being embarked for Spanish America, on board a fleet composed of vessels that were esteemed not seaworthy for so long a voyage." Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 1, p. 33.

² Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, pp. 515-516.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 526 et seq.

⁵ Gentz, *Dépêches inédites*, vol. II, p. 81.

⁶ The invitation to Troppau came at an awkward moment for Castlereagh. "We know not what point the Tsar wishes to push the principle of Alliance," he said. "The five powers would soon be a sort of European Government. It would be universal monarchy, the dream of the Abbé St. Pierre!" Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 539.

allied under the terms of the "Holy Alliance." The British (and the French) representatives were frankly present, not to take part in the "European" deliberations but merely to furnish their respective courts with an accurate account of the debates.¹

Alexander saw in the reunion of Troppau a new opportunity to proclaim to the world some of his favorite theories: the fraternal solidarity of the great Powers, and their devotion to the principles of concerted action. The right to exercise powers of supernational police among the countries of Europe was, he believed, to be vindicated at last. From the beginning of the conference, however, he favored a policy which was directly opposed to the wishes of Metternich. He renewed his contention that while a constitution which was the result of a revolutionary movement could not properly be recognized by the Allied Powers, it could nevertheless be granted by a sovereign to his people. The right of Ferdinand—if he so desired—to maintain the constitution already granted was therefore upheld. In view of Alexander's own recently avowed intentions with respect to granting a constitution to Russia, and always haunted by the determination to be "consistent," no other course appeared open to him.

A declaration signed on November 13 by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia and Prussia—the signatories of the "Holy Alliance"—formally announced to Europe a decision which seemed to respect the prejudices of Alexander while in fact affirming the most reactionary features of Metternich's policies.

This declaration created a tremendous sensation throughout Continental liberal circles. It read as follows:

Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become a menace to other states, will automatically cease to form a part of the Alliance, and will remain excluded from its councils until its situation gives every guarantee of order and stability.²

¹ Castlereagh declared to Decaze "he was sick of military revolution." But a strong liberal reaction had resulted in England from the accession of the unpopular George IV. This made it advisable to disassociate English policy from any direct attack on constitutionalism, whether in Naples, Spain or Portugal. Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 526.

² The second article read: "The Allied Powers not only formally declare the above to be their unalterable policy, but, faithful to the principles which they have proclaimed concerning the authority of legitimate governments, they further agree to refuse to recognize any changes brought about by other than legal means. In the case of states where such changes have already taken place and such action has thereby given cause for apprehension to neighboring states (if it lies within the ability of the powers to take such useful and beneficent action) they will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed, should this be necessary." Quoted in Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*, vol. 1, p. 152.

Although the Powers of the "Holy Alliance" alone signed this document, the wording of the manifesto seemed to dedicate the whole power of the European Confederation to the suppression of liberal reform.¹ Not only Castlereagh found himself obliged to disassociate his government from the conclusions reached by the Congress (in two notes, dated December 19 and January 16), but even the Government of Louis XVIII followed suit. Fear of popular and parliamentary disapproval had united Great Britain and France in opposition to the Troppau Declaration.²

The Liverpool Cabinet, however, was far from unsympathetic with any movement that tended to stamp out the "Red" menace of revolution. In France, Richelieu's Ministry, once more in power, was wholly subservient to Russian views. Alexander now sought, in a measure, to placate liberal opinion. In explanation of the manifesto, he again attempted to reaffirm the benevolent principles underlying his conception of a Confederated Europe. The means chosen was a memoir,³ addressed to the Russian representatives in the principal courts of Europe. This document was especially intended to counteract the impression already prevalent "that the Triple Alliance is opposed by another formed of the Constitutional States," the latter group including "besides England and France, the two Americas." After complimenting Austria and Prussia for their firmness "in the great task of reconciliation," the Tsar gave free rein to his resentment against England as the obstacle in the path of concerted action.⁴

* * * * *

In its main results, Troppau definitely ranged the Tsar on the side of obscurantism and reaction. Whatever may have been his personal antipathy to Metternich and his plans, Alexander, by signing the manifesto, entered the group dominated by the genius of the Viennese statesman. While still proclaiming his Liberalism, he now adopted Metternich's formula, to the effect that "to a

¹The Tsar "wished an act of guarantee of the internal peace of states in the sense that the transactions of 1814, 1815 and 1818 had assured the political peace of Europe." Gentz, *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, vol. II, p. 97.

²The preliminary Troppau protocol was signed November 19. "It was the first step along the road followed by this Triple Alliance, which was soon to be substituted for the quintuple." Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. v, pp. 33-34.

³MS. *Troppau*, 1820, Russian Foreign Office.

⁴In the following phrases: "The British Empire, now at the zenith of riches and civilization, appears for the moment to be engulfed by its own prosperity."

world gone mad must be opposed a new order, a new system inspired by wisdom, reason, justice and correction."¹

The Tsar's attitude at Troppau was but confirmed during the adjourned sessions of the Congress held at Laybach (a spot chosen as convenient for the attendance of the King of the two Sicilies). To give the proceedings a tone of formality becoming to an occasion which the Tsar chose to believe an important continuation of the "System of Congress," the Russian plenipotentiaries presented at the first meeting (held January 11, 1821) their "opinion concerning the forms and precedence to be followed during the deliberations of Laybach."² "Far from having in view new political combinations," the Memoir concludes, "this reunion is especially called to reaffirm the system which has given to Europe the blessing of peace by restoring independence to the nations." Instead of the "journal" of the proceedings kept at Troppau, the Tsar now desired to substitute formal "protocols" of the daily proceedings—signed by all the plenipotentiaries present.

It was only when the representatives of the other Powers pointed out that under the terms of such an arrangement the British plenipotentiary (Gordon) would be excluded from the debates by the terms of his instructions that the Russian representatives consented to continue the system of informal conferences which had been followed at Troppau. In the Conferences of Laybach "veritable discussions were replaced in the minutes by convenient debates arranged by Mr. Gentz, who even composed the opposing arguments."³

At the second Conference, held on January 12, the comedy wherein the King of Naples was to play the part of mediator between the Powers and his revolted subjects was carefully staged.

¹ Metternich to Alexander, Troppau, December 15, 1820. MS. *Troppau*, Russian Foreign Office. Whole paragraphs in the above, which include long tirades against anarchy, etc., are heavily underlined in pencil and annotated by Alexander himself.

² This was endorsed by the Emperor himself. In this document, the Russian envoy proposes a set of rules to govern the deliberations of the Powers: While the conferences of Troppau, he maintained, were only preliminary and preparatory (and, the Powers, therefore, necessarily prevented from deliberating "in due form"), the meeting at Laybach formed a European legislature. At Troppau the plenipotentiaries of the *intervening Powers* had not all received "precise and positive instructions concerning the limits of their policy." Now that these preliminary questions had been discussed and the scope of the debates clearly set forth, the plenipotentiaries should now, he believed, declare themselves part of a "formal system." MS. Minutes, *Laybach*, 1820, Russian Foreign Office. This contains, besides the minutes, a "Report to the Emperor."

³ Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 134.

Metternich read a communication from Ferdinand to the Allied sovereigns, asking them to define the intentions of the Conference with respect to his kingdom and to communicate their dispositions to his representative, who would wait upon them at Laybach. In drafting their reply, the plenipotentiaries were careful to annex a stern rebuke to the revolutionary government of Naples, joined to a refusal to deal with any member of the *de facto* government. On the other hand, they "consented" to receive a personal representative of the King in the person of Chevalier de Rufo.¹

The King of Naples continued the rôle which had been assigned him by Metternich, expressing his appreciation of the action taken by the Powers. He begged them with feigned benevolence "not to proceed to extreme measures until all means of conciliation had been exhausted. The just anger of the sovereigns of the "Holy Alliance" having thus been appeased, Metternich next obtained the "approval" of Ferdinand to proceed to more active measures of coercion, which were communicated to Naples. The King, "now convinced of the futility of changing the disposition taken by the united sovereigns," summoned the Duke of Calabria, Regent of the Kingdom, "to require his people to renounce all adherence to the political changes brought about by the revolution of July 2."²

The "small fry" of the Italian Princes were now admitted (January 26), to take cognizance of the proceedings and to justify the principle of "concerted action," by signing Gentz's Minutes.³

King Ferdinand himself had arrived on January 8.⁴ This monarch, after binding himself by every conceivable oath to support the Constitution, had reluctantly been permitted by the *de facto* government to leave his kingdom. Once beyond the frontier, he cast aside the insignia of the Carbonari which decorated

¹ MS. Minutes, *Laybach*, 1820, Russian Foreign Office.

² *Ibid.*, Third Conference, Minutes.

³ Among these were Prince Corsini, representing the Arch-Duke of Tuscany, Count Daglio, representing the King of Sardinia, and Cardinal Spina, representing the Pope. With a single notable exception these lesser Powers approved the measures taken by the Conference. In answer to Metternich's somewhat complacent assumption "that the sovereigns of Italy would approve the resolutions," Spina said that the Pope felt obliged to insert in the protocol a clause to the effect that: "As it now appears that measures which might bring on hostilities are contemplated, the Envoy of His Holiness is not authorized to take any part in the conference or to give any advice." *Ibid.* See Minutes for January 28.

⁴ Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. v, p. 59.

his person and placed himself under the personal protection of Metternich. At Laybach, Ferdinand soon recovered all his legitimist pretensions. He listened with unkingly glee while the Triple Alliance planned the destruction of the Constitutional régime he had sworn to defend. From Pasquier's *Mémoires* we learn it was only with difficulty that the King was persuaded to employ decent diplomatic forms in addressing the provisional government of his kingdom, at the head of which his son, the Duke of Calabria, still posed as Regent.¹

The harmony of the proceedings was now marred by Gordon, the English plenipotentiary. He announced² that "in spite of the presence of a British Minister at Laybach, this envoy finds himself unauthorized to take part directly in the proceedings of the Conference."³ The French plenipotentiary also ventured to ask Metternich whether Ferdinand on his return might not be allowed to modify the disposition taken by the Powers.

The Austrian diplomat replied that "the Italian Powers" could under no circumstances "allow the establishment of institutions incompatible with their tranquillity." Thus even the "liberal" formula just adopted by the Tsar—that reforms were justifiable if granted by a sovereign—was denied all authority. The tide of reaction was at its flood!

At both Laybach and Troppau the Tsar's illusion that these gatherings were an administrative directorate of Europe was carefully respected by Metternich. "Of all the children I have met with," he writes in his *Mémoires* concerning the author of the Holy Alliance, "the Emperor of Russia is the greatest child of all."⁴ During long interviews, which the informal relations established by the gathering of the sovereigns facilitated, Metternich urged upon Alexander the necessity of further reactionary measures. In proving this thesis, he was again singularly helped by the course of events. The activities of the secret societies in Russia were now at their height. The Tsar's own life was threatened by men formerly associated in the movement for reform he had himself initiated. He even offered Metternich the support of Russian troops to restore Ferdinand to his throne.⁴ Besides

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

² Session of January 25. MS. Minutes, *Laybach*, 1820, Russian Foreign Office.

³ Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. III, p. 531.

⁴ Gentz, *Dépêches inédites*, vol. II, p. 127.

the news of continued revolutionary successes in South America, a revolution broke out beneath the very noses of the assembled monarchs in the neighboring state of Piedmont. Here the Liberal Party (profiting by the departure of the Austrian Expeditionary Forces, which were to restore Ferdinand's authority) declared for a constitution similar to those successively adopted in Spain, Portugal and Naples.

It required but a few weeks for the well-drilled armies of Austria to overcome the resistance of the Liberals in both Naples and Piedmont. But the lesson had not been lost upon Alexander. "The period of Troppau and Laybach" (writes Grand Duke Nicolas) was a crisis in the life and experiences of the Emperor. The impression made upon him was so strong that it lasted until the day of his death."¹

The spectacle afforded by the European Congress held at Aix, Troppau and Laybach was calculated to confirm the Washington Cabinet in their determination to remain aloof from the "Holy League." In this policy they were doubtless strengthened by the objections of the British Cabinet—and the reports of the speeches made by the Liberal leaders in Parliament.² American public opinion, in spite of an earlier belief in the high-mindedness of Alexander, could hardly fail to be disillusioned by the transformation brought about in his character through contact with the reactionary statesmen who formed the majority at these "international" gatherings. A strong sympathy with the "revolutionaries" in Spain, Naples and Greece was naturally felt throughout North and South America. The author of "Novosiltzov's Instructions" was about to abandon, in this atmosphere of "practical statesmanship," nearly all the Liberal "points" of the program which had insured him so much hearty sympathy in the New World.³

The sincerity of Alexander's devotion to the principles of international solidarity, and of his conversion to Metternich's policy

¹ Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhaïlowitch, *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, vol. 1, p. 231.

² In France and Great Britain Liberal opinion was aroused against the proceedings at Laybach. In Parliament, Mr. Mackintosh expressed the opinion that the liberty of states was at an end. In the House of Lords, Lord Holland bitterly attacked both the Holy Alliance and the Tsar. Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 146-148. See also a dispatch from Polética to Nesselrode, published in *American Historical Review*, vol. xviii, p. 328.

³ A document whose language is curiously typical of the Laybach Conference will be found in Appendix II. It also offers a remarkable parallel if considered in connection with the "Red Peril" of anarchy in Russia at the present time.

of reaction, was soon to be put to a supreme test. In the measures taken against the secret societies of Russia an exception had always been made in favor of the *Hetairie*, an association whose object was to foster the growing spirit of resistance among the Greek patriots to the oppression of the Turkish Government. A natural sympathy was felt by the Russians with their coreligionaries. Moreover, a large party in Russia were convinced that the Empire's destiny lay in the Orient, considering Alexander's European adventures and his departure from Catherine's plan of Eastern conquest as a fatal step. The news that open revolt had broken out in the Moldo-Wallachian principalities, the autonomy of which were the fruits of Catherine's Turkish wars, reached Laybach shortly after the outbreak of the revolution at Turin. The leader of the Greek revolution was an ex-officer of the Russian Army, the son of a former hospodar, Alexander Ypsilanti.¹ Since the beginning of July, 1820, this rebel leader had made his headquarters at Kichenév, within Russian territory, where his open campaign against the Sultan had received every encouragement from the Tsar's officials. In his proclamation addressed to the Greek patriots, Ypsilanti had even ventured the following significant phrases:

Should the Turks in their desperation venture to make an incursion upon your territory, you have nothing to fear: a great power stands ready to punish their insolence.²

Between his duty to his countrymen and their wishes and his devotion to his new international ideals Alexander did not long hesitate. He felt that the moral obligation to maintain the bond of the Holy Alliance outweighed any doctrine of national or religious solidarity. Ypsilanti was degraded from his rank in the Russian Army. The Russian Ambassador at the Porte, Baron Stroganov, was instructed to inform the Sultan that the Russian forces would remain strictly neutral, and that the Tsar wished to be considered as wholly disapproving the movement. To La Ferronnays, representing the Government of Louis XVIII at Laybach, Alexander expressed himself with all the one-sidedness of a doctrinaire:

This outbreak has occurred when, as the revolutionaries believe, the sovereigns were occupied elsewhere. Moreover, they seem to have

¹ Pasquier, vol. v, p. 191.

² Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*, vol. 1, p. 156.

thought they had my approval to their course. Without paying any attention to what public opinion in Russia may desire, I have published to the whole world my disapproval of the insurrectionary movement.

So far had Metternich's pupil traveled along the paths of reaction that in the outbreak of a Christian population against the secular tyranny of a Mussulman Sultan he now saw only the machinations of a group of secret societies. He could even stretch the mystical language of his Holy Alliance to describe them as "anti-Christian"!¹

* * * * *

Alexander reached St. Petersburg on his return from Laybach on June 7, 1821. Hardly had he lost contact with the "spirit" of the Congress when doubts began to assail him as to the wisdom of his course in the Orient. From the moment he crossed his own frontiers he had been greeted everywhere with loud demonstrations in favor of the Greeks. Half-veiled threats and mutterings of dissatisfaction concerning the measures taken with respect to the late revolution reached him from every side.² In St. Petersburg he found Stroganov awaiting him. The Russian Ambassador at the Porte had been an eye witness of terrible scenes in Constantinople: Sultan Mahmoud had chosen Easter Day to perpetrate a crime peculiarly revolting to the Orthodox Russians. The Patriarch of the Greek Church—the leader of the Christian faith, which the Tsar had sworn to protect and cherish—had been arrested at the altar during mass. Clad in his sacred vestments, he had been hung by Turkish soldiers at the door of the profaned shrine.

On February 28, 1822, the Porte threatened once more to interrupt the peaceful development of the diplomatic negotiations which Alexander (through Metternich's influence) had consented to initiate. An insolent note addressed to the Tsar required among other things the extradition of all Turkish subjects who had taken refuge within the Russian Empire. In order

¹In a letter of March 10, 1821, to his confidant Golytzine in Russia he wrote in even stronger terms "Ypsilanti is mad. His act will not only cause his own undoing, but will probably drag down in his fall a great number of victims. His compatriots have no cannons nor military material, and it is probable that the Turks will easily crush them. Moreover, there is no doubt in my own mind that the first suggestion for this insurrection came from the Central Committee in Paris. They evidently desire to create a diversion in favor of Naples, and thereby to prevent us from destroying one of the chief synagogues of Satan, established with the single intention of propagating his anti-Christian doctrine." Quoted by Rain, *Un Tsar idéologue, Alexandre I^{er}*, p. 403.

²Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. v, p. 331.

to calm Alexander's renewed hostility, Metternich resorted to a plan which he knew would appeal to the Tsar's favorite doctrines. During January-February, 1822, he proposed that the whole question of Greek independence should be regulated by a new Congress of the Great Powers. This was to be held in Vienna.

It was necessary, however, first to obtain the assent of the British Cabinet to a gathering wherein the question of the existence of the Turkish Empire might be decided in accordance with the system "consecrated" by the "Holy Alliance." Metternich craftily pointed out to Castlereagh that in their exhausting struggle with the Turks—marked by terrible atrocities on both sides—the Greeks would necessarily come to a decision of their quarrel before its merits could be submitted to the ponderous judgment of Alexander's world tribunal. In the meanwhile, Lord Strangford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was given a free hand by both Metternich and Castlereagh to hasten an arrangement which would guarantee an early peace.

Metternich had succeeded once more in making Vienna the center of world negotiations. The Russian troops, which to the joy of all Russian patriots had already advanced as far as Witespk, received orders to return to their garrisons, and a Russian envoy, Tatistcheff, preceded his master to the Austrian capital in order to commence negotiations along new lines. As a final guarantee of his determination to submit Russian differences with the Porte to the concerted action of the Powers, Alexander even consented to dismiss from his councils both Capo d'Istria and Stroganov, the principal promoters of the war movement in Russia.

Thus while Byron sang the heroic deeds of Marco Bozzaris, and embarked upon the "Modern Crusade" which so moved the "classicists" of the early nineteenth century, while the passes of Thermopylæ once more saw the hordes of Asia stopped and beaten back by Greek defenders, the diplomats of the "Holy Alliance" continued their negotiations. The Tsar's faith was renewed that an application of the formulas of his "League of Christian Charity and Peace" would enforce order in a distracted world. The enactments of another Congress were about to test once more the practical workings of his "sublime idea."¹

* * * * *

¹"Alexander loved these reunions which recalled his preponderant position in 1814 and 1815." *Ibid.*, p. 443.

The Congresses of Laybach and Troppau had estranged English policy from that of the "Holy Alliance." In the English House of Commons frequent representations were made to Castlereagh that the policy pursued by Great Britain in the Councils of the great Powers was not consistent with the ends pursued by a great liberal democracy. As the orators of the opposition were ready to recall, he had "panegyricized" the objects of the Holy League when the news of this strange agreement had first been brought to the attention of Parliament, nor had his subsequent conduct gone far to reassure the more radical members of that body.¹

The avowed policy of this League of Sovereigns was believed to be no less dangerous from the respectable motives alleged on their behalf.²

A contemporary writer thus summarizes the situation:

A new era had commenced in the history of the World—a system of governing Europe by Congresses, instead of by separate and independent Governments, was established. A scheme was formed, and actually begun to be put in operation, to destroy throughout the globe the just freedom of the people. And while all this mighty machinery was being put in movement, England was, if not a willing, at least a passive spectator.³

It was in the midst of this "complication of affairs and jarring of opposite principles" that the nations learned that the three sovereigns of the "Holy Alliance" and the representatives of France and England were about to meet once more in a Congress at Verona,⁴ at a time when these international gatherings were most suspicious to Liberal opinions.

The tragic death of the Marquis of Londonderry—to which title Lord Castlereagh had succeeded on the death of his father—now brought about a fundamental change in English foreign policy. George Canning, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, was in no sense a radical. He had even been considered one of the decided

¹ Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 1, p. 18.

² "The desire to maintain peace, and to free Europe from the 'scourge of revolution,' determined the three powers forthwith to proceed to *destroy by force of arms* the free institutions which the Neapolitan nation had asked and obtained from their Sovereign. But in assigning the reasons for the selection of Naples in preference to either Spain or Portugal, as the object of their interference, the intention to act in the same way, as soon as possible, towards those two countries, was clearly manifested. . . ." *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁴ Verona was chosen rather than Vienna because the affairs of Italy were supposed to be the object of the gathering. Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. v, p. 446.

enemies of reform—but his attitude with respect to English interests abroad had always been approved by the lovers of constitutional liberty.¹

Canning received the seals of the Foreign Office from the King on September 16, 1822. In inaugurating his policy he was determined not to lend the prestige of his new office either to the Congress in Vienna or to the subsequent gathering in Verona. It is, indeed, probable that Canning would have avoided, if possible, sending any English representative whatsoever to the latter gathering.²

The Duke of Wellington, the envoy chosen by Castlereagh, had been delayed on his journey to Vienna, so that his arrival almost coincided with the departure of the Allied sovereigns for Verona.³ It, therefore, appeared advisable that this great man, who embodied England's prestige both at home and abroad, should be permitted to accompany the leaders of Europe. Wellington's instructions, moreover, were precise and complete, and his character gave every guarantee to Canning that they would be loyally carried out. He was to decline in the name of his government all participation, either direct or indirect, in the military operations in Spain, for which the Tsar Alexander now sought a mandate, and to forbid all access to Portugal to the armies of the "Holy Alliance" in the name of the ancient treaties which had so long united that country to Great Britain.

The matters to be considered at the Congress of Verona (October-November, 1822) were arranged by Metternich according to a well-considered agenda.⁴ The question of Greek independence (involving the quarrel—so dangerous for Europe's peace

¹ It was not without some hesitation that Canning had accepted the Foreign Secretaryship. In the Cabinet he was about to join, certain members held principles far different from his own,—nor was he supported by the personal views of his Sovereign. The Duke of Wellington had been one of Castlereagh's supporters and was, therefore, believed to be strongly "predisposed towards the policy of the Continental School." In Lord Liverpool, however, the head of the Cabinet, Canning had a warm personal friend and admirer, and a "cordial approver of his system of foreign policy." Stapleton, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 125-129.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

³ Pasquier, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 446.

⁴ This agenda included:

1. The slave trade.
2. The piracies exercised in American waters, and the question of Spanish colonies.
3. The Grecian question.
4. The Italian question.
5. The Spanish question.

See Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone*, vol. 1, p. 74.

—between the Governments of Russia, Austria and the Sublime Porte) was the first discussed.

The differences between Turkey and Russia continued in the hands of Austria and England, as mediating Powers. The Greeks were, however, sternly denied the assistance—or even the moral support—of the new Congress. The Tsar in his distrust of all revolutionary movements declared them wholly unworthy of sympathy, and even refused to allow the delegates (waiting the pleasure of the Powers at Ancona) a hearing before that body.¹ In spite of an eloquent appeal which Andrew Mataxis addressed to the Pope, their delegates were finally ordered to return to their distracted country.

In respect to Italian affairs, the decisions of the Congress of Verona were also in accord with the policy of the Holy Alliance. The mandate of Europe seemed permanently accorded to Austria to carry out the anti-revolutionary campaign proposed by Metternich, although the Pope still courageously protested against this tyranny.² Alexander, however, was careful to intimate to Austria (with the support of the French delegation) that the exercise of this mandate in no way involved the permanent recognition of Austria's rights to the hegemony of Italy.

With the exception of the above definite successes for the policy of the "Triple Alliance,"—events which were in the main unopposed by England or France—the course of the debates at the Congress of Verona now tended undeniably toward a disintegration of the "European system."³

¹ Debidour, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 187.

² The astute diplomacy of the Vatican had distrusted from the beginning the "quietist" language of the Act of September, 1815. The King of Naples, lost to every sense of patriotism or personal dignity, begged that the Austrian Army of Occupation be allowed to remain in his dominions.

³ Nevertheless, the Tsar's optimism remained insensible to every reproof. In a conversation with Chateaubriand, Alexander triumphantly declared himself as follows: "Can you now believe, as our enemies declare, that the Alliance is a vain word which only serves to cover private ambitions? This was perhaps true in the beginning of our system, but now that the civilized world is in peril, particularistic interests must be forgotten. There can no longer be any question of English, French, Russian, Prussian or Austrian policy; there only remains a general political system, which should, in the interest of all, be followed in common by all peoples and their rulers. I must be the first to exhibit my belief in these principles—convictions on which I had founded the Alliance. An occasion to prove this presented itself in connection with the Grecian revolt. Nothing was less in accord with public opinion in my country than my acts at that time. I saw, however, in the troubles of the Peloponnesus the signs of a revolutionary plot, and I immediately desisted from further action on their behalf." Quoted in Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone*, vol. 1, pp. 221-222.

Wellington maintained that Great Britain regarded as wholly pernicious and dangerous the policy—approved by the Congress—of addressing common notes of protest to the Spanish Constitutional Cabinet. His government, he declared, had adopted as a basic principle of foreign policy the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The English representative would be ordered to remain in Madrid, whether or not the representatives of the other Powers were ordered to withdraw.¹

In view of the imminent intervention of France in Spanish affairs, Wellington, moreover, now saw fit officially to bring to the attention of the Congress Great Britain's intention of recognizing the Spanish-American Colonies. This action, so important to the common policy which the two Anglo-Saxon Powers were about to develop, had long been pending:

The relations which existed between His Majesty's subjects and certain other parts of the world for a long time have placed His Majesty in a position where it will be necessary to recognize the *de facto* existence of governments formed by the different Spanish provinces in order to enter into relations with the latter. The relaxation of Spanish authority has given rise to an increase of piracy and filibustering. It is impossible for England to put a stop to this intolerable affliction without the cooperation of the local authorities along these coasts. The necessity of cooperation in this respect, therefore, can hardly help but lead to new acts recognizing the *de facto* existence of one or another of these self-constituted governments.²

By basing this action on commercial rather than political grounds, the British Cabinet sought through a policy of expediency to avoid raising the time-worn issue of "legitimacy" in connection with the Spanish colonies. But, as Wellington was well aware, in addition to the commercial aspects of the case, a large party in the English Parliament supported the constitutional pretensions of the South American republics in the spirit of liberal sympathy long upheld by the Congress of the United States.³

¹ This note is given in *ibid.*, p. 123.

² Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

CHAPTER VI

EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

"It ought to be the aim of American statesmanship to prevent and frustrate for all time European interference with the development of the states, and even with the destinies of the whole Northern Continent." Hamilton's policy in 1781, as outlined in Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union*.

While the closing debates of the Congress of Verona were taking place, and the language of the platitudinous manifesto, which was to crown its labors, was in course of elaboration by the delegates of the "Holy Alliance," negotiations were being carried on in Paris with respect to the proposed French intervention in Spain. Chateaubriand had a final long interview with Alexander, whose personal influence and charm were never exerted to better purpose than in his negotiations with the two principal French envoys at Verona. Montmorency, who was almost as visionary and mystical as the Tsar himself, fell a ready victim to his persuasions respecting an intervention in the interests of Ferdinand. Chateaubriand, who had been chosen by Villèle to counteract his colleague's legitimist enthusiasm, fell a victim to his own childish vanity. The Tsar's flattery and a little personal attention from the Autocrat seem to have convinced him that the Spanish campaign was the surest way of restoring French prestige. Although no Russian interests were directly served, the Tsar found satisfaction in giving actuality to the anti-revolutionary program of international administration laid down at Troppau and Laybach.

Chateaubriand now accepted the plan of an intervention in Spain with all the enthusiasm of an author compiling a historical scene. In the situation he was contriving he already saw himself the central figure. Only the monumental conceit of the creator of "Atala" could have penned the dispatches he has assembled in two volumes dealing with this episode—so closely connected with the history of Spain in South America and the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.¹

It was in vain that public opinion in France protested against an enterprise to a great extent imposed upon the French envoys at Verona by the Tsar's conception of international duty. In

¹ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone*.

vain the opposition called attention to the impropriety of the Constitutional King of France using his superior strength to crush the power of a constitutional government and to reestablish absolutism in a liberal state. The supporters of the Charter—upon which rested the restored Government of France—saw in the policy of intervention the first steps towards the denunciation of this pact. But Villèle, persuaded by Chateaubriand and the growing influence of the Ultra-Royalists, now wavered in his wise determination to neglect the Tsar's advice. Only Canning's appeals—made through a direct correspondence with Chateaubriand—delayed for a time the march of the Royalist troops.¹

The ensuing months were nevertheless to be filled with a series of bitter disappointments for the Tsar, and of rebuffs to his schemes of concerted action. Far from the center of European events, he followed with an anxious eye the development of the French intervention in Spain and the struggle of the Greeks for the liberty which he had denied them in the interests of a doctrinaire devotion to the tenets of the Holy Alliance. Austrian jealousy—and the French Ministry's desire to reserve for the Bourbon dynasty all the laurels to be gained in the Spanish War—kept him from taking an active part in these events. Nevertheless he intimated to the Allied Powers that the nucleus of a Russian Army, which he pompously called "The Army of the Alliance," was already mobilizing in Poland.² Every success of the campaign to restore Ferdinand to his throne was followed by a shower of Russian decorations conferred upon all those who had shown the slightest deference for his advice and "policies."

The military details of the campaign of 1823 do not fall within the province of this study.³ A Bourbon prince carried the white standard of "Old" France across the frontier, and the numerical superiority of the French troops, aided by the guerrilla bands of the "Apostolicos," soon brought the Duke of Angoulême to the walls of Cadiz. Within this city the Constitutional Government had taken refuge, carrying with them the unwilling Ferdinand,

¹ "Negotiate at least before you invade," was Canning's common sense rejoinder to the elegantly phrased arguments of the author of the *Mémoires d'outre tombe*. "Leave the Spanish revolution to burn itself out within its own crater; you have nothing to apprehend from the eruption, if you do not open a channel for the lava through the Pyrenees. Such are my opinions honestly and sincerely given. Such, Lord Liverpool tells me, he believed to be *yours* before you left this country." Chateaubriand, vol. 1, p. 473.

² See Rain, *Un idéologue Alexandre Ier*, p. 425.

³ See Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. v, pp. 497-499.

now a political prisoner rather than a king of Spain. In spite of the support platonically extended the Constitutional cause by public opinion in both England and the United States, it became evident at the end of September that further resistance was useless. Ferdinand VII was allowed his liberty after taking the most solemn oaths to refrain from reprisals toward the Constitutionalists. Scarcely had the King found safety behind the French lines when he gave the signal for an outbreak of reactionary terrorism, which has made his name execrated throughout the peninsula to the present day. Riego, the patriotic leader, was hanged at Madrid. A Royalist Government, composed of Apostolics, carried out the whims of a maniac monarch, in face of the protests of the Duke of Angoulême, who returned to France in disgust, leaving behind him a discontented Army of Occupation.¹

The Conservative Party in Portugal now sought to imitate the reactionary deeds of Ferdinand. Here, however, Canning firmly intervened. By the terms of a note dated March 31, Canning intimated to the French Government that if their troops should further approach the Portuguese frontier, it would be considered by Great Britain as a "hostile act." The Absolutist Party nevertheless once more took up their arms against the Constitutional Government in spite of Canning's effort to isolate Portugal from the quarrels of legitimacy and liberalism.²

While the brief triumph of the Bourbon intervention in Spain was wholly gratifying to the reactionary Powers of the "Holy Alliance," the course of events in Spanish America was soon to give them cause for serious alarm. Every success of the policy pursued by France in Spain caused Canning to seek a counterpoise which might add to the influence of Great Britain in the affairs of the Spanish Colonies. Yet even at this time Canning retained hopes of preserving the monarchical system in South America. This is shown by the special favors he extended to the

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 517-521.

² In September, 1824, the monarchs forming the Holy Alliance received a new recruit wholly in accord with their most obscurantist doctrines. By the death of the prudent Louis XVIII, his brother, the Count d'Artois, became King (Charles X) of France. During the years 1823-1824 the tide of reaction—which now characterized the Tsar's internationalism—was at its height. Metternich was wholly occupied in applying the repressive measures of 1820 to the German Confederation. It was time—he informed his master—to oblige the sovereigns of South Germany, if not to abolish their constitution, at least to modify them to an extent which would suppress public debates. Such was the strange outcome of the policies now championed by the author of the Instructions to Novosiltzov!

Empire founded by Iturbide in Mexico. In that continent he was now, however, confronted with the growing republican influences of the United States. In the month of July, 1823, it was learned in London that Iturbide's scheme to found a vast Central American state had ended in failure. Mexico under the influences of the United States was about to declare itself a federal republic.¹

A new factor reconciling the British Cabinet to this plan was the ominous program of monarchical intervention urged by the diplomatic impresario, Chateaubriand.² This imaginative statesman now dreamed of extending the French intervention in Spain—where it appeared firmly established—to the colonies overseas. To Ferdinand VII he hinted a compromise, by the terms of which the colonies of South America would be transformed into a league of separate principalities. At the head of each of these would be placed a prince of the House of Bourbon, chosen from the French, Spanish and Italian branches. The whole of this gigantic scheme of reaction was to be underwritten and guaranteed by the Powers of the "Holy Alliance." It was at this moment, so fateful to both American Continents—that the British Foreign Minister made the first overtures for a coordination of the liberal policies pursued in both Great Britain and the United States.³

On March 31, 1823, Rush, the American Minister at the Court of St. James, had an important interview with Canning concerning the Spanish Colonies. Referring to the British note which had immediately preceded the invasion of Spain by the French Armies, he asked whether its meaning was that England would not remain passive under any attempt by France to bring any of the American Colonies "under her dominion either by conquest or by cession from Spain." Canning replied by asking Rush what he thought his Government would say to going "hand in hand

¹ See Villanueva's interesting study based upon the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *La Santa Alianza (La Monarquía en América)*, vol. III, p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, 73. Chateaubriand ordered the French Minister at Madrid to advise sending a Bourbon Prince to Mexico.

³ The determination with which Chateaubriand had carried out his policy, and the confidence he expressed in the ability of France to carry out the mandates of the "Holy Alliance," were proofs of the constant and unwavering support he had obtained from the Emperor of Russia. In the debates of Parliament concerning South America, Brougham, the great champion of South American freedom, had stated as an undisputed fact "that Ferdinand had been promised by the Emperor Alexander, that if the King of Spain would throw off the Constitutional fetters by which he was trammelled, he would assist him in recovering his Transatlantic Dominions." Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. II, p. 46.

with England in such a policy?" The Minister expressly added that "he did not think that concert of *action* would become necessary." ¹

Canning received no direct answer from Rush, who now sought instructions from his government. The matter was indeed not formally resumed until August 22. On that date Canning set forth the British position as follows:²

1. She conceived the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. That the question of their recognition as independent states was one of time and circumstances.
3. That England was not disposed, however, to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and mother country by amicable negotiation.
4. That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for herself.
5. That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other Power with indifference.

At the same time Rush was told by Canning that if the United States "acceded to such views, a declaration to that effect on their part concurrently with England" would be the most effectual mode of warning France and of persuading Spain that neither of the Anglo-Saxon countries cherished territorial ambitions in South America.³

On August 23, Rush replied categorically to Canning's questions,⁴ assuming an identical position except with regard to recognition (which had already been made by the United States). In reporting the matter to his government he was careful to point out that while he had thought it proper to meet the spirit of the British proposals as far as he could, he had at the same time avoided any act which might be construed as pledging his government or to "implicate it in the federative system of Europe."⁴ This appeared the more necessary from the fact, that as Canning informed him on the 26th, the affairs of Spanish America were to form the subject of a new European Congress as soon as France had terminated her military operations in Spain.

On the 28th, Rush informed Adams of the quandary in which he was placed by the rapid development of the situation, and of his

¹ Rush, *Residence at the Court of London*, vol. II, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

intention on his own responsibility "to make a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy Alliance." This declaration, however, he made contingent upon "recognition by Great Britain without delay." It will thus be seen that if Canning had not judged it inopportune to afford the recognition urged by Rush (which he accorded the following year), that courageous diplomat would have associated the policies of his country and that of Great Britain on his own responsibility, subject to the disavowal of the Department of State.¹

On November 26 Canning informed Rush that their last interview on the subject, just a month before, had led him to conclude that nothing could be done between them in view of the latter's insistence regarding recognition. He had therefore decided that "Great Britain should herself, without any concert with the United States, come to an explanation with France," and had already had several conferences with the French Ambassador,² Prince Polignac, and had afterwards recorded them as an official Memorandum embodying England's "irreducible demands." This was coupled with a notification of the British Cabinet's unchangeable determination to withdraw from the Congressional system of the Holy Alliance. "England could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other Powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question, and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it."³

In answer to Canning's contentions, Polignac was instructed to present a note modifying Chateaubriand's previous attitude. He now admitted in substance the whole of the British demands:

That his Government believed it to be utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relation to Spain;

That France disclaimed, on her part, any intention or desire to avail herself of the present state of the Colonies, or of the present situation of France towards Spain, to appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America, or to obtain for herself any exclusive advantages;

And that, like England, she would willingly see the mother country, in possession of superior commercial advantages, by amicable arrange-

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Lastly, that she abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the Colonies by force of arms.

That as to what might be the best arrangement between Spain and her Colonies, the French Government could not give, nor venture to form, an opinion until the King of Spain should be at liberty.¹

While acquiescing in the principal points of Canning's memorandum, Polignac was not, however, prepared to abandon the principles of intervention. Referring to the conference which France now desired, he declared:

That he saw no difficulty which should prevent England from taking part in the Conference, however she might now announce the difference, in the view which she took of the question from that taken by the Allies.²

He, moreover, made the acquiescence of France in the British program in South America—and by implication that of the Powers of the Holy Alliance—depend upon a "principle of union in government, whether monarchical or aristocratical," at the same time referring to the principles of the Spanish-American revolution as "absurd and dangerous theories."³

True, however, to his policy of reducing the Spanish-American question to one of an opportunistic and commercial character, Canning now replied:

That, however desirable the establishment of a monarchical form of government, in any of those provinces, might be, on the one hand, or whatever might be the difficulties in the way of it, on the other hand, his government could not take upon itself to put it forward as a condition of their recognition.⁴

While from the above declarations it will be seen that the aims of the reactionary government in France were not wholly abandoned, the phrase "that it was utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relations to Spain" was the outstanding result the "logic of events" recognized by both parties. England now followed the example of the United States in

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While from the above declarations it will be seen that the aims of the reactionary government in France were not wholly abandoned, the phrase "that it was utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relations to Spain" was the outstanding result the "logic of events" recognized by both parties. England now followed the example of the United States in

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31. "The refusal of England to cooperate in the work of reconciliation might afford reason to think, either that she did not really wish for that reconciliation, or that she had some ulterior object in contemplation; two suppositions equally injurious to the honor and good faith of the British Cabinet." *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴ Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. II, p. 32. Gentz at this time nevertheless believed that Canning realized the necessity of supporting the monarchical principle. See Gentz, *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, vol. II, p. 282.

accrediting Consuls to the principal "provinces" of South America. Commissioners—a term by which the diplomatic rank of Minister was thinly veiled—were sent to both Colombia and Mexico.

Canning realized that in all these transactions France represented the policy of the Holy Alliance. But in view of the complicated negotiations which were being simultaneously carried on involving the integrity of the Turkish Empire, he believed it unwise to risk an open break with Russia and Austria. Moreover, the interior situation in England, and the reactionary tendencies of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Liverpool, prevented any avowed opposition towards the Continental Powers with respect to the monarchical principles of "conservation" and "legitimacy."¹

* * * * *

A last attempt was now made by King Ferdinand himself to obtain the intervention of the three Powers. He proposed that—the several Powers, the Allies of His Catholic Majesty . . . establish a Conference at Paris; in order that their Plenipotentiaries, together with those of His Catholic Majesty, might aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted colonies.²

This invitation, communicated by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Diplomatic Agents of the Courts of Paris, St. Petersburg and Vienna, was couched in the most conciliatory language. The King of Spain even promised "to consider of the alterations which events had produced in his American provinces."³

In order to persuade England to overlook the indiscretions of Ferdinand VII, and to consent once more to enter into a conference with respect to Spanish-American affairs, Chateaubriand

¹ The key of Canning's policy towards the "Holy League," as set forth by biographer Stapleton, was as follows:

"Still it was not by any violent transition from a practice of support to a system of active opposition to that Alliance, that he could have safely brought about any salutary results. A sudden change from one side to the other, would infallibly, by raising the hopes of the democratical party, have excited them to outrage, and have thus produced the very evil which it was intended to prevent. But, no: the dissolution of the Alliance was to be effected, gradually, by the withdrawal from it of the countenance of England; and the balance was to be held 'not only between contending nations, but between conflicting principles,' giving the preponderance to neither, but aiding rather the liberal side." Stapleton, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 134-135.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³ *Ibid.* At the same time, however, a decree was issued by the Council of the Indies which showed the determination of this infatuated Monarch to replace the administration of the Colonies upon the same basis as they had existed before the Revolution of 1820.

memorialized Canning in a series of notes, which only succeeded in drawing from the British Foreign Minister a more definite statement of England's views with respect to all forms of international intervention.

It was not by perpetually creating occasions (Canning stated); it was not by incessant meddling with petty interests, and domestic squabbles in other countries, that the influence of Great Britain was to be maintained. On the contrary, it was more likely to be frittered away by such restless exertion, and to be found exhausted, or disabled from acting, when real occasion should arise.¹

His disgust with the principles of the European Confederation was summed up in a final scathing inquiry:

What was the influence which we had had in the Counsels of the Alliance? We protested at Laybach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste paper; our remonstrances mingled with the air.¹

Meanwhile, the Republics of South America, through the force of arms, were assuring for themselves the right to an independent choice of their own form of government, the end so ardently desired by the Liberals in both England and the United States.

Following the victories of Bolivar and Sucre, the former had been proclaimed dictator of a federation of republics, which included Peru, Venezuela and Greater Colombia. After the Battle of Ayacucho (December 8, 1824), the Spanish forces were shut up in the fortresses of Callao, which became the last remaining vestige of Spain's great Colonial Empire on the South American Continent. There could no longer be any question of controlling the destinies of the New World through policies of international action such as those pursued by the Emperor Alexander and Chateaubriand. The latter, indeed, now disappeared from the scene, unregretted even by the Ultra-Royalists.²

But the Washington Government was still ignorant of Polignac's declaration. The Monroe Cabinet were now earnestly considering to what lengths they were prepared to go in single opposition to the European System.³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

² In the future he employed his undoubted talents as a writer in a prolonged opposition to the Villèle Cabinet.

³ Russia was now isolated in her pretensions—and Russia, as Canning held, "could hardly act alone." With the fall of Cadiz, Monroe and Calhoun had believed that the Holy Alliance would restore South America to Spain. Only the sturdy Adams maintained his determined composure. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 50 *et seq.*

On November 19 (during an interview with Addington), Adams, while suggesting the difficulties that Great Britain might find in breaking her former close relations with her allies, declared that the United States would decline to attend any conference on South America, unless the new republics were also invited to be present. No Congress, he maintained, could give Europe a right "to stretch the arm of power across the Atlantic." In the strongest terms he reflected upon the pretensions of the "Congressional System": "The very atmosphere of such an assembly must be considered by this government as infected—and unfit for their plenipotentiary to breathe in." "The ground I wish to take," wrote Adams in his *Diary*, "is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European Powers by force in South America—but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe."

"As the Holy Alliance has come to edify and instruct us with their principles," he wrote in reference to Polética's Mission of Exhortation, "it is due in candor to them and in justice to ourselves to return the compliment."

It was Adams's temperate views that triumphed in the Cabinet and the final Presidential Message of December reflected his desires. Moreover, as subsequent events readily proved, this limited association with British policy was wholly satisfactory to the friends of the liberal cause in Parliament.¹ The Monroe Message of December 2, 1823, was chiefly directed against the principles of intervention by the Powers of Europe with respect to matters of purely American interest. In affirming their detachment from European affairs, Monroe and Adams also placed themselves in direct opposition to the system of World Congress which Alexander had sought to establish under the auspices of his League of Peace. The unanimity with which these gatherings of the Powers had avoided the thorny dangers of European policy—always complicated by particularistic interests—to join in comminatory notes and admonitions to the United States, had doubtless not escaped their attention. Moreover, a question of purely

¹"The question with regard to South America," said Mr. Brougham, "was now, he believed, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event had recently happened, than which no event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the Freemen of Europe; that event, which was decisive on the subject, was the language held with respect to Spanish America in the speech . . . of the President of the United States." Stapleton, vol. II, p. 46.

North American policy was still pending—the immediate cause of the “non-colonization clause” of the message.

The Tsar had shown no intention of invoking the fraternal bond of the Holy Alliance as against the territorial expansion of the United States in the northern continent of America. In spite of his attempts at Aix-la-Chapelle to annex a territorial guarantee to the program of the Powers, no attempt was ever made to coerce the Washington Cabinet by “concerted action” in the latter’s somewhat arbitrary treatment of the Florida question. But the objections which the young Republic addressed to the Continental Powers with respect to “extending their system” to South America or of “controlling the destinies” of that quarter of the globe was accompanied by a territorial declaration which at the time applied chiefly to their own northern Continent. This had immediately in view the Tsar’s famous *ukase* of 1821.¹

By the terms of this decree, which had been taken as foreshadowing a policy of Russian expansion on the North Pacific coast, the “pursuit of commerce, whaling and fishing was exclusively reserved to Russian subjects from the Behring Straits to 51° north latitude.” At the same time all foreign vessels were forbidden to approach “within less than one hundred Italian miles of the Russian settlements on that coast” under pain of confiscation.²

When Middleton, the American Minister, stated his objections to Speranski, Governor of Siberia, regarding these pretensions of the *ukase*, the latter did his best to reassure him with respect to the policy it indicated. The Tsar, he said, had abandoned his original intention to make of these northern waters a *mare clausum* out of respect to the United States. Middleton, who was without instructions, contented himself with somewhat sarcastically referring to the Papal Bulls of 1493 “dividing the oceans between Spain and Portugal.”³

Middleton soon observed, however, “that the conditions of the *ukase* were not insisted upon.” He also learned that “they were signed by the Emperor without examination,” and that “it was

¹ MS. Dispatches, *Russia*, 1822, contains a printed copy of the *ukase* forwarded in Middleton’s dispatch of January 9, 1822. Middleton reports the Tsar much occupied by his duties as the arbitrator between Great Britain and the United States in the question arising from Article I of the Treaty of Ghent.

² Bancroft, *History of the Pacific States*, vol. xxiii, pp. 348–351.

³ Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1822. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

possible that his signature had been surreptitiously obtained" by persons interested in the trade of the Northwest coast. In short, while Capo d'Istria maintained, "We will not revoke or retract," the American envoy was at the same time informed "that no orders have been issued in the sense that you fear."¹ There is every proof that the subsequent negotiations were marked by the Tsar's desire to retire with dignity from the position which he had assumed, and the principal importance of the entire incident turns on the important declaration of American policy which it provoked and the non-colonization clause of the Monroe Message.

The terms of the *ukase* had been communicated to the Secretary of State by Polética in February, 1822, and caused an immediate protest. When Monroe inquired why the boundary, as yet undefined by treaty, had thus been arbitrarily settled, the Russian Minister replied that 51° north latitude had been chosen as lying half way between the Russian settlement at Novo Archenglsk and the most northern American settlement at the mouth of the Columbia River. Mention was made of the matter in the Presidential Message of December, 1822, but it was not until the new Envoy Baron de Tuyll arrived in April, 1823, that the matter was resumed. Under instructions from the Tsar he asked that the American Minister in St. Petersburg be given power to negotiate a settlement. This was agreed to by Adams and resulted in instructions to Mr. Middleton being drawn up.

In July, 1823, de Tuyll was called to the State Department and told that the question had been altered by the determination of the United States Government to consider the whole territory of *both North and South America* "as closed in future to European colonization." Adams now based his case on the newly signed treaty with Spain which had ceded to the United States all the rights formerly held by that country up to the 41st degree of latitude north, upon the discoveries of Captain Grey and of the Lewis and Clarke Expedition, and doubtless upon Middleton's report of his negotiations in St. Petersburg.²

A large part of the territory affected by the *ukase* of 1821 was, pending a settlement of the boundary between Great Britain and the United States, held in common by these two countries. Their

¹ Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1822. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

² These negotiations were reported by Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, April 19, 1824. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

interest in curbing the Tsar's pretensions was thus a mutual one, and, until the enunciation of the "non-colonization" principle in the Monroe Message, seemed likely again to give to their policies a similar direction. On January 5, 1824, however, Rush had an important interview with Canning in London. The former told the American Minister "that he was still embarrassed in the preparation of his instructions to Sir Charles Bagot in consequence of the non-colonization principle laid down in the President's message."¹ He also asked Rush to allow the negotiations in St. Petersburg to progress separately and not conjointly, as previously proposed by the United States.¹ It now became the task of the American Minister to obtain support or at least toleration for "non-colonization" by enlisting the ready jealousies of the Powers. At a dinner at Prince Polignac's he expressed a hope that France would not intervene on such a principle as he had to meet the "known opposition of the whole British Cabinet." By such means the antipathies of the European Powers were stayed until the important principle became established by time.² Meanwhile, an amicable negotiation had settled the matter of the *ukase*. Middleton signed an agreement with Russia, fixing the boundary at 55° north latitude in April, 1824, four months after the bold stand taken in Monroe's Message.³

Having traced the evolution of the two cardinal principles of the foreign policy of the United States published to the world by the Monroe Message, i. e. the paragraph forbidding the powers of Europe to extend their system to the American Continent or to control the destinies of its inhabitants⁴ and the equally important warning concerning any future attempts at colonization,⁵ it now

¹ Rush, *Residence at the Court of London*, vol. II, p. 87.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³ McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. V, pp. 20-22.

⁴ "We owe it therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. II, p. 218.

⁵ "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers." *Ibid.*, p. 209.

becomes necessary to consider the corresponding *obligation* reaffirmed by the American Cabinet as part of this same declaration: the renewed engagement not to interfere in matters of purely European concern.¹

The sincerity of the intentions thus declared was to be tested almost immediately by the course of European events. The struggle carried on by the Greek insurgents had been followed with sympathetic interest in the United States. Monroe had been inclined to empower Rush to act in concert with the British Government to end the horrors of their situation and even wished to propose an appropriation for a Minister to Greece. In his Message of December 3, 1822, he had declared it natural that "the reappearance of those people in their original character, contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor which have been so signally displayed throughout the United States." At the same time he expressed a strong hope "that these people will recover their independence and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth."² Largely due to the influence of Adams, however, and his determination to avoid all interference on our part with Europe, the President's generous impulses were restrained. The Greeks were again noticed in the message of a year later, but the challenge it contained to Alexander's favorite internationalist policies had little or no application to the Grecian situation, and was indeed wholly ignored in St. Petersburg.³

The final settlement of the fate of these revolutionists was to offer the last occasion upon which the Tsar sought to apply the later formulas of his internationalism, and only concerns our study in this respect.

To Alexander—brooding over his own misunderstanding of the Turkish situation—the reports of Canning's able negotiations in the interest both of Great Britain and of the Grecian patriots

¹ "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers." Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. II, pp. 218-219.

² *Ibid.*, p. 193.

³ A curious example of the point to which the prejudice has developed in America against entanglement in European affairs is shown in a recent *Life of Clara Barton*, by William E. Barton. The author points out that the first refusal by the United States to join the International Red Cross was largely the result of the popular belief that such an act would be contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

came as a bitter disillusion. This able statesman, in whom he recognized the arch enemy of the "Holy Alliance," had now induced even the wily Metternich to serve his own aims. While Lord Byron led another expedition of volunteers in active military support of the Greeks, Canning skilfully held the balance between the sympathies of the Liberals and the time-honored British policy of maintaining the prestige of the Sublime Porte.

When, however, the French intervention in Spain had brought the Spanish War to a favorable conclusion, Alexander determined once more to appeal to his allies in support of his favorite policy of a "European intervention" to insure the pacification of Greece. With this end in view, he sought an interview with the Emperor of Austria at Czernowitz in October, 1823. Nesselrode was also sent to consult with Metternich, who was detained by illness at Lemberg.

These *pourparlers* resulted in a compromise. While Austria and England were allowed to continue their negotiations at Constantinople, it was agreed that the five great Powers should at the same time be invited to a series of conferences at St. Petersburg, where the Emperor of Russia would be afforded an opportunity to develop his views with respect to revolution. This gathering was but to reveal the growing weakness of the bonds uniting the Holy League.

The Tsar's last attempts to make a "European matter" of the Greek situation were resisted by Villèle, who retained the Presidency of the Council under the reactionary Charles X. He refused to risk any action that might cause a break in Anglo-French relations. Even the Court of Berlin, under the domination of Metternich ventured to withhold its assent to any plan for an intervention by the Powers.

The Austrian Ambassador again and again declared that his master would in no case join in "coercive measures." Finally, after six weeks of sterile debate, the Conference avoided the appearance of failure by issuing a protocol (dated April 7, 1825), which directly avoided reference to the principal matters at issue. The Sublime Porte was requested to accord "spontaneously" measures necessary to pacify the revolted provinces. In case of refusal, a "mediation" was to be proposed by each of the Powers *acting separately*, the latter phrase being a concession to England's views.

This complete breakdown of the principle of concerted action was highly resented by Alexander. The Emperor complained, in terms of reproachful bitterness, of the treatment which he had met with from his allies. At the same time he threw out hints that the Greek question was "not the only ground of difference" between Russia and Turkey; and that if Russian grievances had been for a time abandoned in favor of European interests, the failure of the conference to support the latter principle would be a reason for peremptorily insisting upon satisfaction regarding the other points of dispute.¹

For a time it looked as though, in spite of all Metternich's finesse, the Turko-Russian conflict feared by the Powers of Europe was about to break out. The Russian Cabinet renewed a diplomatic protest with respect to the whole series of its complaints against the Porte. In addition to these demands, the mobilization of Russian troops began along the River Pruth, the old route of invasion from Russia to Turkey. The Tsar, meanwhile, set out upon a journey toward the southern provinces, which in the eyes of Europe took on a dangerous significance.

At this time, however, the aspect of Grecian affairs underwent a sudden change. The Egyptian Army, which had energetically aided the Turkish forces in reducing the Greek insurgents of the Peloponnesus, suddenly suspended its victorious attack upon Nauplia. In the month of July they reembarked for Tripoli and Egypt. The explanation for such a merciful course of conduct could only be found in an English intervention. The fleets of Great Britain under Commodore Hamilton threatening the base of the Turkish Army had brought about results which the united protests of the Powers of the "Holy Alliance" had been unable to obtain. As a result of this respite, the Greek Government offered to Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg—the English candidate for the Grecian throne—the crown which the French Ministry had desired to confer upon a Bourbon prince.

Thanks to Canning's diplomacy and the might of Britain's

¹ Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. II, p. 436. Contemporary Liberal opinion held that this was a complete and unregretted defeat of the Tsar's principles. "The admission by one of the members of the Holy Alliance of that which this proposal implies, that there 'were interests which would justify nations in taking their own measures with regard to countries in a state of civil war,' was at once giving up one of the principles to which that Alliance had most pertinaciously adhered, and consequently was an acknowledgment that their principles (England having set them at defiance) were no longer tenable in practice." *Ibid.*, p. 437.

sea power, the Greek question seemed about to reach a settlement. Alexander (through Mme. de Lieven, wife of his Ambassador in London) sought a reconciliation with the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. But before undertaking the mediation that the Tsar now appeared willing to place solely in his hands, Canning demanded that the Russian Armies be withdrawn from the Pruth, and even threatened, if this were refused, to occupy the Morea and the Islands of the Grecian Archipelago.

But a dramatic turn of affairs was about to follow this final abdication by Alexander of his favorite principle of European intervention. On September 1, 1825, he had left St. Petersburg for the South. Failing health, not reasons of a military nature, was the cause of this journey. In a little town on the Asiatic borders of his vast Empire, the final act in the life drama of the Tsar-Idealist was about to be played. Far from the scenes of his triumphs and disappointments, the conqueror of Napoleon—the dreamer of a Holy Alliance which should unite the nations of the world in bonds of “Justice, Christian Charity and Peace”—was to end his full and eager life beneath the shadow of disappointment and failure.

Sensitive to the opinion of his contemporaries, the Tsar suffered acutely from the misunderstanding and suspicion that greeted every new effort to give practical effect to his international policies.¹ Nor could he hide from himself the fact that in Russia his popularity had fallen to the lowest ebb from his readiness to sacrifice national interests to the welfare of the doctrinaire ideal of European Federation.

A morbid detestation of revolution at home and abroad became the guiding principle of his policy. He seems to have regarded the growing danger of his own assassination with a certain fatalism—whether arising from an increasing mental lethargy or from a kind of heroic indifference, it is hard to say. But with respect to the repressive policy of the Holy Alliance he remained adamant. In July, 1825, but a few months before his death, he sermonized the French Minister at length upon the dangers of coming to any agreement with the insurgents of San Domingo.² “In the great struggle we are carrying on the issue is between good and evil—

¹ Rain, *Un Tsar idéalogue Alexandre I^{er}*, p. 425.

² Dispatches of the French Minister to the Foreign Office, quoted in Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhatlowitch, *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, vol. II, p. 530.

law against fact—order against license. The present unfortunate example is both risky and dangerous . . . The recognition of the independence of the United States led directly to the French Revolution.”¹

Yet now and again a bright ray of his old time liberalism came to lighten the abyss of obscurantism into which he was plunged. As the end approached he seems to have renewed the dreams and visions of his younger days. To Karamzine, the great historian, who urged upon him the fact that his “years are numbered” while Russia still awaited fulfillment of the promise of his earlier reign he replied: “I shall yet give my Empire her fundamental rights!”² A promise made under the shadow of death yet as vain as those which had preceded it! To all who surrounded him Alexander remained to the last the “impenetrable sphinx.”³

It became evident to his entourage that following the failure of his Grecian policy, the Tsar did not himself know what ends he wished to pursue. He seems to have feared the accusation of being under the influence of the liberal Canning as much as he dreaded reminders of his subservience to the reactionary Metternich. Much of this hesitancy was doubtless due to illness. That Alexander's physical condition was now serious had become evident to all who surrounded him. Recurrent attacks of erysipelas frequently confined him to his bed. Morbid suspicions preyed upon his mind.⁴

Moreover, the conviction was daily growing clearer to the Tsar that he was the center of a vast conspiracy aimed at his throne, and

¹ Nevertheless, Alexander remained to the end popular in the United States. Under date of July 2, 1825, Clay, acting in the name of the Cabinet, urged the intervention of the Tsar to bring about a cessation of hostilities between the King of Spain and the insurgents of Cuba and Porto Rico. Middleton in this connection wrote: “The proposition . . . has been communicated to the Allied Cabinets and I am of the opinion that the majority will agree.” Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1825. MS. Dispatches, *Russia*.

² Rain, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

³ Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhaïlowitch, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 309. “I do not believe,” wrote La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, “that it is possible to find anyone more convincingly frank and loyal in his conversation. One always leaves him under the impression that here, at last, is a Prince who unites to the qualities of a Christian knight all the attributes of a great sovereign. He also gives the impression of a man of intelligence and energy. Well! on the other hand, bitter experience and the whole story of his life teaches us that he can not be trusted.” Letter of May 19, 1823, La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, Archives of the French Foreign Office, quoted by Rain, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

⁴ He often asked the favorite Madame Narychkine—of whose fidelity he also had well founded reasons to doubt—“to tell him frankly whether his conduct was not a source of ridicule” to the courtiers of his entourage. He often talked of abdicating the throne with an earnestness that recalled his youthful days. Comtesse de Boigne, *Memoirs*, vol. III, pp. 156-157.

even at his life. The preparations for his eagerly anticipated journey to South Russia (July, 1825) were interrupted by definite reports of an alarming nature concerning the machinations of the "Sects," a Russian officer of English origin named Sherwood revealing to his master the plots of a revolutionary nature which afterwards became fully known through the trials of the Decembrists.

After a tiresome journey lasting for more than two weeks Alexander arrived at the little city of Taganrog near the shores of the Black Sea, where he was shortly afterwards joined by the Tsarina. Freed from the cumbersome etiquette of the court and the grinding military routine which disturbed his leisure at St. Petersburg, the Tsar appears to have rallied from his state of nervous depression. A renewed period of friendship—even of marital affection—reunited him to the much-tried Empress Elizabeth. But the nervous fever of activity which devoured him soon drove him forth upon another journey. Against the advice of his physician, he attempted a tour of inspection in the provinces of the Crimea. Returning to Taganrog on November 17, he immediately took to his bed with a burning fever.

In spite of his precarious condition, he refused the medicines of his physicians, Wylie and Stofregen. It became apparent to all that the will to survive his disillusion was lacking—and only his splendid physique rebelled at the final surrender. On the 27th a priest was sent for in haste to give him the last communion, of which he partook with touching piety and devotion. He died on December 1, 1825.¹

¹ In spite of the autopsy signed by five physicians, a strange tradition still current in Russia declares that the Tsar lived for many years after the date ascribed to his death. He is identified as the monk "Feodor Kousmitch," who lived as a hermit in the wilds of Siberia. In Russia, the author was assured of this fact by the son of an official, who pretended that his father had known the Tsar during this exile.

APPENDIX I

TERRITORIAL GUARANTEES AT THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1818¹

The result of the protocol of November 15—although expressing the benevolent intention of the Allied Powers, as well as those of the great Association of Europe—nevertheless leaves much to be desired. Another agreement more positive in its terms and more conservative in its principles will be needed in the future. The best means to obtain the ends desired would be the signing of a treaty to which the Powers signatory of the *Recess* of Vienna² and the subsequent Acts of Paris would adhere. This alone could mutually guarantee the integrity of their rights and the inviolability of their possessions as defined by the above-mentioned Recess and Treaty of Paris of the year 1815.

Such a guarantee of solidarity ought to be explicit and contain a definition of mutual obligations. His Imperial Majesty finds the basic principles—and a definition of the meaning and tenor of such a treaty—in the fraternal bond of September 14/26, 1815.³ A proof of the immutability of these principles is to be found in the imposing unanimity with which they were accepted by the governments of Europe.

If the Allied Powers share this view and judge it opportune and necessary to base their diplomatic acts and formulæ on the principles consecrated in the act mentioned (thereby ensuring to the alliance the guarantees of peace and security which are the fruit of this pact), the Emperor of Russia is ready to make any sacrifice to accomplish this result. His Minister is ordered to place himself in direct relation with the Allied Cabinets to discuss projects of a treaty along this line

To the above was annexed the following:

PROJECT OF TREATY

The transactions which have taken place among the Powers since the year 1814, and especially the measures taken at the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, have had as their guiding principle the desire to establish in Europe a system of durable peace founded on the basis of a territorial guarantee among the Powers. The courts of

¹MS. Treaty proposed by Alexander at Aix-la-Chapelle contained in a folio marked *Aix-la-Chapelle*, 1818, in Archives of Russian Foreign Office.

²The Final Act of Vienna.

³The Holy Alliance.

Austria, France, Holland, Prussia and Russia have judged it expedient, following the spirit of these general transactions, to make more definite declarations concerning their reciprocal relations. The following dispositions have, therefore, been taken:

RECIPROCAL GUARANTEES

1st. The conduct of the nations will be guided by a rule binding upon each and all; an engagement to remain within the present territorial limits fixed in Europe by the last treaties, and an intention not to attempt to expand these same, unless with the approval of the Alliance or in the case of voluntary agreements.

2d. They mutually guarantee the respective territories as fixed by these treaties and promise to make common cause against any state seeking to trouble the general peace. This clause shall become immediately effective.¹

3d. They agree to notify the Government of Great Britain of the above clause, inviting H. B. M.'s government to use its good offices to obtain the results desired if necessary without requiring its active co-operation or full adhesion (the latter, however, they will always be ready to receive).

4th. The German Confederation will be invited to form a part of the present system.

5th. In view of the fact that a too wide extension of the system of reciprocal guarantees mentioned above would only tend to weaken and render more difficult the attainment of the ends desired, the Powers agree not to make further similar propositions to the other powers.²

¹ Compare Article X of the Treaty of Versailles.

² There is no record that the principles embodied in the above interesting document—preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg—were ever formally debated by the delegates at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The not unnatural reluctance of all the Powers—with the exception of France and Russia—to add to the already complicated system of treaties uniting the Allies may have forestalled consideration of this earlier "territorial guarantee."

APPENDIX II

WORLD REVOLUTION AFTER THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: TROPPAU¹

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been directed to add to the annexed account of the Conference of Troppau certain explanations concerning the objects of the present reunion of the Allied Cabinets. The first aim of these deliberations has had for its object to save the world from the plague of revolutionary anarchy. A union of the great Powers delivered Europe from the military despotism which gave birth to the revolutions in France. Their independence attained, the nations disarmed, and each hoped to see its own population enjoying the blessings of a general peace under the auspices of the great agreement which had assured to the nations of Europe complete security, both within and without. New manifestations of solidarity have surrounded with fresh guarantees this happy state of affairs, and the nations appeared during several years to obtain a breathing spell following the long-drawn period of their misfortunes . . . Nevertheless, the revolutionary struggle had left its mark upon the whole of Europe—and in its trail more ideas perverted by the errors and calamities of the century. These latter theories arose in the midst of the events of the revolution, and, first raised to power by its fatal influence, dropped to obscurity through the ensuing peace. The sects have, therefore, neglected no means to prevent the progress of a durable pacification. No artifice has been spared to sow discord among the Allies. No effort has been overlooked in their desire to drag down the nations or thrones by provoking the people to revolt. This latter effort has been especially directed against the countries wherein revolution has long exercised its influence. In Spain, Naples and Portugal they were, unfortunately, successful. In turn overwhelmed, the downfall of these three states shows to the world the continued existence of that revolution from which it had thought itself forever free. Thus scarcely reconstructed, the edifice of Europe finds itself attacked at its very foundations: international law, religion and Christian morality. At a time when each of the governments is endeavoring to discover the real needs of its nationals and seek-

¹MS. Memoir dated November, 1820, from folio marked *Troppau*, 1820, in the Archives of the Russian Foreign Office.

ing to satisfy these aspirations by constructive measures, their pure intentions are suddenly paralyzed. If Europe had merely opposed silence to the enemy already triumphant throughout the territory of the two peninsulas, the results of the obligations contracted in 1814, 1815 and 1816 would have in turn been defeated. Isolated and without help, the states of Europe could only have compromised with the revolutionary despotism . . .

The revolutionaries attempted to persuade the people that absolute power is leagued against the rights of nationality. It was, therefore, essential to convince them that true sovereign power must prevent and punish crime and insurrection, and this only in order to ensure the enjoyment of the peaceful rights of its subjects. The enemies of government seek to represent the reunion of Troppau as dominated by the three Courts of Austria, Prussia and Russia. They maintain that the spirit of the Triple Alliance is opposed by another formed of the Constitutional states—England, France, Holland, Central Germany, Italy, Spain and the two Americas. It is, therefore, indispensable to demonstrate the contrary and to show them that at Troppau the great Powers in Europe were gathered to deliberate with respect to the stabilization of the European system. This was the fact that rendered necessary the reunion of the five Cabinets. The first problem to be considered was consequently the reconciliation of the respective views of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia so that the policy and system adopted by these Powers toward the revolutionary party should be identical. This was a difficult task, one rendered possible through energy inspired by love of the right.

Austria by its position is called upon to assist the Powers with its advice, and more actively, in Italy, where the situation is only assured by a partial treaty concluded with H. M. of Sicily. The Treaty of June 12, 1815, Austria contends, should, therefore, disappear. Acting as a mandatory of the European Powers, she should play the most important part in the great task of reconciling Naples, both to the King and to the laws of society. France still forms the center of sects, whose ambition it is to overthrow all monarchical government. She, therefore, can not be expected to cooperate successfully at the present time. Acting as a support to the general cause, she should hope for the

assistance of the Powers . . . Great Britain, now at the zenith of riches and civilization, appears for the moment to be engulfed by her own prosperity. The proof of this is to be found in the domestic troubles which menace the Royal family, its August Chief and its most zealous servants. Under these circumstances, the government can not be counted among the number of active members of the European Alliance, and should be happy to keep its rank as an Allied court. It can best aid by not holding forth false hopes to the authors of the great catastrophe. Prussia, fully occupied by internal relations to the federal states of Germany and by new relations with Austria, has not been able to consider in advance the difficult questions confronting the united Cabinets. To Russia alone, therefore, thanks to its strong position, this duty appears in harmony with the engagements already taken, etc.

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